ANALOGY IN
EARLY GREEK THOUGHT
I
Analogy, in its broadest sense, comprehends any
mode
of reasoning that depends on the suggestion or recog-
nition of a relationship of similarity between two ob-
jects or sets of objects. It includes not only
four-term
proportional relationships of the type A:B::C:D (for
which
the Greek term is
ἀναλογία),
but also both
explicit and implicit comparisons, for example the use
of models
(παραδείγματα)
and of images
(εἰκόνεσ).
In
early Greek thought analogies played a fundamental
role in the
expression of cosmological doctrines, in the
development of natural
science, and in ethical and
political arguments.
The three most important types of images used in
cosmological theories are
(1) political and social, (2)
vitalist, and (3) technological, in which,
roughly speak-
ing, the cosmos is conceived as
a state, as a living being,
and as an artifact respectively.
1. Political and Social Images.
The use of political
and social concepts is widespread in
pre-Socratic
cosmology. The idea of cosmic order as a balance of
power
between equal opposed forces goes back to
Anaximander, who describes the
relation between cer-
tain cosmic factors in
legal terms: “They pay the pen-
alty
and recompense to one another for their injustice
according to the
assessment of time.” Heraclitus, on
the other hand, stresses the
constant war and strife
between opposites: “One must realize
that war is com-
mon and justice is strife and
everything happens
through strife and necessity” (frag. 80). But
both
Parmenides in the Way of Seeming and
Empedocles
in his poem On Nature revert to the idea
of a cosmic
balance of power. In Empedocles, for example, Love
and
Strife are equals: they gain the upper hand in the
world in turn, and these
alternations are governed by
a “broad oath,” that is,
by some sort of contract be-
tween them.
Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia use a third
type of political model,
ascribing supreme power to
a single cosmic principle, and Plato similarly
attributes
supreme power to Reason which governs and arranges
all
things for the best. Superficially this last group of
images resembles the
traditional descriptions of Zeus
as supreme god; but there is this
fundamental differ-
ence, that the
philosophers ascribe supreme power not
to a capricious deity, but to the
principle of order and
rationality itself, to Mind or Reason or, in the
case of
Diogenes, to Air, thought of as the seat of intelligence.
These authoritarian images too, like the egalitarian
ones of Anaximander
and Empedocles, serve to express
the idea of cosmic order, although they do
so from
a different point of view and with different associations.
All these philosophers describe the cosmos in terms
of a concrete political
or social situation, whether of
a balance of power and equality of rights,
or of constant
war and aggression, or of benevolent, authoritarian
rule. Plato's antidemocratic, authoritarian political
inclinations are
echoed in his descriptions of Reason
as a supreme, benevolent cosmic ruler,
but the evi-
dence concerning earlier
philosophers is too scanty to
allow us to determine how closely their
cosmological
images tallied with their particular political
ideologies.
However, there are two ways in which their images
may be
related to their historical and social back-
ground.
First, the development of the Greek city-state from
about the seventh
century B.C. was accompanied by
an increasing political awareness and a new
conception
of political rights. In particular the framing of consti-
tutions and the codification of laws
led to a much less
arbitrary administration of justice than had been
the
case in earlier periods. These changes had their coun-
terparts in the political images used
by the cosmolo-
gists; varied as those
images are, they have in common
the notion that cosmological changes are
governed by
rules that are independent of the caprice of individuals.
The development in the attitude towards justice in the
city-state is
reflected in the development of Greek
cosmology itself, since it was
largely by means of the
ideas of law and justice that the pre-Socratic
thinkers
expressed the notion that the changes affecting the
primary
substances in the world are orderly and regu-
lated by immutable principles.
Secondly, the very variety of images and of the
cosmological doctrines
themselves is significant. As in
the political sphere the rise of the
city-state is accom-
panied by a
proliferation of constitutional forms rang-
ing
from extreme democracy to tyranny, the merits
of each of which were much
debated, so similarly in
the field of speculative thought the philosophers
felt
free to reject earlier ideas and to attempt to resolve
each
problem for themselves, and each new theory as
it was advanced was
discussed and criticized openly.
It is difficult to decide how far any of the pre-
Socratics recognized an element of transference in
applying
political and social conceptions to the cosmos.
