University of Virginia Library

MESSAGE COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO HOUSES
OF CONGRESS ON JANUARY 4, 1904

I lay before the Congress for its information a statement
of my action up to this time in executing the act entitled
"An act to provide for the construction of a canal connecting
the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans,"
approved June 28, 1902.

By the said act the President was authorized to secure
for the United States the property of the Panama Canal
Company and the perpetual control of a strip six miles
wide across the Isthmus of Panama. It was further provided
that "should the President be unable to obtain for
the United States a satisfactory title to the property of
the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the
necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia . . .
within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then
the President" should endeavor to provide for a canal by
the Nicaragua route. The language quoted defines with
exactness and precision what was to be done, and what
as a matter of fact has been done. The President was
authorized to go to the Nicaragua route only if within a
reasonable time he could not obtain "control of the
necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia." This
control has now been obtained; the provision of the act
has been complied with; it is no longer possible under
existing legislation to go to the Nicaragua route as an
alternative.

This act marked the climax of the effort on the part of

the United States to secure, so far as legislation was concerned,
an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus. The
effort to secure a treaty for this purpose with one of the
Central American republics did not stand on the same
footing with the effort to secure a treaty under any ordinary
conditions. The proper position for the United
States to assume in reference to this canal, and therefore
to the governments of the Isthmus, had been clearly set
forth by Secretary Cass in 1858. In my annual Message
I have already quoted what Secretary Cass said; but I
repeat the quotation here, because the principle it states
is fundamental:

The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was
sound then and it is sound now. The United States has
taken the position that no other Government is to build
the canal. In 1889, when France proposed to come to
the aid of the French Panama Company by guaranteeing
their bonds, the Senate of the United States in executive
session, with only some three votes dissenting, passed a
resolution as follows:

Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly provided
that the United States should control, police, and
protect the canal which was to be built, keeping it open
for the vessels of all nations on equal terms. The United
States thus assumed the position of guarantor of the canal
and of its peaceful use by all the world. The guaranty
included as a matter of course the building of the canal.
The enterprise was recognized as responding to an international
need; and it would be the veriest travesty on
right and justice to treat the governments in possession
of the Isthmus as having the right, in the language of Mr.
Cass, "to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways
of the world, and justify the act by the pretension
that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and
that they choose to shut them."

When this Government submitted to Colombia the
Hay-Herran treaty three things were, therefore, already
settled.

One was that the canal should be built. The time for
delay, the time for permitting the attempt to be made by
private enterprise, the time for permitting any government
of anti-social spirit and of imperfect development to
bar the work, was past. The United States had assumed
in connection with the canal certain responsibilities, not
only to its own people but to the civilized world, which
imperatively demanded that there should no longer be
delay in beginning the work.

Second. While it was settled that the canal should be
built without unnecessary or improper delay, it was no
less clearly shown to be our purpose to deal not merely

in a spirit of justice but in a spirit of generosity with the
people through whose land we might build it. The Hay-Herran
treaty, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of
an over-generosity towards the Colombian Government.
In our anxiety to be fair we had gone to the very verge
in yielding to a weak nation's demands what that nation
was helplessly unable to enforce from us against our will.
The only criticisms made upon the Administration for
the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty were for having
granted too much to Colombia, not for failure to grant
enough. Neither in the Congress nor in the public press,
at the time that this treaty was formulated, was there
complaint that it did not in the fullest and amplest manner
guarantee to Colombia everything that she could by
any color of title demand.

Nor is the fact to be lost sight of that the rejected
treaty, while generously responding to the pecuniary demands
of Colombia, in other respects merely provided for
the construction of the canal in conformity with the express
requirements of the act of the Congress of June 28,
1902. By that act, as heretofore quoted, the President
was authorized to acquire from Colombia, for the purposes
of the canal, "perpetual control" of a certain strip
of land; and it was expressly required that the "control"
thus to be obtained should include "jurisdiction" to
make police and sanitary regulations and to establish such
judicial tribunals as might be agreed on for their enforcement.
These were conditions precedent prescibed by the
Congress; and for their fulfilment suitable stipulations
were embodied in the treaty. It has been stated in public
prints that Colombia objected to these stipulations, on
the ground that they involved a relinquishment of her
"sovereignty"; but in the light of what has taken place,
this alleged objection must be considered as an afterthought.
In reality, the treaty, instead of requiring a
cession of Colombia's sovereignty over the canal strip,

