University of Virginia Library

BATTLE OF DRURY'S BLUFF.

Butler, during the 9th May, incompletely destroyed a part of
the railroad by upsetting the road structure, the crossties and
rails remaining attached, and it is said[11] intended on the 10th to
cross Swift Creek and make a determined effort at the capture of
Petersburg; but deceived by tidings from Washington received
the night of the 9th, that Lee was in full retreat before Grant,
he determined to turn northward and assist in the capture of
Richmond. Instead, however, of pressing at once upon the latter
place with its meagre garrison, he withdrew aside into his
entrenchments at Bermuda Hundreds, leaving the road open for
the transfer by the shortest route of the troops which had been
confronting him at Swift Creek, into the immediate southern
defenses of the Confederate Capital at Drury's Bluff, and did not
march on the latter place until two days afterward.

In the meanwhile, Major-General Hoke arrived at Petersburg
with the troops (three brigades) which he had had with him in
Eastern North Carolina, and, assuming command, put all our
forces in march for Drury's Bluff along the turnpike left open
by Butler, The movement was a flank march of ten miles along
the enemy's front, he being in superior force about three miles to
the right. The army moved in column of fours, with a field
battery between each brigade, and the ambulances and ordnance
wagons following their respective commands. The usual advance
and rear guards were formed and a strong force of infantry
flankers marched some three hundred yards on the right in single
file at deployed intervals. Cavalry moved parallel with the

march, still further towards the side of attack. The movement
commenced at 1 p. m. on the 11th; Hoke bivouacked eight miles
from Swift Creek, and on the morning of the 12th marched into
the lines of Drury's Bluff. He was not molested. It commenced
raining the night of the 11th and continued two or three days.
The troops suffered much from cold and wet.

Soon after we were in position at Drury's, on the 12th, and
had established our picket line, the enemy appeared. Skirmishing
commenced and was maintained with more or less vigor
during that day and the next. Toward evening of the 13th, some
advantage was obtained over the North Carolina troops on our
right, and Hoke determined to withdraw to the second or interior
line of defense, which was accordingly done before day, on the
14th. At daylight on the same morning, General Beauregard
joined us, having made a circuitous and forced march from
Petersburg by way of Chesterfield Court House with Colquitt's
brigade and a regiment of cavalry.

The lines of Drury's Bluff were in the nature of an entrenched
camp. Starting at the bluff, they ran in a southwesterly direction
across the pike and the Petersburg and Richmond railroad, then
bending back, they returned to the river James, about a mile and
a half north of the bluff. From Fort Stephens (a bastioned work
on this line east of the pike) another line of slighter profile
branched off in a curve still more to the southwest, forming an
advanced line, with its left running into Fort Stephens and its
right resting "in air" near the railroad. It was this last line that
Hoke abandoned on the night of the 13th-14th May.

In the new position, Hagood's brigade occupied Fort Stephens
and extended its right to the turnpike—the regiments coming
from left to right in the following order: Twenty-seventh, Twenty-first,
Seventh, Eleventh and Twenty-fifth. Johnson's, Clingman's
and Corse's brigades came in the order named on Hagood's right.
These four brigades constituted Hoke's division, as the army was
temporarily organized after Beauregard's arrival. Another
division was also organized with Colquitt commanding, and held
in reserve. General Robert Ransom's division occupied the space
from Hagood's left to the river, after it had arrived on the 15th.

Butler's skirmishing was confined to Hoke's front. Seeming
inclined to operate on the Confederate right flank, he was content

to watch Ransom's division next the river with cavalry. His
gunboats had also ascended the river. The general direction of
the river, the River Road,[12] the turnpike and the railroad was
north and south of the two hostile lines east and west, each resting
on the river. Proctor's Creek ran across these avenues and into
the river, something over half a mile in front of the Confederate
lines.

Hoke's evacuation of the exterior line had been made with all
possible secrecy, and our pickets in front were not informed
that it was contemplated. At daylight, the enemy advanced in
strong force, and they quickly came running in. Hagood's picket
continued on to the interior line, when they found exterior line
abandoned. The enemy's skirmishers followed closely after them
and obtained position close on us, within 150 yards, and sheltered
by cabins which had been constructed between the two lines for
barracks. Hagood immediately ordered the picket back, and to
drive these skirmishers (whom he saw would do him infinite
damage) to a greater distance. His picket commander, Colonel
Blake, had completely lost his aplomb, and deprecatingly told
General Hagood it could not be done. He was told to attempt it
anyhow, and leading out his men from Fort Stephens along the
prong of the abandoned line, he stopped without deploying his
men, and conversing with them huddled together, remained a
target for the sharpshooters from the cabins who rained their
fire upon him. Major Abney was sent for to relieve Blake, and
his manner while receiving instructions was not indicative that a
proper selection had been made. When they were concluded,
though directed to go promptly in person to take command of
the picket, he went some ten steps toward the sally port and
sitting down upon the banquette began vacantly to comb his hair
with a pocket comb. He, too, from cause was not himself.
Ordering him back to his regiment and sending Orderly Stoney
to recall Blake and his men, the latter now thoroughly demoralized,
Hagood directed Captain Brooks of the Seventh battalion
to deploy his men behind the line of breastworks occupied
by our line of battle, and at a signal to leap it and drive the
skirmishers back. The company numbered about 90 men and
was well officered. It gallantly performed the duty assigned to it,

