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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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CONCLUSION

Nobody today believes in an objective natural law
inscribed in the nature of things which, if it were
transcribed, would suffice to yield a positive law. But
there are very few people today who admit the con-
ception of positive law as a law arbitrarily imposed
by a legally recognized legislative power.

Though it is true, in any case, that law is a human
product, it is not true that it can be arbitrarily imposed
without consideration for the social function which it
must fill. Beyond what Professor Lon Fuller calls the
“inner morality of law,” which consists of a set of rules
that are related to what the Americans call “due proc-
ess,” there is room to consider, in the elaboration and
application of the law, the so-called “nature of things,”
although this “nature of things,” cannot by itself pre-
scribe precise rules of law.

Let us take the example of a piece of legislation
which for the first time authorizes the legislator to
arrange with the greatest liberty a traffic code; no
general principle of law, no rule of justice in this
domain limits his legislative power. Let us suppose he
announces the rule that every vehicle must be driven
on the right side of the road, in the direction it is
moving. In principle, there is no opposition to this
regulation. However, the nature of things intervenes
in the form of a mountainous road where two vehicles
cannot cross at any point, and when a permanent one-
way road cannot be established, it goes without saying
that the local administration, or the judge in its ab-
sence, will have to define the conditions for utilization
of this road, taking account of the location of the places
and the needs of the community. Here, priority would
be given, either to a certain type of vehicle; whether
it were ascending or descending; or temporary or al-
ternative one-way roads or a completely different
solution, compatible with the technical condition and
with the most rational possible utilization of the exist-
ing road, would be organized. But it would not occur
to anybody to claim that the adopted regulation could
be considered completely arbitrary.

A similar problem appears where “the nature of
things” is not of a purely technical matter, but institu-
tional or moral. Given what is considered marriage in
our society, with the relationships between husband
and wife, between parents and their children, what
should the judge do in the present state of legislation,
if in a family that has an infant child, one of the
parents, for example, the father, changes his sex? The
“nature of things” will oblige the judge not to refer
to a predetermined solution, but to find a solution
compatible with the family relationships and with the
interests of all those who are involved in this unusual
situation.

That which has traditionally been qualified as “natu-
ral law” presents a collection of limitations of every
sort left to the discretion of the legislator, of the ad-
ministrator or of the judge, by drawing their attention
to a collection of exigencies which they must respect
in order that the law may fulfill its avowed function.
If the legislator, who acts in a general manner, does
not fulfill this task, the administration or the judicial
power will take charge. If that is not possible for them,
for any reason, the social discontent which would re-
sult, depending on its intensity and extent, may lead
to an opposition to power, to a reversal of the majority,
or even to a reversal of the system.

Indeed, it is only to the degree to which those who
have the authority to legislate, to govern, or to judge,
fulfill their mission in a manner that does not displease
the governed too much, that their authority will suffice
to maintain, without too much effort, obedience to the
law. But, if we admit that this obedience is the func-
tion, not only of brute force, but also of the respect
which the system and its directors inspire, we come
to the conclusion that any realistic study of law cannot
neglect this aspect of the adaptation of juridical solu-
tions to social exigencies, permanent or lasting, which
is historically summed up in the idea of natural law
or natural rights.