University of Virginia Library

"Ransom moved at 4:45 a. m., being somewhat delayed by a dense fog,
which lasted several hours after dawn and occasioned some embarrassment.
This division consisted of the following brigades in the order mentioned,
commencing from the left: Gracie's, Kemper's (commanded by
Colonel Terry), Barton's (under Colonel Fry), and Colonel Lewis's (Hoke's
old brigade). He was soon engaged, carrying the enemy's breastworks in
his front at 6 a. m. with some loss. His troops moved splendidly to the
assault, capturing five stands of colors and some 500 prisoners. The
brigades most heavily engaged were Gracie's and Kemper's, opposed to the
enemy's right, the former turning his flank. General Ransom then halted
to form, reported his loss heavy and troops scattered by the fog, his ammunition
short, and asked for a brigade from the reserve. Colquitt's brigade
was sent him at 6:30 a. m., with orders to return when it ceased to be
indispensable. Before either ammunition or the reserve brigade had
arrived, he reported the enemy driving Hoke's left, and sent the right
regiment of Lewis's brigade forward at double quick towards the supposed
point of danger. This held the enemy long enough for the reserve brigade
to arrive, charge and drive him back from the front of our left center,
where the affair occurred over and along the works to the turnpike.[14]

"It will be seen from a subsequent part of this report that one of Hagood's
advanced regiments had unexpectedly come into contact with the enemy
and been ordered back, it not being contemplated to press at this point
until Ransom should swing round his left as directed in the battle order.
This possibly originated Ransom's impression as to the condition of Hoke's
left, which in fact had steadily maintained its proper position. At 7:15
a. m., Colquitt's brigade of the reserve was recalled from Ransom and a
slight modification of the original movement was made to relieve Hoke,
in whose front the enemy had been allowed to mass his forces by the
inaction of the left. Ransom was ordered to flank the enemy's right by
changing the front of his right brigade, to support it by another in echellon,
to advance another to Proctor's Creek, and hold a fourth in reserve. This
modification was intended to be temporary, and the original plan was to be
fully carried out on the seizure of the River Road and Proctor's Creek
Crossing.

"In proceeding to execute this order, Ransom found the reserve brigade
engaged, and his own troops moving by the right flank towards the firing
at the center. He, therefore, sent Barton's brigade back instead of Colquitt's,
and reported a necessity to reform and straighten his lines in the
old position near the breastworks he had stormed. Here his infantry rested
during the greater part of the day. Dunovant's cavalry, dismounted, were
thrown forward as skirmishers towards a small force, which occupied a
ridge in the edge of George Gregory's woods, north of Proctor's Creek. This
force with an insignificant body of cavalry, believed to have been negroes,
and a report of threatening gunboats which came some hours earlier, were
the only menace to our left, as since ascertained.

"At 10 a. m., I withheld an order for Ransom to move, until further
arrangements should be made, for the following reasons: The right was
heavily engaged; all the reserve had been detached right and left at
different times; a dispatch had been sent to Whiting at 9 a. m., which was
repeated at 9:30 a. m., `to press on and press over everything in your front
and the day will be complete', and Ransom not only reported a strong force
in his front, but expressed the opinion that the safety of his command
would be compromised by an advance.

"On the right, Hoke early advanced his skirmishers and opened his
artillery. The fog and other causes temporarily delayed the advance of his
line of battle. When he finally moved forward, he soon became hotly
engaged. Hagood and Johnson were thrown forward with a section of
Eschellman's artillery (Washington), and found a heavy force of the enemy
with six or eight pieces of artillery occupying our outer line of works on
the turnpike and his own defensive lines. Our artillery engaged at very
short range, disabling some of the enemy's guns and blowing up two
limbers. Another section of the same battery opened from the right of
the turnpike. They both held their positions, though with heavy loss, until
their ammunition was spent, when they were relieved by an equal number
of pieces from the reserve artillery under Major Owens.

"Hagood with great vigor and dash drove the enemy from the outer lines
in his front, capturing a number of prisoners, and, in conjunction with
Johnson, five pieces of artillery—three 20 dr. Parrotts and two fine Napoleons.
He then took position in the works, his left regiment being thrown
forward by Hoke to connect with Ransom's right. In advancing, this regiment
encountered the enemy behind a second line of breastworks in the
woods with abatis interlaced with wire. Attack at this point not being contemplated,
it was ordered back to the line of battle, but not before its rapid
advance had caused it considerable loss. This circumstance has been
referred to before as the occasion of a mistake made by Ransom.

