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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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11. In the Imperial period the connection of freedom
of speech with political freedom became generally
recognized, for obvious reasons. Paradoxically, Tiberius
was one of the first to say so (Suetonius, Tiberius 28).
Limitation of political discussion even in the Senate
and the disappearance of contiones before the formal
assemblies (followed by the de facto disappearance of
the assemblies themselves), political trials, constant
intimidation, and eventually elimination of potential
rivals left the members of the Roman Empire in no
doubt as to the repressive character of the regime
established by Augustus. The burning of books and
desultory persecution of philosophers (especially under
Vespasian and Domitian) more particularly affected the
intellectuals. Restrictions in the practice of astrology
(Dio Cassius, 56, 25, 5) and frequent expulsions of
astrologers from Rome underlined the danger of any
enquiry about the future of the government of the
Empire. Noises in the circus remained the only im-
pressive (and occasionally effective) form of verbal
protest in the Roman Empire. Widespread servility
made sensitive people aware that adulation was a
characteristic vice of Imperial society—a vice dis-
astrous for the moral fibre of men. In the first century
and in the early part of the second, both Roman and
Greek writers expressed profound disgust with adula-
tion (Phaedrus, Persius, Quintilian, Juvenal, on the
Roman side; Philo, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, and
Epictetus, on the Greek side). Tacitus, though not
without contradictions, gave this feeling its classical
expression. His Annals are a study in the moral degen-


262

eration resulting from the lack of freedom of speech.
His Dialogue on the Orators examines the relation
between decay in eloquence and decline of political
liberty.

After the first decades of the second century freedom
of speech ceased to be an important issue. It was
replaced by the issue of religious toleration raised by
the spread of Christianity. As far as we are aware,
nobody presented the case for or against Christianity
as a question involving the principle of freedom of
speech. There is, however, a Christian development
of the idea of freedom of speech which deserves our
attention and may bring our story to a conclusion.

parrhesia was one of those words—like ecclesia,
intercessio, suffragium
—which the Christian Church
took over from Greek and Latin political language and
endowed with a new meaning. The Christians were
preceded by the Jews in this reinterpretation. The
isolated expression of Isocrates' Busiris 40, “liberties
towards the gods,” was rediscovered and given a posi-
tive meaning by Jewish writers such as the Septuagint
translators, Philo and Josephus. The Septuagint used
parrhesia to translate different Hebrew expressions
(Leviticus 26:13; Proverbs 1:20, Psalms 93:1, etc.), one
of which indicated God's power. parrhesia became the
right and the privilege of the believer; already in Philo
(De specialibus legibus I, 203) and later in the Testa-
ment of the XII Patriarchs
(Reuben 4, 2) it is connected
with the notion of syneidesis, conscience (cf. also
Josephus, Antiquitates iudaicae 2, 52). In the New
Testament, parrhesia “in the name of Jesus” is the
consequence of conversion. The word occurs most
frequently in the Fourth Gospel, in Acts and in Saint
Paul. It is the sign of the new hope (II Corinthians
3:12). The believer can speak not only in the name
of Jesus, but also to Jesus. He has parrhesia towards
God. Saint John Chrysostom makes it clear that a
catechumen does not enjoy this right (Homilies 2, 5,
ed. Gaume, X, 506). More particularly, parrhesia be-
comes the right and the privilege of the martyr and
of the saint. These have purchased liberty by martyr-
dom and sanctification, and have a special right to
speak to God. They can therefore help other people
by speaking to God on their behalf. The Life of Saint
Anthony by Athanasius is a conspicuous document
testifying to this conception which was to affect the
whole outlook of the Middle Ages. On the other hand
parrhesia is used in monastic texts (for instance, the
Apophthegmata patrum) to indicate pride and excessive
attachment to this world.

We have come a long way from the political
parrhesia of which the Athenians were proud, but the
new parrhesia of the Christian martyr and saint con-
tributes to the notion of freedom of conscience. Faith
and suffering give a right to speak out—even to God.