expressly acknowledged, confirmed, and preserved her
sovereignty over it. The treaty in this respect simply
proceeded on the lines on which all the negotiations leading
up to the present situation have been conducted. In
those negotiations the exercise by the United States, subject
to the paramount rights of the local sovereign, of a
substantial control over the canal and the immediately
adjacent territory, has been treated as a fundamental part
of any arrangement that might be made. It has formed
an essential feature of all our plans, and its necessity is
fully recognized in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The
Congress, in providing that such control should be
secured, adopted no new principle, but only incorporated
in its legislation a condition the importance and propriety
of which were universally recognized. During all the
years of negotiation and discussion that preceded the
conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated
that the requirement by the United States of
control over the canal strip would render unattainable
the construction of a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama;
nor were we advised, during the months when legislation
of 1902 was pending before the Congress, that the
terms which it embodied would render negotiations with
Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation could
construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a
less degree of control than was stipulated for in the Hay-Herran
treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of control
was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable treaty
at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the question
whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of the
world's traffic across the Isthmus.

That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the people
of the locality through which it was to pass, and that
the people of this locality no less eagerly longed for its
construction under American control, are shown by the
unanimity of action in the new Panama Republic.

Furthermore, Colombia, after having rejected the treaty
in spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her
power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness
to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be
restored. One of the men standing highest in the official
circles of Colombia, on November 6th, addressed the
American Minister at Bogota, saying that if the Government
of the United States would land troops to preserve
Colombian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian
Government would "declare martial law; and, by virtue
of vested constitutional authority, when public order is
disturbed, [would] approve by decree the ratification of
the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the
United States prefers, [would] call extra session of
the Congress—with new and friendly members—next
May to approve the treaty." Having these facts in view,
there is no shadow of question that the Government of
the United States proposed a treaty which was not
merely just but generous to Colombia; which our people
regarded as erring, if at all, on the side of over-generosity;
which was hailed with delight by the people of the immediate
locality through which the canal was to pass, who
were most concerned as to the new order of things, and
which the Colombian authorities now recognize as being
so good that they are willing to promise its unconditional
ratification if only we will desert those who have shown
themselves our friends and restore to those who have
shown themselves unfriendly the power to undo what
they did. I pass by the question as to what assurance
we have that they would now keep their pledge and not
again refuse to ratify the treaty if they had the power;
for, of course, I will not for one moment discuss the possibility
of the United States committing an act of such
baseness as to abandon the new Republic of Panama.

Third. Finally the Congress definitely settled where
the canal was to be built. It was provided that a treaty

should be made for building the canal across the Isthmus
of Panama; and if, after reasonable time, it proved impossible
to secure such treaty, that then we should go to
Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for it needs no
argument to show that the intent of the Congress was to
insure a canal across Panama, and that whether the republic
granting the title was called New Granada, Colombia,
or Panama mattered not one whit. As events turned out,
the question of "reasonable time" did not enter into the
matter at all. Although, as the months went by, it became
increasingly improbable that the Colombian Congress
would ratify the treaty or take steps which would
be equivalent thereto, yet all chance for such action on
their part did not vanish until the Congress closed at the
end of October; and within three days thereafter the
revolution in Panama had broken out. Panama became
an independent state, and the control of the territory
necessary for building the canal then became obtainable.
The condition under which alone we could have gone to
Nicaragua thereby became impossible of fulfilment. If
the pending treaty with Panama should not be ratified by
the Senate this would not alter the fact that we could
not go to Nicaragua. The Congress has decided the route,
and there is no alternative under existing legislation.