No philosopher before Plato
explicitly refers to his
cosmological images as images
(εἰκόνεσ),
and yet it is
unlikely that any of them simply failed to differentiate
at all between the realm of society and that of nature,
the relations
between which had become, by the end
of the fifth century at least, the
subject of heated
controversy. Heraclitus, for instance, tacitly distin-
guishes between human laws and the
divine law, while
saying that the former depend on the latter, in frag.
114. Evidently he did not simply confuse human soci-
ety and cosmic order. Yet law and justice applied to
the cosmos were no mere figures of speech, for order
in the human sphere
was regularly conceived as part
of the wider cosmic
order and as somehow derived
from it.
2. Vitalist Images.
Most of the earlier pre-Socratic
philosophers imagined that the
primary stuff out of
which things are made or from which they
originate
is not merely like something that is
alive, but is indeed
instinct with life. This is
true of all three Milesian
philosophers and of Heraclitus; when he
describes the
world-order as an “ever-living” fire in
frag. 30, “ever-
living” is not simply a poetical equivalent for
“ever-
lasting,”
for he held that fire is indeed the substance
of which our own souls
consist. Later the Atomists too
seem to have believed that the mass of
atoms from
which worlds originate is instinct with life in the sense
that it is permeated by soul-atoms. Although Aristotle
ridiculed the belief
that soul is intermingled in the
whole universe, he himself held that the
heavenly
bodies are alive, and indeed some of his general physi-
cal theories, for example the doctrine of
potentiality
and actuality, are much influenced by ideas which
apply
primarily to the sphere of living things.
These and other vitalist beliefs affected the develop-
ment of Greek cosmology in three main ways.
First,
the earliest philosophers were “hylozoists”;
they as-
sumed that the primary substance, being
alive, is in
motion. The question of the origin or cause of move-
ment only came to be recognized as a
problem after
Parmenides had denied the possibility of change.
Secondly, vitalist notions are naturally very impor-
tant in accounts of how the world developed from an
original,
undifferentiated state. Anaximander, for ex-
ample, pictured the world evolving from a seed that
separated off
from the Boundless, and some of the
Pythagoreans too thought that the One
from which
the cosmos developed was composed of seed.
Thirdly, the structure of the cosmos was sometimes
compared with that of man
and vice versa. The idea
that the world is a living creature may underlie
the
comparison that Anaximenes drew between the role
of air in the
world and that of breath in man. But two
of the Hippocratic treatises put
forward much more
elaborate analogies between the microcosm and the
macrocosm. In De victu man's body is said to be
a
copy of the world-whole, the stomach being compared
with the sea and
so on. And De hebdomadibus suggests
detailed
correspondences both between the substances
in the body and those in the
universe—where the bones
correspond to the stony core of the
earth, for example—
and between the various parts of the body
and different
geographical areas—where the Thracian Bosphorus is
said to correspond to the feet, the Peloponnese to the
head,
and so on. While Plato proposed no detailed
analogy between the anatomy of
man and the structure
of the universe, he stated unequivocally his
conviction
that “this world is in truth a living creature,
endowed
with soul and reason” (
Timaeus
30b), and according
to the
Philebus (29b ff.) both
our body and our soul
are derived from the body and the soul of the world-
whole respectively.
3. Technological Images.
Several of the pre-
Socratics use
the metaphor of steering in their cos-
mologies, but the first to employ a wide range of
technological
images is Empedocles, and then both
Plato and Aristotle use them
extensively in two con-
texts, especially, (1)
to describe the role of a moving
or efficient cause, and (2) to express the
idea of intelli-
gent design in the cosmos.
In Empedocles' system everything is composed of
the four
“roots,” earth, water, air, and fire, together
with
Love and Strife, and in describing how complex
substances and the organs in
the body come to be he
assigns to Love the role of craftsman, the four
elements
being the material on which it works. It would be
anachronistic to attribute a clear distinction between
“material” and “efficient” causes to
Empedocles; but
it is in the descriptions of the craftsmanlike
activity
of Love that he comes closest to treating it as a purely
efficient cause. Plato's Timaeus is the first Greek
text
to describe the formation of the world as a whole as
the work of
a Craftsman. In Plato the Demiurge takes
over already existing matter and
imposes order on its
disorderly movements, and his account of the
details
of creation is full of images drawn from carpentry,
weaving,
modelling, metallurgy, and agricultural tech-
nology. Aristotle's unmoved mover, unlike Plato's
Craftsman, is only
a final, not an efficient cause; but
Aristotle too believes that final
causes are at work in
natural processes, and he uses comparisons drawn
from
the arts and crafts extensively to illustrate this. Despite
their
unconcealed contempt for the life led by merely
human artisans, both Plato
and Aristotle found techno-
logical
imagery indispensable for expressing their belief
in the rational design of
the universe.
