University of Virginia Library

IV
AT HAVERHILL, MASS., AUGUST 26, 1902

My fellow-citizens:

Naturally at the home of Secretary Moody I should
like to say a word or two about the navy. I think that
whenever we touch on the navy we are sure of a hearty
response from any American audience; we are just as
sure of such a response in the mountains and great
plains of the West as upon the Atlantic or Pacific seaboards.
The entire country is vitally interested in the
navy, because an efficient navy of adequate size is not
only the best guarantee of peace, but is also the surest
means for seeing that if war does come the result shall
be honorable to our good name and favorable to our
national interests.

Any really great nation must be peculiarly sensitive to
two things: stain on the national honor at home, and
disgrace to the national arms abroad. Our honor at
home, our honor in domestic and internal affairs is at all
times in our own keeping and depends simply upon the
national possession of an awakened public conscience.
But the only way to make safe our honor as affected, not
by our own deeds, but by the deeds of others, is by readiness
in advance. In three great crises in our history
during the nineteenth century—in the War of 1812, in
the Civil War, and again in the Spanish War—the navy
rendered to the nation services of literally incalculable
worth. In the Civil War we had to meet antagonists even

more unprepared at sea than we were. On both the other
occasions we encountered foreign foes, and the fighting
was done entirely by ships built long in advance, and by
officers and crews who had been trained during years of
sea service for the supreme day when their qualities were
put to the final test. The ships which won at Manila
and Santiago under the administration of President McKinley
had been built years before under Presidents
Arthur and Cleveland and Harrison. The officers in
those ships had been trained from their earliest youth to
their profession, and the enlisted men, in addition to their
natural aptitude, their intelligence, and their courage, had
been drilled as marksmen with the great guns and as
machinists in the engine-rooms, and perfected in all the
details of their work during years of cruising on the high
seas and of incessant target practice. It was this preparedness
which was the true secret of the enormous
difference in efficiency between our navy and the Spanish
navy. There was no lack of courage and self-devotion
among the Spaniards, but on our side, in addition to the
courage and devotion, for the lack of which no training
could atone, there was also that training—the training
which comes only as the result of years of thorough and
painstaking practice.

Annapolis is, with the sole exception of its sister academy
at West Point, the most typically democratic and
American school of learning and preparation that there is
in the entire country. Men go there from every State,
from every walk of life, professing every creed—the chance
of entry being open to all who perfect themselves in the
necessary studies and who possess the necessary moral
and physical qualities. There each man enters on his
merits, stands on his merits, and graduates into a service
where only his merit will enable him to be of value.

The enlisted men are of fine type, as they needs must
be to do their work well, whether in the gun turret or in

the engine-room; and out of the fine material thus provided,
the finished man-of-war's man is evolved by years
of sea service.

It is impossible after the outbreak of war to improvise
either the ships or the men of a navy. A war vessel is a
bit of mechanism as delicate and complicated as it is
formidable. You might just as well expect to turn an
unskilled laborer off-hand into a skilled machinist or into
the engineer of a flyer on one of our big railroad systems,
as to put men aboard a battleship with the expectation
that they will do anything but discredit themselves until
they have had months and years in which thoroughly to
learn their duties. Our shipbuilders and gunmakers must
keep ever on the alert so that no rivals pass them by;
and the officers and enlisted men on board the ships must
in their turn, by the exercise of unflagging and intelligent
zeal, keep themselves fit to get the best use out of the
weapons of war intrusted to their care. The instrument
is always important, but the man who uses it is more important
still. We must constantly endeavor to perfect
our navy in all its duties in time of peace, and above all
in manoeuvring in a sea-way and in marksmanship with
the great guns. In battle the only shots that count are
those that hit, arid marksmanship is a matter of long
practice and of intelligent reasoning. A navy's efficiency
in a war depends mainly upon its preparedness at the
outset of that war. We are not to be excused as a nation
if there is not such preparedness of our navy. This is
especially so in view of what we have done during the
last four years. No nation has a right to undertake a big
task unless it is prepared to do it in masterful and effective
style. It would be an intolerable humiliation for us
to embark on such a course of action as followed from
our declaration of war with Spain, and not make good
our words by deeds—not be ready to prove our truth by
our endeavor whenever the need calls. The good work of

building up the navy must go on without ceasing. The
modern warship cannot with advantage be allowed to
rust in disuse. It must be used up in active service even
in time of peace. This means that there must be a constant
replacement of the ineffective by the effective. The
work of building up and keeping up our navy is therefore
one which needs our constant and unflagging vigilance.
Our navy is now efficient; but we must be content with
no ordinary degree of efficiency. Every effort must be
made to bring it ever nearer to perfection. In making
such effort the prime factor is to have at the head of the
navy such an official as your fellow-townsman, Mr. Moody;
and the next is to bring home to our people as a whole
the need of thorough and ample preparation in advance;
this preparation to take the form not only of continually
building ships, but of keeping these ships in commission
under conditions which will develop the highest degree
of efficiency in the officers and enlisted men aboard them.