When in August it began to appear probable that the
Colombian Legislature would not ratify the treaty it became
incumbent upon me to consider well what the situation
was and to be ready to advise the Congress as to
what were the various alternatives of action open to us.
There were several possibilities. One was that Colombia
would at the last moment see the unwisdom of her position.
That there might be nothing omitted, Secretary
Hay, through the Minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned
Colombia that grave consequences might follow from her
rejection of the treaty. Although it was a constantly
diminishing chance, yet the possibility of ratification did

not wholly pass away until the close of the session of the
Colombian Congress.

A second alternative was that by the close of the session
on the last day of October, without the ratification of the
treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by Panama,
the American Congress on assembling early in November
would be confronted with a situation in which
there had been a failure to come to terms as to building
the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not
been a lapse of a reasonable time—using the word reasonable
in any proper sense—such as would justify the
Administration going to the Nicaragua route. This
situation seemed on the whole the most likely, and as a
matter of fact I had made the original draft of my Message
to the Congress with a view to its existence.

It was the opinion of eminent international jurists that
in view of the fact that the great design of our guaranty
under the treaty of 1846 was to dedicate the Isthmus to
the purposes of interoceanic transit, and above all to
secure the construction of an interoceanic canal, Colombia
could not under existing conditions refuse to enter into a
proper arrangement with the United States to that end,
without violating the spirit and substantially repudiating
the obligations of a treaty the full benefits of which she
had enjoyed for over fifty years. My intention was to
consult the Congress as to whether under such circumstances
it would not be proper to announce that the canal
was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms
that we had offered and no others; and that if such terms
were not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement
with Panama direct, or take what other steps were needful
in order to begin the enterprise.

A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus,
who had formerly constituted an independent state, and
who until recently were united to Colombia only by a
loose tie of federal relationship, might take the protection

of their own vital interests into their own hands, reassert
their former rights, declare their independence upon just
grounds, and establish a government competent and willing
to do its share in this great work for civilization.
This third possibility is what actually occurred. Every
one knew that it was a possibility, but it was not until
towards the end of October that it appeared to be an
imminent probability. Although the Administration, of
course, had special means of knowledge, no such means
were necessary in order to appreciate the possibility, and
toward the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary
outbreak and of its success. It was a matter of common
notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be
indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs; a very
few will suffice. From Costa Rica on August 31st a
special was sent to the Washington Post, running as
follows:

A special dispatch to the Washington Post, under date
of New York, September 1st, runs as follows:

In the New York Herald of September roth the following
statement appeared:

In the New York Times, under date of September 13th,
there appeared from Bogota the following statement:

In the New York Herald of October 26th it was reported
that a revolutionary expedition of about seventy
men had actually landed on the Isthmus. In the Washington
Post of October 29th it was reported from Panama
that in view of the impending trouble on the Isthmus the
Bogota Government had gathered troops in sufficient
numbers to at once put down an attempt at secession.
In the New York Herald of October 30th it was announced
from Panama that Bogota was hurrying troops
to the Isthmus to put down the projected revolt. In
the New York Herald of November 2d it was announced
that in Bogota the Congress had indorsed the energetic
measures taken to meet the situation on the Isthmus and
that six thousand men were about to be sent thither.

Quotations like the above could be multiplied indefinitely.
Suffice it to say that it was notorious that revolutionary
trouble of a serious nature was impending upon
the Isthmus. But it was not necessary to rely exclusively
upon such general means of information. On October
15th Commander Hubbard, of the Navy, notified the
Navy Department that though things were quiet on the
Isthmus a revolution had broken out in the State of
Cauca. On October i6th, at the request of Lieutenant-General
Young, I saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and Lieut.
Grayson Mallet-Prevost Murphy, who had just returned
from a four months' tour through the northern portions
of Venezuela and Colombia. They stopped in Panama
on their return in the latter part of September. At the
time they were sent down there had been no thought of
their going to Panama, and their visit to the Isthmus was
but an unpremeditated incident of their return journey;
nor had they been spoken to by any one at Washington

regarding the possibility of a revolt. Until they landed
at Colon they had no knowledge that a revolution was
impending, save what they had gained from the newspapers.
What they saw in Panama so impressed them
that they reported thereon to Lieutenant-General Young,
according to his memorandum—

