3. Theodicy in the Reformation and Leibniz. In the
theological conflicts of the Reformation another critical
reaction to the Augustinian theodicy developed. Both
Luther and Calvin followed Augustine's doctrine that
all evils follow from the sin and fall of man. But Luther
in particular, in the tradition of voluntarism, stressing
faith as independent of reason, repudiated the entire
conception of a philosophical theodicy on fideistic
grounds. Not God is to be justified, but man. To raise
the speculative question of a theodicy merely reveals
the entire sinful condition of man. Only faith has the
assurance that God will use the evil of the world for
his own ends. Faith exceeds our present understanding
as does the justice of God in accepting sinners.
This skepticism of the intellect, which shifts the
problem of theodicy from philosophy to revelation and
faith, is, of course, as old as Job, and has continued
until now, in the Neo-Orthodoxy of our times (Karl
Barth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, Munich [1932], Vol. 3,
Parts 1-3). But theological controversy made inevitable
a revival of metaphysics and natural theology, particu-
larly the Neo-Platonic view that evil becomes mean-
ingful in the larger and higher context of the purpose
of creation. Nicholas of Cusa argued that since all
creation is an image of the divine, the world is as good
as it possibly could be, given its status as contingent
and finite (De ludo globi, I). In the argument for the
goodness of the world, teleological or “physico-
theological” arguments eventually assume a priority
over the other traditional forms, so that by the seven-
teenth century nature has been freed from the curse
of Adam, and its newly discovered mathematical and
organic harmonies appear as empirical evidence for
the justice of God. The preoccupation of the early
Boyle Lectures with teleological considerations marks
a high point of this development.
The defense of God against the attacks of atheists
and “libertines” was a prominent concern of thinkers
of the seventeenth century, and the problem of man's
freedom in its relation to God's omniscience and power
became an important issue in the theodicic argument.
In his apologetic work, left incomplete as the Pensées,
Pascal attributed evil to man's sin, to be overcome by
the redeemed in mystical revelation through faith.
Spinoza, by contrast, had exonerated God from both
good and evil, these being relative to what is useful
or harmful to man, and capable of being understood
through an adequate grasp of God and the active
emotions which arise from this.
Like Spinoza, Leibniz had a sharp sense of the reality
of the problem of evil, particularly the historical evils
which beset Europe. The task of theodicy was therefore
to show that the reality of evil is compatible with,
indeed, follows from, the creation and providence of
a God whose attributes are perfections. In addition to
the great
Theodicy of 1710, he wrote many briefer
ones, including “Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit
Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” (“Of the
Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Free-
dom of Man”); from the early Paris years the
Confessio
philosophi (“Confession of a Philosopher,” edited by
I. Jagodinski, Kazan [1915]); the
Discours de la méta-
physique (“Discourse on Metaphysics,” 1686), espe-
cially section 30 (Wiener, pp. 331-34); and the
Causa
Die, already mentioned. To the
Theodicy, written
discursively for a wide circle of readers, he added as
an appendix, an “Abridgment of the Argument Re-
duced to Syllogistic Form” (the
Abrégé, Gerhardt VI,
376-87; trans. Wiener, pp. 509-22), which set the
arguments against God in twelve syllogisms, and
refuted them in counter-syllogisms—a logical process
which Hume and Kant adopted in their refutations.
Leibniz repeated, in general, the Augustinian-
Thomistic arguments, with some adaptations to fit his
analytic logic of propositions, his monadic theory of
substance, and a quasi-mathematical conception of the
principle that of all possible events, the best possible
always occurs. His analysis is aided by clear definitions
of justice (as the love of the wise man), of freedom
as self-determination, and of will, anticipatory and
consequent. As Thomas had done before him, he
discusses three kinds of evil: metaphysical, moral, and
natural. Metaphysical evil is essentially finiteness or
privation in the law of individual natures. Moral evil
or sin is real; it is based on unclear and inadequate
knowledge; and God, who determined the law of each
individual nature as the best possible in itself and in
the harmony of the whole universe, is not responsible
for it. Natural evil is determined by laws which also
define the best possible consequences. Thus in every
case evil must be judged teleologically in terms of the
best possible whole. God is justified because evils are
used to achieve greater goods than would otherwise
be possible; evil historical events are processes of
retrenchment and of the clearing of obstacles for a
better future (reculer pour mieux sauter); on the same
grounds suffering is justified as retribution for evil
actions. The indestructibility of the monads is the
assurance of an immortality in which the greatest
harmony and justice will continue to be achieved. Since
truths of fact lie beyond the range of any finite analysis,
we cannot now completely comprehend the place of
any event in the total harmony.
