II. DEFENDERS OF FINAL CAUSES
Final causes had followers among the Scholastics,
among the biologists in
the Aristotelian and Galenic
tradition, among the Neo-Platonists, and among
those
philosophers in whom we customarily see the basic
features of
the baroque period. Final causes were also
welcomed by other parties, e.g.,
by some of the atom-
ists despite the fact that
they were strongly influenced
by Epicureanism. Sébastien Basson
(ca. 1600) and
Pierre Gassendi were teleologists. Gassendi defended
his own views against those of Descartes by opposing
them on religious
grounds, and by maintaining the
applicability of final causes in natural
philosophy, es-
pecially in biology.
Furthermore, Gassendi insisted on
the necessity of final causes that would
demonstrate
the existence of God and his presence in creation.
Similar religious preoccupations guided Leibniz and
Boyle in their attitude
toward final causes. Leibniz
maintained that Descartes' antifinalism led to
Spinoza's
determinism (we may recall that in the Scholastic
tradition
of final causation the ideas of free will and
providence were linked
together; however, we have
also mentioned the finalistic determinism of the
Cal-
vinists). Leibniz argued for the
subordination of me-
chanical to final
causes; in addition, he tended to inject
final causes also into physics,
and believed he had
succeeded in doing so by dealing with an argument
in optics (light rays in refraction follow the path of
least action, a
problem solved by the calculus of mini-
mal
paths or “economy of action”). But he did not
succeed
in going much farther, and in any case his
treatment of final causes did
not rest on any structure
used by Aristotle to justify final causation.
Still Leibniz
did speak often in favor of substantial forms and of
Plato's teleology. Religious concerns motivated him
and also convinced him that a mechanical explanation
of the
universe was inadequate.
Robert Boyle insisted on the necessity of investi-
gating the ends or purposes of those things which were
studied
according to the criteria of mechanism, but that
we ought not to ignore
Divine providence. However,
he did believe it illegitimate to deduce from
alleged
ends consequences otherwise unknown.
Despite all the attempts to restore final causes they
indeed received a very
severe blow, particularly in
natural philosophy.
