V. SCHILLER
The most important theory in the entire history of
this topic is found in
the aesthetic writings of Friedrich
Schiller. It is odd but worthy of note
that the signifi-
cance of his contribution
has been seriously underes-
timated both
by students of Schiller and of play theory.
His originality in the matter,
despite the obvious debts
to Kant and to Rousseau's educational theories,
to say
nothing of those of Lessing and Herder, lies in the
breadth of
the metaphysical claims he makes on behalf
of the aesthetic, and in his
modifications of the Kantian
position.
The most important of these are: (1) in the absence
of access to the
“thing-in-itself,” metaphysical pre-
suppositions are in principle
unverifiable—hence man
is free to construct explanatory schemes
of various
kinds to render his experience comprehensible to him-
self; (2) such schemes in the first place
reflect typologi-
cal differences of
temperament (Naive and Sentimental
Poetry—hereafter NS—176) in which particular
“modes of perception” (Empfindungsweisen) result in
diverse accounts of reality, each
compatible with facts
and logic though incompatible with each
other—two
such types are the “realist” and
the “idealist,” each
of whom is persuaded by his
idiosyncratic perspective
that the other is wrong, but in view of (1)
above, both
are wrong; (3) thus, instead of the uniform human
nature
presupposed by Kant as the foundation of “ob-
jective” knowledge, Schiller's postulation of
two
human natures accounts for the insolubility of meta-
physical, ethical, and political questions and for
the
dogmatic assertion by each type of the truth of its own
position
at the expense of the other; (4) a crucial aspect
of Schiller's account of
human nature follows from the
importance of form and content in Kant. These
are
seen by Schiller as distinctive features of human modes
of
experience in terms of impulses (Triebe). The form
impulse is seen as the tendency of the human mind
to structure experience
in particular ways and is con-
nected with
predominantly rationalist explanations of
the world (the idealist
position), while the material
impulse (Stofftrieb)
supposes its explanations to be
given along with concrete facts (the
realist position).
A third principle, the play impulse (Spieltrieb) is ad-
vanced as
mediating between these two. (Two paren-
thetical observations: (a) these Triebe are not to
be
confused with the impulses or drives of more recent
psychologies,
though many commentators have mis-
takenly
praised Schiller for anticipating Freud, while
others have denounced him
for not being enough of
a Freudian; the impulses are rather
“dispositions,”
tendencies to think and act in
characteristic ways; (b)
it is typical of Schiller's dialectical method to
find a
third principle to mediate between and reconcile the
differences between polar opposites); (5) the divergen-
cies of perspective do not arise at the level of
fact
or logic, but in disputed interpretations of facts them-
selves not in dispute.
From these divergencies from Kant, Schiller adum-
brates, but does not fully develop, a remarkable theory.
Schiller has often been called the poet of freedom; in
his Aesthetic Letters this is manifested by his search
for a means to liberate man from the coercion of
industrialized society,
and in NS from the compulsion
of genetic endowment, environment, and tempera-
ment. On the
Sublime seeks to overcome the ultimate
compulsion, that of a fixed
unalterable reality (whether
conceived of as Nature, Fate, or the laws of
physics).
The concepts of reality produced by the theologian,
the
historian, the scientist, or the metaphysician are
all simply an illusion
or appearance (Schein); they are
inventions, not
discoveries about the world. Nonethe-
less
they are all too frequently mistaken for ultimate
truths, and this in turn
leads to the dogmatism and
even fanaticism that appear justified by
premature
ontological commitment to their truth.
Only the artist is free of illusions about his illusions;
in his creations
no claim to reality is made. Rather
he plays with
the appearances he constructs; what he
proposes is without ontological
commitment, it is a
game operating within self-imposed rules, as well
as
within the limiting conditions of fact and logic. It is
contemplative and detached as befits aesthetic crea-
tion; but it is also carried out for its own sake as befits
a
game. (Schiller also makes use of the role of play
as preparation for
“serious” activity, and of re-creation
following the
tensions of labor, but neither of these
is central.) The Kantian notions of
heuristic devices
are thus brought a stage further. The aesthetic
attitude
becomes the paradigm of all human perspectives on
the world.
Schiller sharply attacks the philosopher who
dogmatically insists on all
the details of an elaborate
system erected on metaphysical assumptions
whose
origin and validity have never been investigated:
“The
philosopher is a caricature compared with the
poet.”
Schiller is well aware of the dangers of such a posi-
tion and is at pains to forestall criticisms of solipsism
and
aestheticism, to say nothing of self-indulgent
daydreaming and triviality.
By his insistence on the
Kantian foundations of objective knowledge, the
facts
are, as it were, stipulated by all parties, so that the
Kantian
notion of “objective,” or at least
“universally
subjective” knowledge is
preserved—nothing is the
case simply because someone says so.
Nor is a retreat
into fantasy permissible, for this too belies the
facts.
Instead, much the way the hero in tragedy preserves
his dignity intact amid physical defeat, so the aesthetic
attitude permits moral superiority to the facts, not
empirical
subordination to them. Nor will the charge
of triviality stand, for, as
Schiller puts it, “Man is never
so serious as when he
plays.” A quite extraordinary
demand is being made here: at the
metaphysical level
it is that we somehow resolve the problem how to
maintain our deepest and most serious beliefs strongly
enough to be able to
act on them, while at the same
time recognizing that those beliefs have no
final justifi-
cation. The latter part of
this proposition is closest to
play, and such a prospect will seem
melancholy to
some, but Schiller chooses to be exhilarated by it; we
are free to build tragedy or comedy indifferently on
the same data. There
will be poignant exceptions, but
under ideal conditions man “is
wholly man only when
he plays” (15th of the
Aesthetic Letters). Then man
possesses the childlike quality of
grace, aesthetic edu-
cation is complete, and
in spontaneity and harmony
one plays the game of life.
Of those directly influenced by Schiller the most
notable are Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche. Schopen-
hauer, in
particular, after condemning metaphysical
explanations of the world as
illusory, finds almost the
only redemption in art, because we are aware
that we
are playing a game, and also because we are contem-
plating Platonic ideas, and the
illusion is harmless. But
perhaps the most consummate realization of
Schiller's
ideas is found in Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel
(Magister Ludi): the
account of the Music Master is
closest of all.
