University of Virginia Library

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"Our army was organized into three divisions, right, left and reserve,
under Major-Generals Hoke and Ransom, and Brigadier-General Colquitt.
. . . Our left (Ransom) lay behind the trenches on Kingland Creek,
which runs an easterly course not far in front of Drury's Bluff. Our right

wing (Hoke) occupied the intermediate line of fortifications from Fort
Stephens, crossing the turnpike to the railroad. Colquitt's reserve, in rear
of Hoke, centered on the turnpike. The cavalry was posted on our flank
and in reserve, and the artillery distributed among the divisions. A
column from Petersburg, under Major-General Whiting, had been directed
to proceed to Swift Creek on the turnpike, over three miles from Petersburg
and nine from my lines, and was under orders to advance at daybreak
to Walthal Junction, three miles nearer. The enemy's forces, under
Butler, comprised the corps of Gilmore and W. F. Smith (Tenth and
Eighteenth) and his line was generally parallel to ours. . . . They
held our own outer lines of works, crossing the turnpike half a mile in our
front. Their line of breastworks and entrenchments increased in strength
with its progress westward. Its right and weakest point was in the edge
of William Gregory's woods, about half a mile from James River. . . .
Going westwardly, after crossing the railroad, their line widened to the
north.

"With the foregoing data, I determined upon the following plan: That our
left wing, turning and hurled upon Butler's weak right, should with crushing
force double it back on the center, thus interposing an exterior barrier
between Butler and his base; that our right wing should simultaneously,
with its skirmishers and afterwards in force, as soon as the left became
fully engaged, advance and occupy the enemy to prevent his re-enforcing
his right and thus form his northern barrier without, however, permanently
seeking to force him far back before our left could completely outflank him
and our Petersburg column close up in his rear; and, finally, that the
Petersburg column, marching to the sound of heaviest firing, should interpose
a southern barrier to his retreat. Thus environed by three walls of
fire, Butler, with his defeated troops, could have no resource against substantial
capture or destruction, except in an attempt at partial and hazardous
escape westward away from his base trains and supplies. Two difficulties
might impede or defeat the success of this plan; one was a possible
stubborn and effective resistance of the enemy, in virtue of his superior
numbers; another (probably a grave one) existed as to the efficient and
rapid handling of a fragmentary army like ours, so hastily assembled and
organized—half of the brigades without general officers, some of the troops
unacquainted with their commanders and neighbors, staff officers unknown
to each other, etc. The moral force arising from the unity, which springs
from old association, was entirely wanting; and from these causes, generally
so productive of confusion, great inconvenience arose. On the other
hand, I reckoned on the advantage of being ready at daylight, with short
distances over which to operate, a long day before me to maneuver in, plan
direct routes and simplicity in the movements to be executed. Accordingly,
at 10:45 a. m. on the 15th, preparatory information and orders were forwarded
to Major-General Whiting, then at Petersburg twelve miles from
me, with instructions to move his force to Swift Creek, three miles nearer,
during the night, and at daylight next morning to proceed to Walthal
Junction, about three miles still nearer. These instructions were duly

received by that officer, and were as follows: `I shall attack the enemy in
my front tomorrow at daybreak by River Road, to cut him off from his
Bermuda base. You will take up your position tonight at Swift Creek with
Wise's, Martin's, Dearing's and two regiments of Colquitt's brigade, with
about twenty field pieces under Colonel Jones. At daybreak you will
march to Walthal Junction, and when you hear an engagement in your
front you will advance boldly and rapidly by the shortest road in the
direction of the heaviest firing to attack enemy in rear or flank. You will
protect your advance and flank with Dearing's Cavalry, taking necessary
precautions to distinguish friend from foe. Please communicate this to
General Hill. This revokes all former orders of movement. Signed G. T.
Beaureguard, General Commanding. P. S.—I have just received a telegram
from General Bragg informing me that he has ordered you to join
me at this place; you need not do so, but follow to the letter the above
instructions. G. T. B.' In the early afternoon I delivered in person to the
other division commanders assembled the following circular instructions
of battle, with additional oral instructions to General Ransom, that while
driving the enemy he should promptly occupy with a brigade the crossing
of Proctor's Creek by the River Road, which was Butler's shortest line of
retreat to Bermuda Hundred's Neck.