LETTER XL.
Dear Charles,—Granting that your argument is true in
part, it surely is not so in all respects.
Are we so to interpret the right of instruction as to narrow
it down to an obligation to obey that small body of the
people who are a legislator's immediate constituents; and
shall the legislator study their interest to an utter disregard of
the interests of the people at large? Can any right of instruction
free the representative from moral responsibility?
Must he obey his constituents when that obedience is clearly
seen to conflict with their real and the ultimate good?
Is the hall of legislation a mere court of justice, with its
judges and jury, where the representative appears in behalf
of his constituents to make the best of their cause as if his
clients; and does he hold his station as a fee for services?
Is his sole and paramount duty to strive that these shall be
victorious; while others are to watch whether law or equity
be saved or violated? It can be this, and nothing more nor
less, if we admit the doctrine of representative instruction in
all the latitude for which most contend.
Why the long and thorough debates in congress, and
elsewhere, if not to ascertain where the truth lies? And if
the truth be discovered, is it not to be obeyed? But how
can it be obeyed if the representative has yet no liberty to
vote except for what he is pledged, and to please an exceedingly
small part comparatively of the common country—those
who are separately each man's constituents?
A pack-horse or a donkey might serve to carry up a vote
as well as a representative, provided he had equal intelligence,
honesty and obstinacy—i. e. provided he knew his duty was
most perseveringly to kick at all reasoning, and at the end
of a month's discussion, shutting his ears resolutely against
the voice of truth, to deliver very solemnly and with the air
of a patriot his constituents' vote. And then he might go
back and claim his reward.
A thousand local matters doubtless there are, in no way
affecting the public at large, in which a reciprocal kindness
and good will are felt by all sections of the common country.
Here representatives may and must adhere to the letter of
their instructions—the whole country allows this and is mutually
benefited by it. In these separate and mutually permitted
sectional interests, the representatives are rather
agents than representatives—they come to ask of the whole
a favor for a part—and pledge that part as willing in its
turn to help the whole or any other part. But if he be mainly
a legislator of the people as well as the agent of a part in
some things, he
must follow the truth when rendered plain
by the discussion. If that truth accords with the wishes of
his immediate constituents (for
all are indirectly his constituents),
well; if not, then ought he utterly to disregard
his neighborhood or mere party instructions.
As far as the representative is an agent to do the business
of his locality, and that business conflicts with no common
interest, he may and must do that business; and, where the
local interest can be regarded when it is involved in some
common interest, he may, by the expressed or implied assent
of the whole, honorably strive to save or guard that
special interest. The whole brotherhood may be rendered
willing to sacrifice part of a common good, and in some cases
entirely to forego that good, if a part of the brotherhood be
seriously damaged or entirely ruined. But the representative
in his legislative character ought not to act with local
views; and if the good of the whole imperatively demand
of him to vote contrary to the wishes of his neighborhood or
party, he is bound to obey the whole people in preference to
a part. And that is patriotism—and requires a representative
other than a pack-horse or a donkey; and yet is it a
patriotism that shall become the signal for a braying loud
and discordant—a patriotism, that shall save, indeed, the
country, but shall utterly ruin itself. A patriotism that
swims with the tide is cheap and plentiful; a patriotism that
resists a current dashing onward to a deep fall, and bearing
to ruin all that is great and good, is rare and godlike.
It is granted, that parties and their representatives may
often be so honestly confident that the truth is with them, as
to believe that the more thorough the discussion, the plainer
will their side appear. Very well; and if that, upon a
thorough discussion, prove the case, let the representative
vote with a safe conscience: not, however, because it is a
party view, and he is instructed so to vote, or is threatened
if he vote not thus, but simply because it is in itself right—
the truth demands it. But if the discussion show truth to be
on the other side, then to the other side let him pass—he has
no option, nor may he either dodge or resign; he was sent
thither to obey the truth, and at the peril of displeasing God
let him in no way desert, or be coaxed or threatened to resign
his power. His party will call him traitor, possibly, if he
now obeys the truth;—but what is that, compared with the
judgment of God and the approbation of all coming ages in
the world's history?
