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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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Justice has been conceived historically in two sepa-
rate ways: as a supramundane eternal idea which is
independent of man, and as a temporal man-made
social ideal. The two meanings illustrate the difference
between contemplation and action, philosophical re-
flection and practical conduct. Our discussion will,
however, include a middle ground in which theory and
practice are intermingled.

We shall, accordingly, be concerned with: (1) an idea
or tradition of justice conceived to exist apart from
man and stemming from a higher source, although man
seeks to know its nature and draw inspiration from it
in his actions; (2) a conception completely dependent
upon man in its inception and practice; and (3) an
intermediate ground partaking of each of the preceding
two conceptions in various intermingled forms.

While each of these conceptions may be discerned
in the writings of ancient and modern authors, it is
in the middle ground where the tradition of justice
appears currently in the forms of man's faiths, ethical
beliefs, social institutions, and in those of his actions
which reflect this dual nature of justice.