and succeeded in getting a good position for the brigade skirmish
line.[13] Brooks was then relieved by the regular skirmish detail
for the day composed of detachments from each regiment.

The enemy soon had artillery in position, the fire of which was
chiefly directed against Fort Stephens and was very annoying,
particularly that from a battery of six pieces in position where
the turnpike crossed our abandoned line. The fire from these
guns took the left face of Fort Stephens in reverse, and the
Twenty-seventh regiment stationed there had to be put in the
outer ditch for protection. The opposing lines were near enough
for long range sharpshooting, and the intermediate lines of
skirmishers were constantly engaged in the effort to drive each
other. The casualties of the brigade on the 13th and 15th,
inclusive, were 9 killed, 51 wounded, and 12 missing.

Lieutenant Archy St. John Lance, of the Twenty-seventh, was
killed in the fort; Lieutenant Seay, of the same regiment, died
of exhaustion; Captain Ledbetter, of the Eleventh regiment, was
killed on the skirmish line, and among others who here gave their
lives freely for their country was one whose history recalled that
of Latour D'Avergne, "Le premier grenadier de la France."
Pinckney Brown, a gentleman of means and literary culture, had
taken no part in public affairs until 1860, when, an ardent Secessionist,
he had been elected to the Convention and signed the
Ordinance which we had all fondly hoped was to have been our
second Declaration of Independence. When war followed this
act, he enlisted as a private in Miles's company of the Twenty-seventh
regiment and had since bravely and unflinchingly discharged
every duty of the patriot soldier. Promotion was
frequently offered him and invariably declined. Rifle in hand,
he died "sur le champ du battaile," shot through the head upon
the skirmish line.

At one time, on the 15th, the enemy appeared to be massing for
assault. None followed. The Federal historians say that Butler
had ordered it, but his troops were so strewn out that a sufficient
number were not available for the attack, and he directed it postponed
till the next day. That evening, Beauregard, passing along
the lines, asked some of his soldiers if they were not tired of this
sort of fighting, and said he "would change it for them."

At 10 o'clock at night on the 15th, Hoke's brigade commanders
were summoned to his headquarters, informed that the offensive
would be taken in the morning, and instructed in the plan of
battle.

Beauregard's plan showed the instinct of genius. They could
not under the circumstances, notwithstanding the difficulty of
handling rapidly and effectively an army so recently organized,
have failed substantially to have annihilated his antagonist, had
not two of his division commanders failed him. The shortcomings
of General Ransom and General Whiting are indicated
in the official report. The first failing to carry out his instructions
with vigor, and making strangely inaccurate reports of the
condition of things in his part of the field, is pretty severely
handled by General Beauregard. The last did not move at all,
notwithstanding reiterated orders, and as far as the record goes
his inaction is not explained. There is but little doubt that it
was due to the unfortunate use of narcotics. Brigadier-General
Wise subsequently described Whiting as stupefied from the use
of these during the time Beauregard's reiterated orders to attack
were being received. This was in conversation with the writer,
and he also stated that he had preferred charges against Whiting
on the ground of his condition, but had withdrawn them upon a
personal appeal from that officer. He was relieved from this
command and sent to Wilmington without an official investigation.
There he resumed an important command, and his name
will again occur in the Memoirs. After the war, the Federal
General Ames told General Hagood that during the evening and
night when Butler's routed and discouraged column was defiling
within a mile of Whiting's 4,000 men of all arms, but a thin
skirmish line intervened between them and destruction. The
following are the official reports, or rather so much of them as
without repetition continues the narrative:

. . . . . . . . . . . .