I am aware that it is said, let the representative in the
case supposed resign; and let him make way for one who
will carry out the party views. What does that mean,
Charles? Shall the man basely resign, and desert his country
at the very moment she needs his service? Shall he
refuse to obey the truth, neglect his opportunity, and give
room to another who he knows will do wrong? He cannot
throw off the responsibility of injuring the country by resigning:
the Providence of God has placed him where he
must act even if it ruin his political prospects, and he must
not despise that Providence. After having heard a discussion
for months, at an enormous expense to his country—a
discussion held for his very aid, in discovering the right
path—and after a laborious and diligent search, shall he be
bid, at the moment he finds that path, to turn away from it?
Oh! folly most preposterous! Oh! most lame and impotent
conclusion!
But it may be said the representative is elected with an
understanding, expressed or implied, that if he change his
views after or during the discussion, he shall resign and
give way to another, who cannot be converted by the truth,
or who has a tougher conscience! There is, however, a
more important anterior question here: has any party a right
to expect or demand such a thing? Has any man a right
to allow such expectation or demand? To me the answer
is plainly negative, and for the very and similar reasons
already urged—no society or party can have a right to do
other than the representative does, who, after full and fair
discussion, follows the truth whithersoever she leads. Any
doctrine the contrary of this, is evidently preposterous, and
fraught with evil, and evil only.
The contrary doctrine makes a hall of legislation a mere
market-house, where the agents of parties buy for their employers
as cheap as they can, and strive, in every possible
way, legally moral, to defraud the other parties. It creates
cliques and clans, arraying the South against the North and
the West against the East; allowing nothing to be done for
the whole Republic, but teazing the representatives to consider
all universal benevolence and good will as subordinate
to the interests of his party or neighborhood; and even
where the good of other parties and sections and neighborhoods
is consulted, it is mainly on the principle of
quid pro
quo. It tempts to obstinacy and falsehood, and provokes to
anger and revenge. It renders discussion a solemn farce;
wasting time and money to discover the truth to men sworn
to obey her, but secretly pledged, if needs be, against her;
and to make plain a path which only they whose interest it
is previously, are expected to follow. It dispenses with all
intelligence, conscience and free agency in a representative,
making him little better than a mercenary and slave.
And what moral cowardice it generates in public men!
Hence the tendency, and every hour becoming stronger, to
throw back upon the people, assembled in disorderly mass-meetings
of different sorts, questions which ought to be decided
by the legislatures. The sole anxiety is to ascertain
the will of the people, as it is called; and that will shall be
obeyed, right or wrong. For instance, we beg the legislature
to decide for us by law, some question affecting the sale
of spirituous liquors. “Oh!—aye!—yes!—hem!—Well,
what do the people down your way think should be done?”
“Why, gentlemen, the sober set say you ought to abate the
nuisance.” “Oh!—yes!—hem!—of course; but—hem!—
the majority—eh?” “Why, please your excellencies, the
majority down our way are topers; and they say if you do
not let them alone, you shall see what the people will do next
election!”
And then, of course, as it is the will of the people, and
the evident vox dei, (i. e. Bacchi,) the legislature, created
for the good of the people, decides that the evil shall continue!
And yet, amiable patriots! if the majority are for
the good, so are they, too! These gentlemen go for the people,
if the people have a majority of only one—and that one a
drunken beast, who deposits his ticket with an oath! Some
infidel legislators would vote for bawdy-houses, if their constituents
were in their favor. “Good souls! kind souls!”
The doctrine is every day becoming more and more settled,
that laws are to be made such as the people will bear;
and we have a thousand Solons willing, not to make the best
laws and compel the wicked to live according to justice and
virtue, but the “best the Athenians will endure;” although
our modern peoples cannot be entreated or bought to swear
obedience for “even ten years,” to any system of laws that
can be devised. We desire new laws, new constitutions,
new names, new customs, new antiquities, every year!
Tell me, Charles, is this liberty or licentiousness? Has not
all this a tendency to agrarianism and its cognates? and will it
not destroy representative democracy, and give us virtually
now, and in form hereafter, primary assemblies in lieu of legislatures
and councils? Is a representative any longer a ruler?
or is he a slave? Ought sovereignty, or such portion as is
delegated to our legislators and magistrates by the laws and
the constitution, to be tamely cast back upon the people?
And if power is somewhere, and must be somewhere, pray
where is it, on this pendulum principle?—ever vibrating back
and forth, between people and representative!