Lieutenant-General Young regarded their report as of
such importance as to make it advisable that I should
personally see these officers. They told me what they
had already reported to the Lieutenant-General, adding

that on the Isthmus the excitement was seething, and
that the Colombian troops were reported to be disaffected.
In response to a question of mine they informed me that
it was the general belief that the revolution might break
out at any moment, and if it did not happen before,
would doubtless take place immediately after the closing
of the Colombian Congress (at the end of October) if the
canal treaty were not ratified. They were certain that
the revolution would occur, and before leaving the
Isthmus had made their own reckoning as to the time,
which they had set down as being probably from three to
four weeks after their leaving. The reason they set this
as the probable inside limit of time was that they reckoned
that it would be at least three or four weeks—say
not until October 20th—before a sufficient quantity of
arms and munitions would have been landed.

In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Department
to issue instructions such as would insure our having
ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of
need arising. Orders were given on October iQth to the
Boston to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; to
the Dixie to prepare to sail from League Island; and to
the Atlanta to proceed to Guantanamo. On October
30th the Nashville was ordered to proceed to Colon. On
November 2d when, the Colombian Congress having adjourned,
it was evident that the outbreak was imminent,
and when it was announced that both sides were making
ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and
disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked
on vessels, the following instructions were sent to the
commanders of the Boston, Nashville, and Dixie:

These orders were delivered in pursuance of the policy
on which our Government had repeatedly acted. This
policy was exhibited in the following orders, given under
somewhat similar circumstances last year, and the year
before, and the year before that. The first two telegrams
are from the Department of State to the consul at Panama:

The next three telegrams are from and to the Secretary
of the Navy:

On November 3d Commander Hubbard responded to
the above-quoted telegram of November 2, 1903, saying
that before the telegram had been received four hundred
Colombian troops from Cartagena had landed at Colon;
that there had been no revolution on the Isthmus, but
that the situation was most critical if the revolutionary
leaders should act. On this same date the Associated
Press in Washington received a bulletin stating that a
revolutionary outbreak had occurred. When this was
brought to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of
State, Mr. Loomis, he prepared the following cablegram
to the consul-general at Panama and the consul at Colon:

Before this telegram was sent, however, one was received
from Consul Malmros at Colon, running as follows:

This cablegram was received at 2.35 P.M., and at 3.40
P.M. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram which he had already
prepared to both Panama and Colon. Apparently, however,
the consul-general at Panama had not received the
information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin,
upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his
dispatch; for his answer was that there was no uprising,
although the situation was critical, this answer being received
at 8.15 P.M. Immediately afterwards he sent
another dispatch, which was received at 9.50 P.M., saying
that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful,
with no bloodshed. The Colombian gunboat Bogota next
day began to shell the city of Panama, with the result of
killing one Chinaman. The consul-general was directed
to notify her to stop firing. Meanwhile, on November
4th, Commander Hubbard notified the Department that
he had landed a force to protect the lives and property of
American citizens against the threats of the Colombian
soldiery.

Before any step whatever had been taken by the United
States troops to restore order, the commander of the
newly landed Colombian troops had indulged in wanton
and violent threats against American citizens, which
created serious apprehension. As Commander Hubbard
reported in his letter November 5th, this officer and his

troops practically began war against the United States,
and only the forbearance and coolness of our officers and
men prevented bloodshed. The letter of Commander
Hubbard is of such interest that it deserves quotation in
full, and runs as follows:

In his letter of November 8th Commander Hubbard
sets forth the facts more in detail:

This plain official account of the occurrences of November
4th shows that, instead of there having been too
much prevision by the American Government for the
maintenance of order and the protection of life and property
on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the
American warships had been too long delayed; so long,
in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors
available to land and protect the lives of American men
and women. It was only the coolness and gallantry
with which this little band of men wearing the American
uniform faced ten times their number of armed foes, bent
on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Colombian
commander, that prevented a murderous catastrophe.
At Panama, when the revolution broke out, there was
no American man-of-war and no American troops or
sailors. At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with
entire impartiality towards both sides, preventing any
movement, whether by the Colombians or the Panamans,

which would tend to produce bloodshed. On November
9th he prevented a body of the revolutionists from landing
at Colon. Throughout he behaved in the most
creditable manner. In the New York Evening Post,
under date of Panama, December 8th, there is an article
from a special correspondent, which sets forth in detail
the unbearable oppression of the Colombian Government
in Panama. In this article is an interesting interview
with a native Panaman, which runs in part as follows:

