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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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The Science of Human Nature and the Science of
Legislation.
Continental thinkers like to take as the
starting-point of modern thought man's three “humili-
ations,” namely, the recognition that the earth is not
the center of the universe; that man, rather than being


092

created in the divine image, is a creature of nature
like the other animals; and that his reason is subject
to the passions and subconscious urges. In the view
of the Enlightenment these “humiliations” appear as
intellectual conquests which spell out man's peculiar
responsibilities: these are the scientific discovery of
truths, the realization of individual happiness in a
viable society, and the exploration of the conditions
and limits of liberty. In place of a static conception
of a divine, immutable order a new sociological per-
spective takes over; society and culture are regarded
as products of history, i.e., of man's free and creative
will, and as subject to change. The existence of man
in society, what he is, and what he can do, become
the basic questions to be explored. “Instead of follow-
ing the high a priori road [of metaphysical enquiry],
would it not be better humbly to investigate the de-
sires, fears, passions and opinions of the human being,
and to discover from them what means an able legis-
lator can employ to connect the private happiness of
each individual with the observance of those laws
which secure the well-being of the whole?” (Gibbon,
“Abstract of Blackstone's Commentaries,” quoted by
William Holdsworth, A History of English Law,
London [1938], XII, 753).

The Encyclopédie views man as “a feeling, deliber-
ating, thinking being who walks freely the surface of
the world... the first... among all other animals,
who lives in society, has invented sciences and arts,
has a goodness and malevolence quite his own, has
given himself masters, has made laws for himself...
to know him in all his qualities one must know him
in his passion” (article “Homme”). Man is the product
of nature and of history, as Hume points out in his
epoch-making Treatise of Human Nature (1739);
“There is a general course of nature in human actions
... There are also characters peculiar to different
nations and particular persons, as well as common to
mankind... the different stations of life influence the
whole fabric, external and internal.... Man cannot
live without society, and cannot be associated without
government... [whose] actions and objects cause such
a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an
uniformity in human life” (Book II, Part III, Sec. I).

The course of nature, individual and national char-
acter, the inequality of classes, man's sociability, uni-
formity amidst variety—these notions of the science
of human nature enter into the modern social sciences
as basic propositions. It is necessary to know man's
natural propensities and his historical achievements.
They teach, however, that “man may mistake the
objects of his pursuit; he may misapply his industry,
and misplace his improvements.... [Therefore] it is
of more importance to know the condition to which
we ourselves should aspire than that which our ances-
tors may be supposed to have left” (Adam Ferguson,
An Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767], Part
I, Sec. I). It is not enough to ask what man is and what
he can do. The answers to these questions supply the
raw material for the crucial enterprise of giving direc-
tion to human activity or at least preventing it from
self-destruction. Within the limits set by nature and
history there is a dichotomy between what is and what
ought to be. Men “cannot change their natures. All
that they can do is to change their situation” (Hume,
Treatise, Book III [1740], Part II, Sec. VII).

The ought of the Enlightenment is therefore not an
appeal so much to the individual, the product of nature
and history, as to the advisors of the legislator who
can change the environment in which men and nations
live. Thus Adam Smith defines “political economy...
as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator”
(Book IV, Introduction), who must have the welfare
of both the individual and society in mind, must bal-
ance and protect the concerns of various groups of
people and of various localities with a view to
adjudicating what the state should take upon itself and
what it should leave to individual initiative. If the
article “Homme” in the Encyclopédie had dealt with
facts of nature and history, that on “Société” establishes
the general principle of social action: “The rationale
of human society is based upon this general and simple
principle: I want to be happy; but I live with men
who, like myself, want to be happy as well, each
according to his own light: let us then search for the
means of procuring our happiness by procuring theirs,
or at least without ever harming it.” The balanced
emphasis on both man and society preserved Enlight-
enment thought from the extremes of nineteenth-
century individualism and holism.