27. CHAPTER XXVII.
Siege of Baza.—Embarrassments of the army.
The morning sun rose upon a piteous scene, before
the walls of Baza. The christian outposts, harassed
throughout the night, were pale and haggard; while
the multitudes of slain which lay before their palisadoes,
showed the fierce attacks they had sustained,
and the bravery of their defence.
Beyond them lay the groves and gardens of Baza;
once, the favorite resorts for recreation and delight—
now, a scene of horror and desolation. The towers
and pavilions were smoking ruins; the canals and
water-courses were discolored with blood, and choked
with the bodies of the slain. Here and there, the
ground, deep dinted with the tramp of man and
steed, and plashed and slippery with gore, showed
where there had been some fierce and mortal conflict;
while the bodies of Moors and christians,
ghastly in death, lay half concealed among the matted
and trampled shrubs, and flowers, and herbage.
Amidst these sanguinary scenes arose the christian
tents, which had been hastily pitched among the
gardens in the preceding evening. The experience
of the night, however, and the forlorn aspect of
every thing in the morning, convinced king Ferdinand
of the perils and hardships to which his camp
must be exposed, in its present situation; and, after
a consultation with his principal cavaliers, he resolved
to abandon the orchards.
It was a dangerous movement, to extricate his
army from so entangled a situation, in the face of so
alert and daring an enemy. A bold front was therefore
kept up towards the city; additional troops were
ordered to the advanced posts, and works begun as
if for a settled encampment. Not a tent was struck
in the gardens; but in the mean time, the most active
and unremitting exertions were made to remove all
the baggage and furniture of the camp back to the
original station.
All day, the Moors beheld a formidable show of
war maintained in front of the gardens; while in the
rear, the tops of the christian tents, and the pennons
of the different commanders, were seen rising above
the groves. Suddenly, towards evening, the tents
sunk and disappeared; the outposts broke up their
stations and withdrew, and the whole shadow of an
encampment was fast vanishing from their eyes.
The Moors saw too late the subtle manœuvre of
king Ferdinand. Cidi Yahye again sallied forth with
a large force of horse and foot, and pressed furiously
upon the christians. The latter, however, experienced
in Moorish attack, retired in close order, sometimes
turning upon the enemy and driving them to
their barricadoes, and then pursuing their retreat.
In this way the army was extricated, without much
further loss, from the perilous labyrinths of the
gardens.
The camp was now out of danger; but it was also
too distant from the city to do mischief, while the
Moors could sally forth and return without hindrance.
The king called a council of war, to consider in
what manner to proceed. The marques of Cadiz was
for abandoning the siege for the present, the place
being too strong, too well garrisoned and provided,
and too extensive, to be either carried by assault or
invested and reduced by famine, with their limited
forces; while, in lingering before it, the army would
be exposed to the usual maladies and sufferings of
besieging armies, and, when the rainy season came
on, would be shut up by the swelling of the rivers.
He recommended, instead, that the king should throw
garrisons of horse and foot into all the towns captured
in the neighborhood, and leave them to keep
up a predatory war upon Baza, while he should
overrun and ravage all the country; so that, in the
following year, Almeria and Guadix, having all their
subject towns and territories taken from them, might
be starved into submission.
Don Gutiere de Cardenas, senior commander of
Leon, on the other hand, maintained that to abandon
the siege would be construed by the enemy into a
sign of weakness and irresolution. It would give
new spirits to the partisans of El Zagal, and would
gain to his standard many of the wavering subjects
of Boabdil, if it did not encourage the fickle populace
of Granada to open rebellion. He advised
therefore that the siege should be prosecuted with
vigor.
The pride of Ferdinand pleaded in favor of the
last opinion; for it would be doubly humiliating,
again to return from a campaign in this part of the
Moorish kingdom, without effecting a blow. But
when he reflected on all that his army had suffered,
and on all that they must suffer should the siege continue—especially
from the difficulty of obtaining a
regular supply of provisions for so numerous a host,
across a great extent of rugged and mountainous
country—he determined to consult the safety of his
people, and to adopt the advice of the marques of
Cadiz.
When the soldiery heard that the king was about
to raise the siege in mere consideration of their sufferings,
they were filled with generous enthusiasm,
and entreated, as with one voice, that the siege might
never be abandoned until the city surrendered.
Perplexed by conflicting counsels, the king dispatched
messengers to the queen at Jaen, requesting
her advice. Posts had been stationed between them,
in such manner that missives from the camp could
reach the queen within ten hours. Isabella sent instantly
her reply. She left the policy of raising or
continuing the siege to the decision of the king and
his captains; but should they determine to persevere,
she pledged herself, with the aid of God, to forward
them men, money, provisions, and all other supplies,
until the city should be taken.
The reply of the queen determined Ferdinand to
persevere; and when his determination was made
known to the army, it was hailed with as much joy
as if it had been tidings of a victory.