I call especial attention to the concluding portion of
this interview which states the willingness of the Panama
people to fight the Colombian troops and the refusal of
Commander Hubbard to permit them to use the railroad

and therefore to get into a position where the fight could
take place. It thus clearly appears that the fact that
there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due
—and only due—to the prompt and firm enforcement by
the United States of its traditional policy. During the
past forty years revolutions and attempts at revolution
have succeeded one another with monotonous regularity
on the Isthmus, and again and again United States sailors
and marines have been landed as they were landed in this
instance and under similar instructions to protect the
transit. One of these revolutions resulted in three years
of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed and misery
caused by them has been incalculable. The fact that in
this last revolution not a life was lost save that of the
man killed by the shells of the Colombian gunboat, and
no property destroyed, was due to the action which I
have described. We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in
the interest of its inhabitants and of our own national
needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world.
Failure to act as the Administration acted would have
meant great waste of life, great suffering, great destruction
of property; all of which was avoided by the firmness
and prudence with which Commander Hubbard
carried out his orders and prevented either party from
attacking the other. Our action was for the peace both
of Colombia and of Panama. It is earnestly to be hoped
that there will be no unwise conduct on our part which
may encourage Colombia to embark on a war which can
not result in her regaining control of the Isthmus, but
which may cause much bloodshed and suffering.

I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which
have been made of complicity by this Government in the
revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as destitute
of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for
my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons
might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self-respect.

I think proper to say, therefore, that no one
connected with this Government had any part in preparing,
inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the
Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of our
military and naval officers, given above, no one connected
with this Government had any previous knowledge of the
revolution except such as was accessible to any person of
ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept
up a current acquaintance with public affairs.

By the unanimous action of its people, without the
firing of a shot—with a unanimity hardly before recorded
in any similar case—the people of Panama declared themselves
an independent Republic. Their recognition by
this Government was based upon a state of facts in no
way dependent for its justification upon our action in
ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to
deny, either the validity or the propriety of the general
rule that a new state should not be recognized as independent
till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence.
This rule is derived from the principle of
non-intervention, and as a corollary of that principle has
generally been observed by the United States. But,
like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is
subject to exceptions; and there are in my opinion clear
and imperative reasons why a departure from it was justified
and even required in the present instance. These
reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our
national interests and safety; and, third, the interests of
collective civilization.

I have already adverted to the treaty of 1846, by the
thirty-fifth article of which the United States secured the
right to a free and open transit across the Isthmus of
Panama, and to that end agreed to guarantee to New
Granada her rights of sovereignty and property over that
territory. This article is sometimes discussed as if the
latter guaranty constituted its sole object and bound the

United States to protect the sovereignty of New Granada
against domestic revolution. Nothing, however, could
be more erroneous than this supposition. That our wise
and patriotic ancestors, with all their dread of entangling
alliances, would have entered into a treaty with New
Granada solely or even primarily for the purpose of enabling
that remnant of the original Republic of Colombia,
then resolved into the States of New Granada, Venezuela,
and Ecuador, to continue from Bogota to rule over the
Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that would in itself
be incredible, even if the contrary did not clearly appear.
It is true that since the treaty was made the United States
has again and again been obliged forcibly to intervene for
the preservation of order and the maintenance of an open
transit, and that this intervention has usually operated
to the advantage of the titular Government of Colombia,
but it is equally true that the United States in intervening,
with or without Colombia's consent, for the protection
of the transit, has disclaimed any duty to defend the
Colombian Government against domestic insurrection or
against the erection of an independent government on the
Isthmus of Panama. The attacks against which the
United States engaged to protect New Granadian sovereignty
were those of foreign powers; but this engagement
was only a means to the accomplishment of a yet
more important end. The great design of the article was
to assure the dedication of the Isthmus to the purposes
of free and unobstructed interoceanic transit, the consummation
of which would be found in an interoceanic
canal. To the accomplishment of this object the Government
of the United States had for years directed its diplomacy.
It occupied a place in the instructions to our
delegates to the Panama Congress during the Administration
of John Quincy Adams. It formed the subject of
a resolution of the Senate in 1835, and of the House of
Representatives in 1839. In l846 its importance had
become still more apparent by reason of the Mexican
War. If the treaty of 1846 did not in terms bind New
Granada to grant reasonable concessions for the construction
of means of interoceanic communication, it was only
because it was not imagined that such concessions would
ever be withheld. As it was expressly agreed that the
United States, in consideration of its onerous guaranty
of New Granadian sovereignty, should possess the right
of free and open transit on any modes of communication
that might be constructed, the obvious intent of the
treaty rendered it unnecessary, if not superfluous, in
terms to stipulate that permission for the construction of
such modes of communication should not be denied.