"Johnson meanwhile had been heavily engaged. The line of the enemy
bent round his right flank, subjecting his brigade for a time to a fire in
flank and front. With admirable firmness he repulsed frequent assaults of
the enemy moving against his right and rear. Leader, officers and men
alike displayed their fitness to the trial to which they were subjected.
Among many instances of heroism, I can not forbear to mention that of
Lieutenant Waggoner, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment. He went
alone through a storm of fire and pulled down a white flag which a small
isolated body of our men had raised, receiving a wound in the act. The
brigade holding its ground nobly, lost more than a fourth of its entire
number. Two regiments of the reserve were sent up to its support, but
were less effective than they should have been, owing to a mistake of the
officer posting them. Hoke also sent two regiments from Clingman's to
protect Johnson's flank. The same mistake was made in posting these.
They were placed in the woods, where the moral and material effect of their
presence was lost.

"I now ordered Hoke to press forward his right for the relief of his right
center. He advanced Clingman with his remaining two regiments, and
Corse with his brigade. They drove the enemy with spirit, suffering some
loss, but the gap between Clingman and the troops on his left induced him
to retire his command to prevent being flanked, and reform it in the
intermediate lines. Thus Corse became isolated, and learning from his
officers that masses were forming on his right flank, he withdrew some
distance, not quite as far back as his original position. These two brigades
were not afterward engaged, though they went to the front, Corse about
one hour after he fell back, and Clingman about 2:15 p. m. The enemy
did not reoccupy the ground from which they drove them before their
retreat.

"In front of Hagood and Johnson, the fighting was stubborn and prolonged.
The enemy slowly retired from Johnson's right and took a strong
position on the ridge in front of Proctor's Creek, massing near the turnpike
and occupying advantageous ground at the house and grove of Charles
Friend. At length, Johnson having brushed the enemy from his right flank
in the woods with some assistance from the Washington Artillery, and
cleared his front, rested his troops in the shelter of the exterior works.
One of the captured pieces having opened on the enemy's masses, he finally
fell back behind the wood and ridge at Proctor's Creek, though his skirmish

line continued the engagement some hours longer. Further movement was
here suspended to wait communication from Whiting, or the sound of his
approach, and to reorganize the troops which had become more or less
disorganized. Brief firing, at 1:45 p. m., gave some hopes of his approach.
I waited in vain. The firing heard was probably between Dearing[15] and
the enemy's rear guard. Dearing had been ordered by Whiting to communicate
with me, but unsupported by infantry or artillery he was unable
to do so except by sending a detachment by a circuitous route which
reached me after the work of the day was closed. At 4 p. m., all hope of
Whiting's approach was gone, and I reluctantly abandoned so much of my
plan as contemplated more than a vigorous pursuit of Butler and driving
him back to his fortified base. To effect this, I resumed my original position
and ordered General Hoke to send two brigades along the Courthouse
road to take the enemy in flank and establish enfilading batteries in front
of the heights west of the railroad.

"The formation of our line was checked by a heavy and prolonged storm
of rain. Meanwhile, the enemy opened a severe fire, which was soon
silenced by our artillery. Before we were ready to advance, darkness
approached and upon consultation with several of my subordinate officers,
it was deemed imprudent to attack, considering the probability of serious
obstacles and the proximity of Butler's entrenched camp. I, therefore, put
the army in position for the night and sent instructions to Whiting to join
our right at the railroad in the morning.

"During the night, the enemy retired to the fortified line of his present
camp, leaving in our hands some fourteen hundred prisoners, five pieces of
artillery, and five stand of colors. He now rests there, hemmed by our lines
which have since from time to time been advanced with every skirmish,
and now completely cover the southern communications of the capital, thus
securing one of the principal objects of the attack. The more glorious
results anticipated were lost by the hesitation of the left wing and the premature
halt of the Petersburg column before obstacles in neither case
sufficient to have deterred from the execution of the movement prescribed.

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