"Our army was organized into three divisions, right, left and reserve,
under Major-Generals Hoke and Ransom, and Brigadier-General Colquitt.
. . . Our left (Ransom) lay behind the trenches on Kingland Creek,
which runs an easterly course not far in front of Drury's Bluff. Our right

wing (Hoke) occupied the intermediate line of fortifications from Fort
Stephens, crossing the turnpike to the railroad. Colquitt's reserve, in rear
of Hoke, centered on the turnpike. The cavalry was posted on our flank
and in reserve, and the artillery distributed among the divisions. A
column from Petersburg, under Major-General Whiting, had been directed
to proceed to Swift Creek on the turnpike, over three miles from Petersburg
and nine from my lines, and was under orders to advance at daybreak
to Walthal Junction, three miles nearer. The enemy's forces, under
Butler, comprised the corps of Gilmore and W. F. Smith (Tenth and
Eighteenth) and his line was generally parallel to ours. . . . They
held our own outer lines of works, crossing the turnpike half a mile in our
front. Their line of breastworks and entrenchments increased in strength
with its progress westward. Its right and weakest point was in the edge
of William Gregory's woods, about half a mile from James River. . . .
Going westwardly, after crossing the railroad, their line widened to the
north.

"With the foregoing data, I determined upon the following plan: That our
left wing, turning and hurled upon Butler's weak right, should with crushing
force double it back on the center, thus interposing an exterior barrier
between Butler and his base; that our right wing should simultaneously,
with its skirmishers and afterwards in force, as soon as the left became
fully engaged, advance and occupy the enemy to prevent his re-enforcing
his right and thus form his northern barrier without, however, permanently
seeking to force him far back before our left could completely outflank him
and our Petersburg column close up in his rear; and, finally, that the
Petersburg column, marching to the sound of heaviest firing, should interpose
a southern barrier to his retreat. Thus environed by three walls of
fire, Butler, with his defeated troops, could have no resource against substantial
capture or destruction, except in an attempt at partial and hazardous
escape westward away from his base trains and supplies. Two difficulties
might impede or defeat the success of this plan; one was a possible
stubborn and effective resistance of the enemy, in virtue of his superior
numbers; another (probably a grave one) existed as to the efficient and
rapid handling of a fragmentary army like ours, so hastily assembled and
organized—half of the brigades without general officers, some of the troops
unacquainted with their commanders and neighbors, staff officers unknown
to each other, etc. The moral force arising from the unity, which springs
from old association, was entirely wanting; and from these causes, generally
so productive of confusion, great inconvenience arose. On the other
hand, I reckoned on the advantage of being ready at daylight, with short
distances over which to operate, a long day before me to maneuver in, plan
direct routes and simplicity in the movements to be executed. Accordingly,
at 10:45 a. m. on the 15th, preparatory information and orders were forwarded
to Major-General Whiting, then at Petersburg twelve miles from
me, with instructions to move his force to Swift Creek, three miles nearer,
during the night, and at daylight next morning to proceed to Walthal
Junction, about three miles still nearer. These instructions were duly

received by that officer, and were as follows: `I shall attack the enemy in
my front tomorrow at daybreak by River Road, to cut him off from his
Bermuda base. You will take up your position tonight at Swift Creek with
Wise's, Martin's, Dearing's and two regiments of Colquitt's brigade, with
about twenty field pieces under Colonel Jones. At daybreak you will
march to Walthal Junction, and when you hear an engagement in your
front you will advance boldly and rapidly by the shortest road in the
direction of the heaviest firing to attack enemy in rear or flank. You will
protect your advance and flank with Dearing's Cavalry, taking necessary
precautions to distinguish friend from foe. Please communicate this to
General Hill. This revokes all former orders of movement. Signed G. T.
Beaureguard, General Commanding. P. S.—I have just received a telegram
from General Bragg informing me that he has ordered you to join
me at this place; you need not do so, but follow to the letter the above
instructions. G. T. B.' In the early afternoon I delivered in person to the
other division commanders assembled the following circular instructions
of battle, with additional oral instructions to General Ransom, that while
driving the enemy he should promptly occupy with a brigade the crossing
of Proctor's Creek by the River Road, which was Butler's shortest line of
retreat to Bermuda Hundred's Neck.

" `(Circular.)

" `General: The following instructions for battle tomorrow are communicated
for your instruction:

" `The purpose of the movement is to cut off the enemy from his base at
Bermuda Hundreds and capture or destroy him in his present position.
To this end we shall attack and turn by the River Road his right flank,
now resting on James River, while his center and left flank are kept
engaged to prevent him from re-enforcing his right. Major-General Ransom's
division will tonight take the best position for attack on the enemy's
right flank to be made by him tomorrow at daylight. His skirmishers will
drive back vigorously those of the enemy in his front and will be followed
closely by his line of battle, which will, at the proper time, pivot on its
right, so as to take the enemy in flank and rear. He will form in two
lines of battle and will use his artillery to the best advantage. Colonel
Dunovant's (South Carolina) regiment of cavalry will move with this
division under the direction of General Ransom. Major-General Hoke's
division, now in the trenches on the right of the position herein assigned
to General Ransom, will at daylight engage the enemy with a heavy fire
of skirmishers, or as soon as General Ransom's line of battle shall have
become fairly engaged with the enemy. General Hoke will form in two
lines of battle four hundred yards apart in front of his trenches at the
proper time and in such manner as not to delay his forward movement.
He will use his battalion of artillery to the best advantage. Colonel