Long before the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty
the course of events had shown that a canal to connect
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans must be built by the
United States or not at all. Experience had demonstrated
that private enterprise was utterly inadequate for
the purpose; and a fixed policy, declared by the United
States on many memorable occasions, and supported by
the practically unanimous voice of American opinion, had
rendered it morally impossible that the work should be
undertaken by European powers, either singly or in combination.
Such were the universally recognized conditions
on which the legislation of the Congress was based,
and on which the late negotiations with Colombia were
begun and concluded. Nevertheless, when the well-considered
agreement was rejected by Colombia and the
revolution on the Isthmus ensued, one of Colombia's
first acts was to invoke the intervention of the United
States; nor does her invitation appear to have been confined
to this Government alone. By a telegram from
Mr. Beaupré", our Minister at Bogota, of the 7th of November
last, we were informed that General Reyes would
soon leave Panama invested with full powers; that he
had telegraphed the President of Mexico to ask the

Government of the United States and all countries represented
at the Pan-American Conference "to aid Colombia
to preserve her integrity"; and that he had requested
that the Government of the United States should meanwhile
"preserve the neutrality and transit of the Isthmus"
and should "not recognize the new Government." In
another telegram from Mr. Beaupré, which was sent later
in the day, this Government was asked whether it would
take action "to maintain Colombian right and sovereignty
on the Isthmus in accordance with article 35 [of] the
treaty of 1846" in case the Colombian Government should
be "entirely unable to suppress the secession movement
there." Here was a direct solicitation to the United
States to intervene for the purpose of suppression, contrary
to the treaty of 1846 as this Government has uniformly
construed it, a new revolt against Colombia's
authority brought about by her own refusal to permit
the fulfilment of the great design for which that treaty
was made. It was under these circumstances that the
United States, instead of using its forces to destroy those
who sought to make the engagements of the treaty a
reality, recognized them as the proper custodians of the
sovereignty of the Isthmus.

This recognition was, in the second place, further justified
by the highest considerations of our national interests
and safety. In all the range of our international relations,
I do not hesitate to affirm that there is nothing of
greater or more pressing importance than the construction
of an interoceanic canal. Long acknowledged to be
essential to our commercial development, it has become,
as the result of the recent extension of our territorial
dominion, more than ever essential to our national self-defence.
In transmitting to the Senate the treaty of
1846, President Polk pointed out as the principal reason
for its ratification that the passage of the Isthmus, which
it was designed to secure, "would relieve us from a long

and dangerous navigation of more than nine thousand
miles around Cape Horn, and render our communication
with our own possessions on the northwest coast of
America comparatively easy and speedy." The events
of the past five years have given to this consideration
an importance immeasurably greater than it possessed in
1846. In the light of our present situation, the establishment
of easy and speedy communication by sea between
the Atlantic and the Pacific presents itself not
simply as something to be desired, but as an object
to be positively and promptly attained. Reasons of
convenience have been superseded by reasons of vital
necessity, which do not admit of indefinite delays.

