6. Sixthly, Our knowledge, therefore, narrower than our ideas.
Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the extent of our
knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Though our
knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be
very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in
some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received from
some few, and not very acute, ways of perception, such as are our senses; yet it would be well with us if our
knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we
have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless I do not question but that
human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much further
than it has hitherto been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour
of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood,
to maintain a system, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without injury to
human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning
those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise
concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able
to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but
possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by
the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some
systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a
thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension
to conceive that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to
it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of
substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by
the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator.