Baker's regiment of cavalry will move in conjunction with Hoke's division,
so as to protect his right flank. He will receive more definite instructions
from Major-General Hoke. Colonel Shingler's regiment of cavalry will
move with the same division. The division commanded by Brigadier-General
Colquitt will constitute the reserve and will tonight form in column
by brigades in rear of Hoke's present position, the center of each brigade
resting on the turnpike. The division will be massed under cover of the
hill now occupied by Hoke's troops so as to be sheltered at first from the
enemy's fire in front. During the movement the head of the reserve column
will be kept about 500 yards from Hoke's second line of battle. As soon
as practicable, the interval between the brigades of the reserve division
will be maintained at from two to three hundred yards. The reserve
artillery, under Generol Colquitt, will follow along the turnpike about
300 yards in rear of the last brigade. He will use it to the best advantage.
Simultaneously with these movements, Major-General Whiting will move
with his division from Petersburg along the Petersburg and Richmond turnpike
and attack the enemy in flank and rear. The movement above indicated
will be executed, and must be made with all possible vigor and celerity.
The generals commanding divisions and Colonels Shingler and Baker, commanding
cavalry, will report at these headquarters at 6 p. m. today. In the
meantime they will give all necessary instructions for providing their
respective commands with sixty rounds of ammunition issued to each man,
and at least twenty rounds for each in reserve. They will cause their commands
to be supplied with two days' cooked rations.

"Ransom moved at 4:45 a. m., being somewhat delayed by a dense fog,
which lasted several hours after dawn and occasioned some embarrassment.
This division consisted of the following brigades in the order mentioned,
commencing from the left: Gracie's, Kemper's (commanded by
Colonel Terry), Barton's (under Colonel Fry), and Colonel Lewis's (Hoke's
old brigade). He was soon engaged, carrying the enemy's breastworks in
his front at 6 a. m. with some loss. His troops moved splendidly to the
assault, capturing five stands of colors and some 500 prisoners. The
brigades most heavily engaged were Gracie's and Kemper's, opposed to the
enemy's right, the former turning his flank. General Ransom then halted
to form, reported his loss heavy and troops scattered by the fog, his ammunition
short, and asked for a brigade from the reserve. Colquitt's brigade
was sent him at 6:30 a. m., with orders to return when it ceased to be
indispensable. Before either ammunition or the reserve brigade had
arrived, he reported the enemy driving Hoke's left, and sent the right
regiment of Lewis's brigade forward at double quick towards the supposed
point of danger. This held the enemy long enough for the reserve brigade
to arrive, charge and drive him back from the front of our left center,
where the affair occurred over and along the works to the turnpike.[14]

"It will be seen from a subsequent part of this report that one of Hagood's
advanced regiments had unexpectedly come into contact with the enemy
and been ordered back, it not being contemplated to press at this point
until Ransom should swing round his left as directed in the battle order.
This possibly originated Ransom's impression as to the condition of Hoke's
left, which in fact had steadily maintained its proper position. At 7:15
a. m., Colquitt's brigade of the reserve was recalled from Ransom and a
slight modification of the original movement was made to relieve Hoke,
in whose front the enemy had been allowed to mass his forces by the
inaction of the left. Ransom was ordered to flank the enemy's right by
changing the front of his right brigade, to support it by another in echellon,
to advance another to Proctor's Creek, and hold a fourth in reserve. This
modification was intended to be temporary, and the original plan was to be
fully carried out on the seizure of the River Road and Proctor's Creek
Crossing.

"In proceeding to execute this order, Ransom found the reserve brigade
engaged, and his own troops moving by the right flank towards the firing
at the center. He, therefore, sent Barton's brigade back instead of Colquitt's,
and reported a necessity to reform and straighten his lines in the
old position near the breastworks he had stormed. Here his infantry rested
during the greater part of the day. Dunovant's cavalry, dismounted, were
thrown forward as skirmishers towards a small force, which occupied a
ridge in the edge of George Gregory's woods, north of Proctor's Creek. This
force with an insignificant body of cavalry, believed to have been negroes,
and a report of threatening gunboats which came some hours earlier, were
the only menace to our left, as since ascertained.

"At 10 a. m., I withheld an order for Ransom to move, until further
arrangements should be made, for the following reasons: The right was
heavily engaged; all the reserve had been detached right and left at
different times; a dispatch had been sent to Whiting at 9 a. m., which was
repeated at 9:30 a. m., `to press on and press over everything in your front
and the day will be complete', and Ransom not only reported a strong force
in his front, but expressed the opinion that the safety of his command
would be compromised by an advance.

