An equal division of lands cannot be established in all democracies.
There are some circumstances in which a regulation of this nature would
be impracticable, dangerous, and even subversive of the constitution. We
are not always obliged to proceed to extremes. If it appears that this
division of lands, which was designed to preserve the people's morals,
does not suit the democracy, recourse must be had to other methods.
If a permanent body be established to serve as a rule and pattern of
manners; a senate, to which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent services
procure admittance; the senators, by being exposed to public view like
the statues of the gods, must naturally inspire every family with
sentiments of virtue.
Above all, this senate must steadily adhere to the ancient
institutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve
from them.
The preservation of the ancient customs is a very considerable point
in respect to manners. Since a corrupt people seldom perform any
memorable actions, seldom establish societies, build cities, or enact
laws; on the contrary, since most institutions are derived from people
whose manners are plain and simple, to keep up the ancient customs is
the way to preserve the original purity of morals.
Besides, if by some revolution the state has happened to assume a
new form, this seldom can be effected without infinite pains and labour,
and hardly ever by idle and debauched persons. Even those who had been
the instruments of the revolution were desirous it should be relished,
which is difficult to compass without good laws. Hence it is that
ancient institutions generally tend to reform the people's manners, and
those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long
administration, the descent to vice is insensible; but there is no
reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.
It has been questioned whether the members of the senate we are
speaking of ought to be for life or only chosen for a time. Doubtless
they ought to be for life, as was the custom at Rome,
[15]
at Sparta,
[16]
and even at Athens. For we must not confound the senate at Athens, which
was a body that changed every three months, with the Areopagus, whose
members, as standing patterns, were established for life.
Let this be therefore a general maxim; that in a senate designed to
be a rule, and the depository, as it were, of manners, the members ought
to be chosen for life: in a senate intended for the administration of
affairs, the members may be changed.
The spirit, says Aristotle, waxes old as well as the body. This
reflection holds good only in regard to a single magistrate, but cannot
be applied to a senatorial assembly.
At Athens, besides the Areopagus, there were guardians of the public
morals, as well as of the laws.
[17]
At Sparta, all the old men were censors. At Rome, the censorship was
committed to two particular magistrates. As the senate watched over the people,
the censors were to have an eye over the people and the senate. Their office was to reform
the corruptions of the republic, to stigmatise indolence, to censure
neglects, and to correct mistakes; as to flagrant crimes, these were
left to the punishment of the laws.
That Roman law which required the accusations in cases of adultery
to be public was admirably well calculated for preserving the purity of
morals; it intimidated married women, as well as those who were to watch
over their conduct.
Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an
extreme subordination of the young to the old. Thus they are both
restrained, the former by their respect for those of advanced age, and
the latter by their regard for themselves.
Nothing gives a greater force to the law than a perfect
subordination between the citizens and the magistrate. "The great
difference which Lycurgus established between Sparta and the other
cities," says Xenophon,
[18]
"consists chiefly in the obedience the citizens show to their laws;
they run when the magistrate calls them. But at Athens a rich man would be
highly displeased to be thought dependent on the magistrate."
Paternal authority is likewise of great use towards the preservation
of morals. We have already observed that in a republic there is not so
coercive a force as in other governments. The laws must therefore
endeavour to supply this defect by some means or other; and this is done
by paternal authority.
Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death over their
children.
[19]
At Sparta, every father had a right to correct another
man's child.
Paternal authority ended at Rome together with the republic. In
monarchies, where such a purity of morals is not required, they are
controlled by no other authority than that of the magistrates.
The Roman laws, which accustomed young people to dependence,
established a long minority. Perhaps we are mistaken in conforming to
this custom; there is no necessity for so much constraint in monarchies.
This very subordination in a republic might make it necessary for
the father to continue in the possession of his children's fortune
during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the
spirit of monarchy.
