4. Sources and Content of the Idea of Justice. The
idea of justice thus seems to have been a part of the
Western, if not the civilized, world's heritage since its
pagan inception. It has been, however, the ascertain-
ment of the course and the analysis of the very meaning
of the idea which, as we have seen, have simultaneously
been the desideratum and the bête noire of philoso-
phers, lawmakers, and others. These individuals have
proposed a variety of sources, as distinguished from
the content, of the idea of justice, and both source and
content may be separately recapitulated even though
interacting and necessarily determining each other to
some undisclosed extent.
The source of the idea of justice has been sought
by many philosophers. Some of these have already been
mentioned, e.g., the Platonic idea or ethical “pattern
of it” which “is laid” in “heaven... which he who
desires may behold.” The somewhat theocratic
(Augustinian) aspect follows in this vein, and also the
logically extended divine reason, although in contrast
with the impersonal Stoics' absolute reason. There is
an ambivalence in the view that utility is the only fount
of (legal) justice and its only basis, or that the basis
lies in the concept of reciprocity which leads into a
contract theory between God and man (the Hebraic
approach) or among men (with king or state, as in
Locke or with other men, as in the Mayflower Com-
pact). Man himself and his legal needs provide another
source, with respect to the governance of his actions
and relations, avoiding injustice, and otherwise resolv-
ing disputes. So, too, the source may be found in his-
tory, custom, or the spirit of the people (Volksgeist),
as in Maine, Savigny, or Herder; or, as Cicero put it,
“the origin of Justice is to be found in Law” (De
legibus, I. vi, 19), or even, as A. Brecht suggests,
“Sometimes a voice within us claims to know” what
is just and unjust. Brecht also lists twelve types of views
of justice which he examines and then concludes, “One
who changes from one conviction [source] to another
will thenceforth have a different idea of justice.”
The choice of one or more of these sources of the
idea of justice is not required of the individual. Hera-
clitus, for one, would not approve, and Aristotle, for
another, would insist upon distinctions, that is, should
an economic, political, or other factor influence the
source most closely approximating it; but if one's in-
terests determine the choice, this permits the basis for
the choice itself to return to the enumerated sources
themselves, and now this circular reasoning requires
another Alexander to cut the apocryphal knot. Aris-
totle's view of man as a social-political animal permits
a multiplicity and combination of choices to be made,
for modern pluralism stresses the variety of man's
interests, associations, and not only social solidarity
(Duguit) but even individualism (Laski), while Protag-
orean humanism and some correlative forms of pragma-
tism permit freedoms in choices almost without stint.
The very many elements which enter into the defini-
tion or content of the idea of justice cannot, of course,
be systematically classified through an arbitrary ar-
rangement of the components, for this presupposes the
possibility of discrete, analytical distinctions, nor can
it or they be subjected to content analysis. Any such
effort can only disclose what the term “justice” vari-
ously connotes rather than what the content of the idea
of justice itself contains. The content of the idea may,
nevertheless, be understood, if not defined, by both
positive and negative characteristics, and also by means
of illustrations; the terms, however, vary with different
thinkers' usages, as when Cairns refers to Plato's view
of justice as “doing one's own business and not being
a busybody,” or as M. R. Cohen sums up Plato “...
as saying that justice is the health of the body politic”
(Reason and Law, Glencoe, Ill. [1950], p. 92), or when
M. Radin refers to social, spiritual, etc., aspects of life
and concludes that “out of these factors there has been
created a social emotion which we call a sense of
justice” (“The Chancellor's Foot,”
Harvard Law Re-
view, 49 [1935], 48).
The following characteristics which permit justice
broad latitude therefore merely indicate, and are not
exhaustive of, the meanings of the idea. Foremost is
the principle that the like be treated alike (equality,
impartiality, to each his own due), and other versions
of the idea refer to: harmony (ethics, morality); right-
eousness (equity, fairness); reason (man, divine, reli-
gion); reciprocity (contract, eye-for-eye); utility
(pleasure, pain); custom (group, tribe, polis); man, his
interests and needs, especially of order, and see also
Leibniz' mature definition of justice as caritas sapientis,
the charity of the wise man which, R. J. Mulvaney
believes, “is without verbal antecedent... in the
entire history of Western moral philosophy” (Journal
of the History of Ideas, 29 [1968], p. 53).
The idea of justice can also be understood by means
of historically concrete illustrations, e.g., in the bases
used for making judicial decisions, or in the political
treatment of minorities which is allegedly the mark
of a civilized society. So also it may be understood
in a negative aspect, e.g., as in diplomatic practice or
in international claims procedures which use the phrase
“denial of justice” to indicate a departure from some
sort of international standard. This negative approach,
however, is better disclosed where treatment based
upon color, national origin, etc., is labeled as unjust,
e.g., the “slaughter by command” of millions during
World War II which resulted in Nuremberg's condem-
nation of such unquestioning obedience (although
compare this type of obedience with the concept of
nomos applied at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. where
Leonidas and the Spartans voluntarily met their death;
so did Socrates in 399 B.C.). This slaughter by command
illustrates an unjust act or conduct, i.e., that injustice
flows from certain facts; there are, of course, other
variations of this negative terminology. This sense of
injustice in effect creates a series of negative criteria
which, by contrast, reveal the positive content of the
idea of Justice more clearly.
