University of Virginia Library

Search this document 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  
expand section 
  
expand section 
  
  

expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionII. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIII. 
collapse sectionII. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIV. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionVII. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIV. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionIV. 
expand sectionIV. 
expand sectionIV. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionVI. 
expand sectionV. 
expand sectionIII. 
expand sectionVI. 

V

We see then that what had happened in antiquity
recurred, on a higher level of development, about 1900:
the axiomatization of mathematics duplicated the axi-
omatization of logic. In 1879, Frege had offered the
first truly axiomatic formulation of the calculus of
propositions. However, the two disciplines of logic and
mathematics are now intimately tied together, as the
very titles of fundamental works show: G. Frege's The
Foundations of Arithmetic, a Logico-mathematical En-
quiry into the Concept of Number
(New York, 1950,
trans. of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch-
mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl,

Breslau, 1884), and Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic,
derived by symbolic representation of concepts
(Grund-
gesetze der Arithmetik begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet,
Jena
1893-1903); A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia
Mathematica,
3 vols. (Cambridge, 1910-13, reprinted
1925-27), the classic of the new symbolic logic or
“logistics.” The nineteenth century had arithmetized
mathematics; the proposal of Frege and Russell was
to logicize arithmetic, that is, to construct its primitive
terms and primitive propositions with the aid of purely
logical terms and purely logical propositions. The latter
would themselves be reduced to a small number of
initial statements; thus the Principia Mathematica
makes the whole calculus of propositions rest on two
undefined terms, negation (∼) and disjunction (∨, the
nonexclusive “or”) and on five axioms. By thus de-
ducing arithmetic from logic, the relative indetermi-
nateness of the foundations of arithmetic was to be
corrected; such an indeterminateness was making of
arithmetic, and with it of the whole of mathematics,
a purely formal science in which, as Russell said in
a well-known sally, “one never knows what one is
saying or whether what is said is true.” However, such
an attempt made sense only on condition that it would
not invest the principles of logic with a similar indeter-
minateness, that is to say, that we accord to the funda-
mental ideas of logic an exact meaning and to its laws
an absolute truth. As completely axiomatic as it might
be, logic, in order to offer a solid basis for the whole
mathematical structure, should itself rest on evidence
and assert its principles categorically as mathematics
also used to do until recently.

But this logical dogmatism soon had to yield, as, not
long before, it was mathematical dogmatism which had
to yield in the wake of physical dogmatism. Just as
geometry in the nineteenth century had proliferated
into a multitude of non-Euclidean geometries, and had
besides, by its axiomatization, eliminated intuitive rep-
resentations, so, around 1920, logic all at once in its
turn went on to diversify itself and empty itself of its
substance. On the one hand, J. Łukasiewicz (1920) and


169

E. L. Post (1921) constructed the first three-valued and
n-valued logics respectively; these were soon followed
by a proliferation of non-Russellian systems. On the
other hand, L. Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-
philosophicus
(London, 1922) characterized logical
laws, axioms, or theorems as simple tautologies, under-
standing by that term that they are devoid of all con-
tent: “all propositions of logic say the same thing, that
is, nothing”; they are pure forms which remain valid
whatever material contents are poured into them. The
primitive terms no longer retain anything of their
intuitive and pre-axiomatic meaning, which was prop-
erly a logical one; they retain only what the group
of axioms as a whole determines in its systematic
ambiguity; and although many systems are still con-
cerned with maintaining a very close correspondence
between these two meanings, there is no longer any
obligation to do so.

The axiomatization of logic is thus allied to that of
mathematics: its terms become rid of their semantic
burden; its axioms lose their self-evidence and fall into
the rank of postulates which are set up in a more or
less arbitrary manner, either to recover as consequences
a body of formulas previously given or simply to see
what set of formulas might be derived from them. Or
better it may be necessary to say that because of its
complete vacuity a system of logical axioms cannot
be distinguished from a system of mathematical axioms
or even, more generally, from any system of axioms
whatsoever. The distinction would only reappear if,
in descending from a pure science to applications, we
recognize that some system lends itself better to an
interpretation in logical notions and propositions, and
some others to interpretation by mathematical ideas
and propositions, taking the words “logical” and
“mathematical” here in their intuitive and pre-axiom-
atic meaning. Strictly speaking it is only on this level
of concrete or nearly concrete interpretations that we
rediscover the idea of truth. In a purely axiomatic
system, the axioms are no longer genuine propositions,
but simply “propositional functions,” i.e., empty for-
mulas which become genuine propositions for every
interpretation of the primitive terms, and become true
propositions if this interpretation satisfies all of the
axioms. In this last case, every theorem of the system,
i.e., every propositional formula deducible, directly or
indirectly from the interpreted axioms, becomes truly
a proposition and also a proposition which is true.