"On the right, Hoke early advanced his skirmishers and opened his
artillery. The fog and other causes temporarily delayed the advance of his
line of battle. When he finally moved forward, he soon became hotly
engaged. Hagood and Johnson were thrown forward with a section of
Eschellman's artillery (Washington), and found a heavy force of the enemy
with six or eight pieces of artillery occupying our outer line of works on
the turnpike and his own defensive lines. Our artillery engaged at very
short range, disabling some of the enemy's guns and blowing up two
limbers. Another section of the same battery opened from the right of
the turnpike. They both held their positions, though with heavy loss, until
their ammunition was spent, when they were relieved by an equal number
of pieces from the reserve artillery under Major Owens.

"Hagood with great vigor and dash drove the enemy from the outer lines
in his front, capturing a number of prisoners, and, in conjunction with
Johnson, five pieces of artillery—three 20 dr. Parrotts and two fine Napoleons.
He then took position in the works, his left regiment being thrown
forward by Hoke to connect with Ransom's right. In advancing, this regiment
encountered the enemy behind a second line of breastworks in the
woods with abatis interlaced with wire. Attack at this point not being contemplated,
it was ordered back to the line of battle, but not before its rapid
advance had caused it considerable loss. This circumstance has been
referred to before as the occasion of a mistake made by Ransom.

"Johnson meanwhile had been heavily engaged. The line of the enemy
bent round his right flank, subjecting his brigade for a time to a fire in
flank and front. With admirable firmness he repulsed frequent assaults of
the enemy moving against his right and rear. Leader, officers and men
alike displayed their fitness to the trial to which they were subjected.
Among many instances of heroism, I can not forbear to mention that of
Lieutenant Waggoner, of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment. He went
alone through a storm of fire and pulled down a white flag which a small
isolated body of our men had raised, receiving a wound in the act. The
brigade holding its ground nobly, lost more than a fourth of its entire
number. Two regiments of the reserve were sent up to its support, but
were less effective than they should have been, owing to a mistake of the
officer posting them. Hoke also sent two regiments from Clingman's to
protect Johnson's flank. The same mistake was made in posting these.
They were placed in the woods, where the moral and material effect of their
presence was lost.

"I now ordered Hoke to press forward his right for the relief of his right
center. He advanced Clingman with his remaining two regiments, and
Corse with his brigade. They drove the enemy with spirit, suffering some
loss, but the gap between Clingman and the troops on his left induced him
to retire his command to prevent being flanked, and reform it in the
intermediate lines. Thus Corse became isolated, and learning from his
officers that masses were forming on his right flank, he withdrew some
distance, not quite as far back as his original position. These two brigades
were not afterward engaged, though they went to the front, Corse about
one hour after he fell back, and Clingman about 2:15 p. m. The enemy
did not reoccupy the ground from which they drove them before their
retreat.

"In front of Hagood and Johnson, the fighting was stubborn and prolonged.
The enemy slowly retired from Johnson's right and took a strong
position on the ridge in front of Proctor's Creek, massing near the turnpike
and occupying advantageous ground at the house and grove of Charles
Friend. At length, Johnson having brushed the enemy from his right flank
in the woods with some assistance from the Washington Artillery, and
cleared his front, rested his troops in the shelter of the exterior works.
One of the captured pieces having opened on the enemy's masses, he finally
fell back behind the wood and ridge at Proctor's Creek, though his skirmish

line continued the engagement some hours longer. Further movement was
here suspended to wait communication from Whiting, or the sound of his
approach, and to reorganize the troops which had become more or less
disorganized. Brief firing, at 1:45 p. m., gave some hopes of his approach.
I waited in vain. The firing heard was probably between Dearing[15] and
the enemy's rear guard. Dearing had been ordered by Whiting to communicate
with me, but unsupported by infantry or artillery he was unable
to do so except by sending a detachment by a circuitous route which
reached me after the work of the day was closed. At 4 p. m., all hope of
Whiting's approach was gone, and I reluctantly abandoned so much of my
plan as contemplated more than a vigorous pursuit of Butler and driving
him back to his fortified base. To effect this, I resumed my original position
and ordered General Hoke to send two brigades along the Courthouse
road to take the enemy in flank and establish enfilading batteries in front
of the heights west of the railroad.

"The formation of our line was checked by a heavy and prolonged storm
of rain. Meanwhile, the enemy opened a severe fire, which was soon
silenced by our artillery. Before we were ready to advance, darkness
approached and upon consultation with several of my subordinate officers,
it was deemed imprudent to attack, considering the probability of serious
obstacles and the proximity of Butler's entrenched camp. I, therefore, put
the army in position for the night and sent instructions to Whiting to join
our right at the railroad in the morning.