To such delays the rejection by Colombia of the Hay-Herran
treaty directly exposed us. As proof of this fact
I need only refer to the programme outlined in the report
of the majority of the Panama Canal Committee, read in
the Colombian Senate on the I4th of October last. In
this report, which recommended that the discussion of a
law to authorize the Government to enter upon new negotiations
should be indefinitely postponed, it is proposed
that the consideration of the subject should be deferred
till October 31, 1904, when the next Colombian Congress
should have met in ordinary session. By that time, as
the report goes on to say, the extension of time granted
to the New Panama Canal Company by treaty in 1893
would have expired, and the new Congress would be in
a position to take up the question whether the company
had not, in spite of further extensions that had been
granted by legislative acts, forfeited all its property and
rights. "When that time arrives," the report significantly
declares, "the Republic, without any impediment,
will be able to contract, and will be in more clear, more
definite, and more advantageous possession, both legally
and materially." The naked meaning of this report is
that Colombia proposed to wait until, by the enforcement

of a forfeiture repugnant to the ideas of justice
which obtain in every civilized nation, the property and
rights of the New Panama Canal Company could be
confiscated.

Such is the scheme to which it was proposed that the
United States should be invited to become a party. The
construction of the canal was to be relegated to the indefinite
future, while Colombia was, by reason of her own
delay, to be placed in the "more advantageous" position
of claiming not merely the compensation to be paid by
the United States for the privilege of completing the
canal, but also the forty millions authorized by the act
of 1902 to be paid for the property of the New Panama
Canal Company, That the attempt to carry out this
scheme would have brought Colombia into conflict with
the Government of France cannot be doubted; nor could
the United States have counted upon immunity from the
consequences of the attempt, even apart from the indefinite
delays to which the construction of the canal was
to be subjected. On the first appearance of danger to
Colombia, this Government would have been summoned
to interpose, in order to give effect to the guaranties of
the treaty of 1846; and all this in support of a plan
which, while characterized in its first stage by the wanton
disregard of our own highest interests, was fitly to end in
further injury to the citizens of a friendly nation, whose
enormous losses in their generous efforts to pierce the
Isthmus have become a matter of history.

In the third place, I confidently maintain that the
recognition of the Republic of Panama was an act justified
by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a
Government could be said to have received a mandate
from civilization to effect an object the accomplishment
of which was demanded in the interest of mankind, the
United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic
canal. Since our purpose to build the canal

was definitely announced, there have come from all
quarters assurances of approval and encouragement, in
which even Colombia herself at one time participated;
and to general assurances were added specific acts and
declarations. In order that no obstacle might stand in
our way, Great Britain renounced important rights under
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and agreed to its abrogation,
receiving in return nothing but our honorable pledge to
build the canal and protect it as an open highway. It
was in view of this pledge, and of the proposed enactment
by the Congress of the United States of legislation to
give it immediate effect, that the second Pan-American
Conference, at the City of Mexico, on January 22, 1902,
adopted the following resolution:

Among those who signed this resolution on behalf of
their respective Governments was General Reyes, the
delegate of Colombia. Little could it have been foreseen
that two years later the Colombian Government, led astray
by false allurements of selfish advantage, and forgetful
alike of its international obligations and of the duties and
responsibilities of sovereignty, would thwart the efforts
of the United States to enter upon and complete a work
which the nations of America, re-echoing the sentiment
of the nations of Europe, had pronounced to be not only
"worthy of the greatness of the American people," but
also "in the highest sense a work of civilization."

That our position as the mandatary of civilization has

been by no means misconceived is shown by the promptitude
with which the powers have, one after another, followed
our lead in recognizing Panama as an independent
State. Our action in recognizing the new Republic has
been followed by like recognition on the part of France,
Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Nicaragua,
Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa
Rica, Japan, and Austria-Hungary.

