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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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Etymologically the Greek word “Idea” is related to
the verbs “to see” and “to know,” and it is not fanciful
to conclude that its primitive denotation was “that
which is seen” or “that which is known.” So in modern
English one says, “I see what you mean,” when “I see”
is equivalent to “I understand.” Thus Pindar (Olympi-
ans
10, 123) could write of a beautiful idea and mean
by it a beautiful sight or form without any implication
that knowledge in the derivative sense of the word is
involved.

The notion that ideas can be apprehended by a kind
of vision or intuition, by looking and seeing them, has
never been lost in Occidental philosophy, for knowing
as a kind of insight, illumination, revelation, has almost
always been retained. The clearest example of this is
the belief that knowledge is of two sorts: one immedi-
ate, sensory, direct grasping of that which is known,
and the other mediated, “intellectual,” inferential.
These two sorts have sometimes been correlated re-
spectively with the Latin cognoscere and scire, the
French connaître and savoir, and the German kennen
and wissen. In English both members of the pairs have
to be translated by the one verb, “to know.” One knows
one's friends and one knows geometry, though the two
experiences are very dissimilar.