"During the night, the enemy retired to the fortified line of his present
camp, leaving in our hands some fourteen hundred prisoners, five pieces of
artillery, and five stand of colors. He now rests there, hemmed by our lines
which have since from time to time been advanced with every skirmish,
and now completely cover the southern communications of the capital, thus
securing one of the principal objects of the attack. The more glorious
results anticipated were lost by the hesitation of the left wing and the premature
halt of the Petersburg column before obstacles in neither case
sufficient to have deterred from the execution of the movement prescribed.

. . . . . . . .

On perhaps the day after the battle, General Beauregard in
relieving General Ransom, that he might return to his local command
at Richmond, did it in a highly complimentary order. This
fact explains the following supplementary report:

"General: In forwarding my report of the Battle of Drury's Bluff, 16
May, 1864, it seems necessary that it should be accompanied by an explanation
of the apparent inconsistency of its conclusion with my special order
Number 11, May 14th, 1864, relieving the commander of the left wing, and
commending in high terms the conduct of his command in the battle. A
copy of the order is annexed. When it was issued, I still assumed that he
had properly felt and estimated the obstacles and hostile force reported by
him in his immediate front, and that his reports were to be accepted as
maturely considered and substantially accurate. Subsequent investigation,
necessarily requiring time, has, I regret to say, brought me to a different
conclusion.

Extracts from Major-General Hoke's report, comprising what
related to Hagood's brigade:

"Captain, . . . owing to the dense fog, I could see nothing of the movement
of Major-General Ransom, and supposing that by this time the right of
the enemy had been turned, I ordered forward the brigades of Hagood and
Johnson with one section of Lieutenant-Colonel Eschelman's artillery and
found the enemy still occupying our outer line of entrenchments, supported
by eight pieces of artillery, with a second line of entrenchments along the
line of the woods in front of our outer line of works. The attack was
handsomely made and resulted in the capture by Hagood's brigade of five
pieces of artillery, besides a number of prisoners and a great many of the
enemy killed and wounded. The outer line of works was occupied, and
one regiment of Hagood's brigade extended beyond it in the direction of
James River. This regiment was ordered forward to connect with the
right of Ransom's division, but, to my amazement, found the enemy in strong
force behind entrenchments. It was not intended that this regiment should
attack the enemy in that position, as the movement was to be made by the
troops on the left, but it in its eagerness did so, and, I am sorry to say,
suffered heavily. When it was seen that the enemy still occupied my front,
this regiment was ordered back to await the further development of the
flank movement. In the meanwhile, the enemy made two charges upon
Hagood and Johnson, but were repulsed, and with the assistance of the

artillery, the pike was cleared of the enemy before the flanking column
reached that point. . . . The commanding general will recollect that I
before stated that the strength of the enemy was in front of these two
brigades, and they deserve great credit. . . .

"The loss of these commands was necessarily heavy, owing to their
making a front attack. . . . I cannot refrain from calling the attention
of the commanding general to the fact that his desire to relieve my command
of the necessity of a front attack by the flank movement of Ransom's
division was on no portion of my line accomplished. . . .

It is curious to compare the manner in which this battle was
actually fought with the well-considered plan devised by Beauregard,
and clearly explained beforehand to his subordinates. The
plan of battle was, briefly, to seize the enemy's line of retreat,
demonstrate on his front, and carry his position by a turning
movement on the flank, behind which was his line of communication.

The actual fight was an almost simultaneous direct attack along
his whole front, and with a hand upon the enemy's line of retreat,
Whiting failed to grasp it. Thus the conceptions of genius were
in the execution reduced to the least skilful of performances,
and instead of a decisive defeat, Butler was merely pushed back
upon his fortified base.

Some remarks are necessary upon the details of the battle as
described in the foregoing official reports. The movement of the
"right regiment of Lewis's brigade" and of "the reserve brigade"
to the relief of "our left center" (Hagood's brigade) mentioned
by General Beauregard upon information from Ransom's
division, was a myth. The writer avers most positively that no
part of Ransom's division ever came to Hagood's assistance, or
passed in front of him till the enemy had retired from his front.
General Hoke's report distinctly sustains this averment, and
General Beauregard's report itself shows that the force from
Ransom's division could not have performed this feat, although
it was the duty to which the whole division was assigned. The
report reads: ". . . Colquitt's brigade from the reserve was sent
him (Ransom) at 6:30 a. m. Before it had arrived, he reported
the enemy driving Hoke's left and sent the right regiment of

Lewis's brigade forward at a double quick towards the point of
supposed danger. This held the enemy long enough for the
reserve brigade[16] to arrive, charge, and drive him back from the
front of our left center over and along the works to the turnpike."
Yet, at 7:15, just three-quarters of an hour after Colquitt's
brigade had moved to Ransom, and about the time it would have
completed this clearing of Hagood's front, the report states, "A
slight modification of the original movement was ordered to be
made to relieve Hoke's front, on which the enemy had been
allowed to mass his forces by the inaction of the left." This order
was to Ransom, and, in substance, to resume the offensive. On
receiving it, he "reported a necessity to straighten and reform his
line in the old position, near the lines he had stormed. Here he
rested during the greater part of the day."