II
The history of early Greek cosmology is largely the
history of the
interpretation of the cosmos in terms
of various ideas derived from the
three fields of politics,
biology, and technology. Aristotle, especially,
criticized
many such ideas, as for example the belief that such
substances as air or fire are alive. Yet these three types
of images
continued to be influential long after him.
The Stoics, in particular, not
only represented the
cosmos as a living creature and believed in the pur-
poseful, craftsmanlike activity of Nature,
but also
described the world as a state governed by divine law,
and
similar ideas had a long history in the Middle Ages
and in the Renaissance.
Moreover while Greek cosmology owed many ideas
to politics and biology,
Greek biological theories and
political thought were similarly colored by
the use of
images drawn from one another. For example, the twin
ideas
that health depends on the equality of rights
(ἰσονομία)
of opposed powers in the body, and that
disease results from the supreme
rule
(μοναρχία)
of one
such power, go back to Alcmaeon and thereafter be-
come commonplaces of Greek pathology and thera-
peutics. Aristotle, too, compares the
living creature
with a well-governed city, describing the heart as the
central seat of authority in the body (e.g., De motu
animalium 703a 29ff.).
Conversely Greek political theorists sometimes
compare the state with a
living organism, and the
influence of other biological and technological
analo-
gies on Greek ethics is marked.
Here Plato provides
the best examples. First he constructed an
elaborate
analogy between the state and the individual in the
Republic, suggesting, for instance, that both may be
divided into three parts, one of which—the Guardians
in the
state and reason in the soul—should be in overall
control. A
second important analogy in Plato is that
between justice and health. This
provides the main
grounds for the two theses, (1) that the just man is
happier than the unjust, and (2) that once having done
wrong, it is better
to suffer than to escape punish-
ment—for punishment is the “cure” for
injustice. And
a third recurrent analogy is that between the
politician
and the artist or craftsman, where Plato suggests that
the
statesman must be an expert in politics in a way
comparable with that in
which a pilot is expert in
navigation or a doctor in medicine. We find
similar
types of analogies in Aristotle, too. In the Politics (1295a
40f.) he describes the constitution as the life,
as it were,
of the state, and in the Nicomachean
Ethics (1113a
25ff.) he draws a comparison between the good man
and the healthy: just as a sick person may be mistaken
about what is hot or
cold or sweet or bitter, and the
judge of these things is the normal,
healthy man, so,
he argues, the good man (ὁ
σπουδαῖος)
is the judge of
what is right and wrong.
Greek ideas on nature and art, on the state, the living
organism, and the
world as a whole, are linked by a
series of interlocking analogies. Most of
the major fifth-
and fourth-century
philosophers put forward analogies
of one or other of the types we have
considered. Yet
the particular forms that their analogies take are
very
varied, and no single version of any of them dominates
the
period. Had any such orthodoxy existed, these
analogies might have impeded
the development of
certain inquiries far more than they did. As it was,
although some Hippocratic writers produced elaborate
versions
of the microcosm-macrocosm analogy, this did
not prevent other theorists
from making considerable
progress in both the study of anatomy and in astron-
omy, during the fourth century. Again,
both Plato and
Aristotle held that the stars are alive and divine, al-
though this had been denied by such thinkers
as
Anaxagoras; yet this belief did not prevent Aristotle
from
attempting a detailed mechanical account of the
movements of the heavenly
bodies, based on Eudoxus'
theory of concentric spheres.
III
Two other features of the role of analogy in early
Greek thought that are
especially notable are (1) their
use as a method of suggesting or
supporting explana-
tions of particular
natural phenomena, and (2) the
gradual exploration of the logic of analogy.
