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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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1. The terminology, theory, and practice of freedom
of speech in the modern Anglo-Saxon world is geneti-
cally connected with Greek and Latin ideas and institu-
tions. It is therefore not very difficult to recognize in
the Greek and Roman world the words, ideologies, and
institutions which can legitimately be studied as the
classical counterpart of the modern notion of freedom
of speech. But the evidence of the classical world
presents serious difficulties to the interpreter insofar
as it is unevenly distributed, and relates to social and
political conditions which are seldom well known. Our
main evidence for Greece is confined to Athens from
the fifth century B.C. onwards; we know very little
about other Greek city-states. The evidence about
Rome begins to be entirely reliable only in the second
century B.C. This means that for both Greece and Rome
the important archaic period, in which institutions and
ideas were shaped, is insufficiently known. Even so,
one is bound to recognize that much more could be
done with the extant evidence if it were properly
collected, sifted, and interpreted according to modern
methods of social research. The present sketch can only
offer a provisional and small map of largely unexplored
territory.

The discovery and interpretation of data relating to
freedom of speech in the great ancient civilizations
of the Near East (Egypt, Mesopotamia, Hittite King-
dom, Persia, Phoenicia, Judea) present far more serious
problems because—with the partial exception of the
biblical texts—genetical connections with modern
ideas and institutions are not apparent. It is even
arguable that the whole political and social structure
makes it difficult to isolate the very notion of freedom
of speech from other political and religious notions.
The only field in which analogy of institutions makes
comparison easier with the modern world is that of
political assemblies.

One general remark may be added. The modern
notion of freedom of speech is assumed to include the
right of speech in the governing bodies and the right
to petition them, the right to relate and publish debates
of these bodies, freedom of public meeting, freedom
of correspondence, of teaching, of worship, of publish-
ing newspapers and books. Correspondingly, abuse of
freedom of speech includes libel, slander, obscenity,
blasphemy, sedition. In the classical world all these
aspects appear to be present, including a sort of jour-
nalism at the end of the Roman Republic and at the
beginning of the Empire. However, certain aspects
such as the right of petition never became seriously
controversial. Others, such as freedom of teaching,
surprisingly enough, were issues only for comparatively
brief periods. Furthermore, religious freedom was so
clearly subordinated to the notion of impiety and later
of heresy as to require special treatment.