In view of the manifold considerations of treaty right
and obligation, of national interest and safety, and of
collective civilization, by which our Government was
constrained to act, I am at a loss to comprehend the attitude
of those who can discern in the recognition of the
Republic of Panama only a general approval of the principle
of "revolution" by which a given government is
overturned or one portion of a country separated from
another. Only the amplest justification can warrant a
revolutionary movement of either kind. But there is no
fixed rule which can be applied to all such movements.
Each case must be judged on its own merits. There
have been many revolutionary movements, many movements
for the dismemberment of countries, which were
evil, tried by any standard. But in my opinion no disinterested
and fair-minded observer acquainted with the
circumstances can fail to feel that Panama had the amplest
justification for separation from Colombia under the conditions
existing, and, moreover, that its action was in the
highest degree beneficial to the interests of the entire
civilized world by securing the immediate opportunity for
the building of the interoceanic canal. It would be well
for those who are pessimistic as to our action in peacefully
recognizing the Republic of Panama, while we lawfully
protected the transit from invasion and disturbance, to
recall what has been done in Cuba, where we intervened
even by force on general grounds of national interest and
duty. When we interfered it was freely prophesied that

we intended to keep Cuba and administer it for our own
interests. The result has demonstrated in singularly
conclusive fashion the falsity of these prophecies. Cuba
is now an independent Republic. We governed it in its
own interests for a few years, till it was able to stand
alone, and then started it upon its career of self-government
and independence, granting it all necessary aid.
We have received from Cuba a grant of two naval stations,
so situated that they in no possible way menace
the liberty of the island, and yet serve as important
defences for the Cuban people, as well as for our own
people, against possible foreign attack. The people of
Cuba have been immeasurably benefited by our interference
in their behalf, and our own gain has been great.
So will it be with Panama. The people of the Isthmus,
and as I firmly believe of the adjacent parts of Central
and South America, will be greatly benefited by the
building of the canal and the guaranty of peace and
order along its line; and hand in hand with the benefit to
them will go the benefit to us and to mankind. By our
prompt and decisive action, not only have our interests
and those of the world at large been conserved, but we
have forestalled complications which were likely to be
fruitful in loss to ourselves, and in bloodshed and suffering
to the people of the Isthmus.

Instead of using our forces, as we were invited by
Colombia to do, for the twofold purpose of defeating our
own rights and interests and the interests of the civilized
world, and of compelling the submission of the people of
the Isthmus to those whom they regarded as oppressors,
we shall, as in duty bound, keep the transit open and
prevent its invasion. Meanwhile, the only question now
before us is that of the ratification of the treaty. For it
is to be remembered that a failure to ratify the treaty will
not undo what has been done, will not restore Panama to
Colombia, and will not alter our obligation to keep the

transit open across the Isthmus, and to prevent any outside
power from menacing this transit.

It seems to have been assumed in certain quarters that
the proposition that the obligations of article 35 of the
treaty of 1846 are to be considered as adhering to and
following the sovereignty of the Isthmus, so long as that
sovereignty is not absorbed by the United States, rests
upon some novel theory. No assumption could be
further from the fact. It is by no means true that a state
in declaring its independence rids itself of all the treaty
obligations entered into by the parent government. It
is a mere coincidence that this question was once raised
in a case involving the obligations of Colombia as an independent
state under a treaty which Spain had made
with the United States many years before Spanish-American
independence. In that case Mr. John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State, in an instruction to Mr. Anderson,
our Minister to Colombia, of May 27, 1823, said:

The principle thus asserted by Mr. Adams was afterwards
sustained by an international commission in respect
to the precise stipulation to which he referred; and a
similar position was taken by the United States with
regard to the binding obligation upon the independent

State of Texas of commercial stipulations embodied in
prior treaties between the United States and Mexico
when Texas formed a part of the latter country. But in
the present case it is unnecessary to go so far. Even if
it be admitted that prior treaties of a political and commercial
complexion generally do not bind a new state
formed by separation, it is undeniable that stipulations
having a local application to the territory embraced in
the new state continue in force and are binding upon the
new sovereign. Thus it is on all hands conceded that
treaties relating to boundaries and to rights of navigation
continue in force without regard to changes in government
or in sovereignty. This principle obviously applies
to that part of the treaty of 1846 which relates to the
Isthmus of Panama.

In conclusion let me repeat that the question actually
before this Government is not that of the recognition of
Panama as an independent Republic. That is already an
accomplished fact. The question, and the only question,
is whether or not we shall build an isthmian canal.

I transmit herewith copies of the latest notes from the
Minister of the Republic of Panama to this Government,
and of certain notes which have passed between the
Special Envoy of the Republic of Colombia and this
Government.