The begin-
nings of the first use go back to
the Milesians, who
based many of their accounts of obscure
astronomical,
meteorological, and geological phenomena on simple
analogies with familiar objects. Thus Anaximenes
compared lightning with
the flash made by an oar in
water, believing both phenomena to be the
result of
a cleaving process. His predecessor Anaximander sug-
gested a more elaborate and artificial
analogy in which
he pictured the heavenly bodies as wheels of fire
enclosed in mist; the stars themselves are seen through
openings in the
mist, and he described eclipses of the
sun and moon as being due to the
temporary blocking
of their apertures. Primitive though this theory is,
it
ranks as the first known attempt to construct a me-
chanical model of the heavenly bodies.
The use of such comparisons grows as the range of
problems investigated is
extended. Empedocles and
some of the Hippocratic writers, especially,
propose
ingenious analogies to explain processes that take place
within the body. Thus Empedocles compares the proc-
ess of respiration with the action of a clepsydra (water
clock).
De natura pueri compares the formation of
a
membrane round the seed in the womb with that of
a crust on bread as
it is baked, and De morbis IV
compares the
formation of stones in the bladder with
the smelting of iron ore. The same
writer also illustrates
how the humors travel between different parts of
the
body by referring to the way in which a system of
three or more
intercommunicating vessels may be filled
with a liquid or emptied by
filling or emptying one
of them, and on other occasions, too, Greek
scientists
refer to simple tests carried out on substances outside
the
body in their search for analogies for biological
processes.
These writers rarely examine explicitly the question
of how the analogies
they propose apply to the phe-
nomena they
were supposed to explain, and many of
their ideas seem farfetched. Even so, analogy provided
an
important, indeed in some cases the only, means
of bringing empirical
evidence to bear on obscure or
intractable problems, especially in such
fields as as-
tronomy and meteorology,
embryology and pathology,
where direct experimentation was generally out of
the
question.
Various writers, beginning with Anaxagoras at the
end of the fifth century,
refer to this use of analogy
under the general heading of making
“phenomena the
vision of things that are obscure”
(ὄψισ
τω̑ν
ἀδήλων
τὰ
φαινόμενα),
and awareness of most of the different
modes of analogy grows rapidly in
the fourth century.
Plato, himself one of the chief exponents of
reasoning
from analogy, was the first to point out how deceptive
similarities may be, and to draw attention to the differ-
ence between merely probable arguments, including
emotive images and myths, and demonstrations. Then
Aristotle analyzed
analogical argument as such in the
form of the paradigm, explaining its
relation to induc-
tion and showing that it is
not formally demonstrative.
Nevertheless he granted its usefulness as a
persuasive
argument in the field of rhetoric, and he even described
how a dialectician may exploit similarities in order to
deceive an
opponent. Plato and Aristotle made decisive
advances in exploring the logic
of arguments from
analogy: yet the effect of their work was not, of
course,
to preclude the use of such arguments, but rather to
show that
they are not formally valid. Moreover while
Aristotle successfully analyzed
analogy as a method of
inference, neither he nor any later Greek logician
made
much progress towards elucidating the other important
function of
analogy, namely as a method of discovery
in natural science.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The principal texts are discussed in G. E. R. Lloyd,
Polarity and Analogy: two types of argumentation in
early
Greek thought (Cambridge, 1966), which includes an exten-
sive bibliography. See also
especially H. Diller, “ὄψισ
τω̑ν
ἀδήλων
τὰ
φαινόμενα
,” Hermes,
67 (1932), 14-42; H.
Gomperz, “Problems
and Methods of Early Greek Science,”
Journal of the History of Ideas,
4 (1943), 161-76; W. K. C.
Guthrie,
“Man's Role in the Cosmos,” The
Living Heritage
of Greek Antiquity (The Hague, 1967), pp.
56-73; C. W.
Müller, Gleiches zu Gleichem:
ein Prinzip frühgriechischen
Denkens (Wiesbaden,
1965); O. Regenbogen, Eine For-
schungsmethode antiker
Naturwissenschaft, Quell. u. Stud.
zur Gesch. der Mathematik,
Astronomie u. Physik, B I, 2
(Berlin, 1930); F. Solmsen,
“Nature as Craftsman in Greek
Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas,
24 (1963), 473-96.
G. E. R. LLOYD
[See also
Atomism; Balance of Power;
Cosmology; Creation;
Nature; Pythagorean Doctrines to 300 B.C.; Stoicism.]