General Beauregard's report also credits Johnson's brigade
with a share in the capture of the five pieces of artillery on the
pike. Hoke, commanding both brigades, was present in person
and gives it exclusively to Hagood's brigade.

General Beauregard (adopting Hoke's report), speaks of one
regiment of Hagood's brigade thrown forward to connect with
Ransom's right. This is scarcely accurate, though there was but
one regiment that actually struck the enemy's second line of
breastworks. The circumstances were minutely these:

Shortly after General Ransom's division had engaged the
enemy and while his advance, visible by the flash of his guns
through the fog, was still on a line with Hagood's front, the
brigade skirmishers under Major Rion were ordered forward.
These quickly drove in the enemy's pickets and carried the
enemy's first line (our abandoned trench), except that portion
just on the turnpike, where the artillery was. The Twenty-fifth
regiment had to be brought up to accomplish that. Hagood's
brigade was now in position, without any other regiment beside
the Twenty-fifth having been engaged, behind this outer line;
but as it bent back on the left to run into the intermediate line at
Fort Stephens, the left regiment of the brigade (the Twenty-seventh)
was placed beyond the trench when this curve backward
commenced, in order to have the line straight and ready for a
further forward movement. There continued a desultory exchange

of fire. Hagood was standing near the Twenty-seventh regiment,
holding his horse by the bridle, when Hoke came up to him on
foot and directed him to swing out to the right and form on the
turnpike in order to connect with Ransom. The fog had partially
lifted and a body of troops was in sight in the open, full 800
yards from Hagood, diagonally from his left front and at least
three-quarters of a mile from the turnpike, on which his right
was resting. This body of troops had half pivoted to the right
and halted. It was Ransom's whole force (see Beauregard's
report). Hagood knew that it was Ransom, for, notwithstanding
the fog, he had, as before noted, been able to trace his course by
the flash of his guns as well as by their sound. Now they were
perfectly visible, halted, and not firing, but firing was going on
ahead of them, and nearer, but still not yet in front of Hagood's
left, from a line not visible which proved to have been Ransom's
skirmishers. When Hagood received Hoke's order, he did not
bring the position of these halted troops to the latter's attention,
for he supposed they were only a part of Ransom's division,
perhaps a reserve, while the line firing, and not visible, was
Ransom's main line advancing through the woods to the pike
with but little opposition. Confirmed in this idea by the positive
direction to swing out on the pike, and connect with Ransom, Hagood merely spoke with Hoke of the tactical execution of the
order and proceeded to obey it. He kept the Twenty-fifth and
Twenty-first regiments, which were nearest the pike, in position,
to give a fire down it, and, pivoting on the right company of the
Seventh battalion, moved out the Seventh battalion and the
Eleventh and Twenty-seventh regiments. This was done in line,
and each regiment swung round by the movement technically
known as "change direction," thus advancing in echellon to their
new position. The distance between our outer line now reoccupied
by us and the enemy's line of breastworks, on the edge of
the woods, was not over two hundred yards. And it was in this
space that these three regiments were maneuvering. In the
change of direction their left alone would strike these works
which, it seemed, Hoke thought the enemy had been driven from
by Ransom's flank movement. Hagood left Hoke after receiving
the order and the movement had hardly begun when a terrific
fire broke out upon the advancing troops, but was hottest upon
the Seventh battalion. Hagood galloped in that direction, having
his horse killed under him as he reached the Seventh. This
battalion, having only to wheel on its own ground, had accomplished
or nearly so a change of direction at right angles to its
former position and parallel to the pike, when its commander,
halting it, caused his men to sit down and fire from that position
while they marked the base of the movement. The Eleventh
regiment, advancing firing, was steadily approaching its position
on the new line, and the Twenty-seventh, coming on upon the
extreme left, struck the breastworks on the edge of the woods and
drove the enemy from them at the point of impact, notwithstanding
the rush of its charge was impeded by wire entanglements
just in front of the works. The increased fierceness of the
enemy's fire brought the movement to a halt, the enemy assaying
to charge, and failing. The position was obstinately held for a
short time to permit relief by Ransom's approach, when General
Hagood, standing behind the Seventh battalion, saw the Twenty-seventh
regiment coming back, and ordered the Eleventh regiment
and Seventh battalion back behind the outer entrenchments.
It appeared afterward that the Twenty-seventh came back under
an order sent direct from General Hoke, who had found out his
mistake as to Ransom's position, and whose instructions, it will
be remembered, did not permit him to press at this point at this
time.

