PREFACE.
The object of this book is to draw the attention of the reader to some
of the social evils that beset us; more particularly in connection with
the administration of criminal justice. So long a time has intervened
since the thought occurred, and so many interruptions have delayed
the progress of the work, that it is felt the subject has been very imperfectly
treated; but it is hoped that enough has been done to cause
a few to reflect on a matter of vital importance; one that to them may
possess the interest of novelty.
A strange indifference exists as to the composition of the juries.
In our view, the institution itself, so admirable in a monarchy, is totally
unsuited to a democracy. The very principle that renders it so
safe where there is a great central power to resist, renders it unsafe
in a state of society in which few have sufficient resolution to attempt
even to resist popular impulses.
A hundred instances might be given in which the juries of this
country are an evil; one or two of which we will point out. In trials
between railroad companies and those who dwell along their lines,
prejudice is usually so strong against the former, that justice for them
is nearly hopeless. In certain parts of the country, the juries are
made the instrument of defeating the claims of creditors who dwell
at a distance, and are believed to have interests opposed to the particular
community where the debtor resides. This is a most crying
evil, and has been the source of many and grievous wrongs. Whenever
there is a motive for creating a simulated public opinion, by the
united action of several journals, justice is next to hopeless; such
combinations rarely, if ever, occurring in its behalf. In cases that
are connected with the workings of political schemes, and not unfrequently
in those in which political men are parties to the suits, it is
often found that the general prejudices or partialities of the out-door
factions enter the jury-box. This is a most serious evil too; for, even
when the feeling does not produce a direct and flagrant wrong, it is
very apt so far to temper the right as to deprive it of much of its
virtue. In a country like this, in which party penetrates to the very
bottom of society, the extent of this evil can be known only to those
who are brought into close contact with the ordinary workings of the
institution.
In a democracy, proper selections in the material that are necessary
to render juries safe, become nearly impossible. Then, the tendency
is to the accumulation of power in bodies of men; and in a
state of society like our own, the juries get to be much too independent
of the opinion of the court. It is precisely in that condition of things
in which the influence and authority of the judge guide the juror, and
the investigation and substantial power of the juror react on the proceedings
of the court, that the greatest benefits have been found to accrue
from this institution. The reverse of this state of things will be very
likely to produce the greatest amount of evil.
It is certain that the juries are falling into disrepute throughout the
length and breadth of the land. The difficulty is to find a substitute.
As they are bodies holding the lives, property and character of every
member of the community, more or less, in their power, it is not to
be supposed that the masses will surrender this important means of
exercising their authority voluntarily, or with good will. Time alone
can bring reform through the extent of the abuses.
The writer has not the vanity to suppose that anything contained
in this book will produce a very serious impression on the popularity of
the jury. Such is not its design. All that is anticipated is to cause
a portion of his readers to refect on the subject; persons who probably
have never yet given it a moment of thought.
There is a tendency, at the present time, to court change for its
own sake. This is erroneously termed a love of reform. Something
very like a revolution is going on in our midst, while there is much
reason to apprehend that few real grievances are abated; the spurious
too exclusively occupying the popular mind, to render easy a just
distinction between them. When an American prates about aristocracy,
it is pretty safe to set him down as knavish or ignorant. It is
purely cant; and the declaimers would be puzzled to point to a single
element of the little understood and much-decried institution, the
country being absolutely without any, unless the enjoyment of the
ordinary rights of property can be so considered. But the demagogue
must have his war-cry, as well as the Indian; and it is probable he
will continue to whoop as long as the country contains minds weak
enough to furnish him with dupes.
Cooperstown, March 12, 1850.
