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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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9. At this point we may pause. isegoria implied
equality of freedom of speech, but did not necessarily
imply the right to say everything. On the other hand,
parrhesia looks like a word invented by a vigorous man
for whom democratic life meant freedom from tradi-
tional inhibitions of speech. We doubt whether the
word parrhesia pleased Cleon, but it must have pleased
Euripides and certainly pleased Demosthenes. We are
not surprised that Plato disliked it (Republic 557e)
except when it was granted as a privilege to the wise
counsellor (Laws 694b; Laches 188e). We shall never
know about Pericles. The two words parrhesia and
isegoria point to the conflict between democracy as
liberty and democracy as equality that was to concern
later political thinkers.

After the fourth century B.C. isegoria remained a
very respectable though not a very common word. It
was used by people with a philosophic education, both
in the political and in the nonpolitical sense. Polybius
used it alone or together with parrhesia (never
parrhesia on its own: 2, 38, 6; 2, 42, 3). He used isegoria
to describe the state of affairs prevailing in the Achaean
League. In this league every member was entitled to
speak in the assemblies, though in fact the league was
ruled by an oligarchy. Soon afterwards, with the Romans
ruling the world, there was little freedom of speech
left for Greek political assemblies. Philodemus the
Epicurean used isegoria in connection with the good
king, and Philo considered isegoria to be the quality
of the serious man. Marcus Aurelius (I, 14) was grateful
to one of his teachers for having introduced him to
the idea of isegoria in politics: it is difficult to imagine
what he really meant.

The career of parrhesia was more brilliant, because
it was not as connected with political institutions.
parrhesia became a philosopher's virtue. In the
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle included it among the
characteristics of the “magnanimous” man (1124b
28-30) and of the good comrade (1165a 9). Diogenes
the Cynic made parrhesia his watchword (Diog. Laërt.,
VI, 69). His choice may have discouraged other philos-
ophers from talking about parrhesia. As a matter of
fact, neither Zeno nor Epicurus seem to have made
extensive use of the word. But later Epicureans came
to like parrhesia as a quality of friendship. Philodemus
wrote a book on parrhesia, and Horace may have got
from him or other Epicureans his incorrupta fides
nudaque veritas
(parrhesia) of the ideal friend (Horace,
Carmen, I, 24). Plutarch defined parrhesia as the voice
of friendship (Moralia 51C). The Cynic Demonax
condemned religious mysteries as secretive, and there-
fore contrary to parrhesia (Lucian, Demonax 11). Many
texts teach us that parrhesia signified a courageous
behavior towards tyrants and emperors. It was not a
revival of the republican or democratic meaning of
parrhesia, but rather the reaction of philosophically
educated men to the flattery and moral degradation
inherent in tyranny. The meaning attributed to libertas
(or even licentia) by some Roman writers, including
Tacitus, was certainly influenced by the use of
parrhesia.