Hagood reformed his lines and remained inactive during the
rest of the day with the remainder of the army. The enemy, very
soon after the advance of his three regiments, withdrew from his
front. Somewhat later in the day, he was hurried to Hoke's right
to resist a supposed flanking movement, which not taking place,
he was returned to his first position. Late in the afternoon, Ransom
moved down Hoke's line to and beyond the turnpike, after
the enemy had withdrawn. The Twenty-seventh regiment was
thrown out to make the right of Ransom's line in this march.

During the whole battle, the brigade behaved with a steadiness
and gallantry that was very gratifying. It was a spectacle to
rejoice the heart of a soldier, the steadiness with which the
Seventh received the enemy's onset when its new line was taken.
Sitting down at the word of command, it gave and received at
close range for ten minutes a murderous fire, the color bearer

slowly waving his flag, and not a straggler going to the rear.
When the line moved, it is no exaggeration to say that the bodies
of the dead and wounded marked the position it had held. There
were fifty-seven bullet marks received on its flag in the action, and
in one of its companies (Brooks's) there were sixty-five casualties,
of which nineteen were killed outright. The casualties of the
whole brigade were 433; its field return of the previous day was
2,235.

Colonels Gaillard and Gantt, Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson, Major
Glover and Captain Wilds, commanding regiments, discharged
their duty with marked ability and were gallantly seconded by
their men. Major Rion and Captain Brooks, of the Seventh,
behaved with conspicuous gallantry, remaining in command after
receiving serious wounds, Rion until nightfall, and Brooks until
he was ordered to the rear by the brigade commander. The staff,
Captain Moloney, Lieutenant Mazyck and Lieutenant Martin
exhibited their usual courage and efficiency. Each one of them
had his horse killed under him in the discharge of his duties, and
Captain Moloney had a second one, which he obtained during the
day, killed.

Lieutenants Taft, Lalam, Shuler, Bomar and Elliott, and Captain
China (all of the Twenty-fifth regiment) were killed. Bomar
was killed in an heroic exposure of himself, rendered necessary by
the failure of his captain to do his duty. China, Elliott and
Shuler were all originally of the First South Carolina regiment.
General Hagood had served with them from the beginning of
the war, and valued them highly as brave and efficient officers.

The following officers and men were mentioned for gallant
conduct by regimental commanders:

Twenty-seventh Regiment—Lieutenant Gelling, Company C,
acting adjutant; Color Bearer Tupper, Private H. P. Foster of
the color guard, and First Sergeant Pickens Butler Watts of Company
E.

In Seventh Battalion—Sergeant J. H. Outz, color bearer,
killed.

* In the color guard of the Seventh Battalion, Sergeants J. B. Robinson and G. W.
Kennington were successively killed with the colors in their hands after Outz fell,
and the colors were brought out by Sergeant Preston Cooper.

In Eleventh Regiment—Lieutenant W. G. Bowman, Company
B; Color Bearer Hickman; Privates J. Jones, Company K; G. W.
Hicks, Company K; A. P. Bulger, Company D, and A. Mixson,
Company F.

In Twenty-fifth Regiment—Sergeant B. P. Izlar, Company G;
Sergeant H. P. Greer, Company B; Privates J. T. Shumaker,
Company G, W. A. Dotterer, Company A, and — Wise, Company
F.

General Hagood also reported for meritorious services, coming
under his immediate observation, Private J. K. Williams, Company
—, Twenty-seventh regiment. He was an Irishman and
deserted to the enemy at Bermuda Hundreds a few days afterward.
In the following August, after the fight on the Weldon
road, one of the brigades captured on the field was carried by a
battery which had been particularly destructive to us and recognized
in one of the gunners, Hagood's "meritorious" Irishman.
Williams greeted him cheerfully and asked after "the gineral."

President Davis was on the field during the latter part of the
day. The army bivouacked among the unburied corpses of the
enemy, and feasted that night upon the unwonted luxuries of
coffee, sardines and canned meats, with which his abandoned
camps were abundantly supplied. The brigade here obtained a
good supply of shelter tents (the tent d'abies of the French);
and the Eleventh regiment, as heretofore mentioned, supplied
itself with Enfield rifles, throwing its old smooth-bore muskets
upon the ground to be picked up by the ordnance fatigue parties.