55.
—One step further in the psychology of conviction, of “faith.”
It is now a good while since I first proposed for consideration the question
whether convictions are not even more dangerous enemies to truth than lies.
(”Human, All-Too-Human,” I, aphorism 483.)[1]
This time I desire to put the question definitely: is there any actual difference
between a lie and a conviction?—All the world believes that there is; but
what is not believed by all the world!—Every conviction has its history,
its primitive forms, its stage of tentativeness and error: it becomes
a conviction only after having been, for a long time, not one, and then, for an
even longer time, hardly one. What if falsehood be also one of these
embryonic forms of conviction?—Sometimes all that is needed is a change
in persons: what was a lie in the father becomes a conviction in the son.—I
call it lying to refuse to see what one sees, or to refuse to see it as
it is: whether the lie be uttered before witnesses or not before witnesses is of
no consequence. The most common sort of lie is that by which a man deceives
himself: the deception of others is a relatively rare offence.—Now, this
will not to see what one sees, this will not to see it as it
is, is almost the first requisite for all who belong to a party of whatever sort:
the party man becomes inevitably a liar. For example, the German
historians are convinced that Rome was synonymous with despotism and that
the Germanic peoples brought the spirit of liberty into the world: what is
the difference between this conviction and a lie? Is it to be wondered at
that all partisans, including the German historians, instinctively roll
the fine phrases of morality upon their tongues—that morality almost owes
its very survival to the fact that the party man of every sort has
need of it every moment?—”This is our conviction: we publish
it to the whole world; we live and die for it—let us respect all who have
convictions!”—I have actually heard such sentiments from the mouths
of anti-Semites. On the contrary, gentlemen! An anti-Semite surely does not
become more respectable because he lies on principle. . . The priests, who have
more finesse in such matters, and who well understand the objection that lies
against the notion of a conviction, which is to say, of a falsehood that becomes
a matter of principle because it serves a purpose, have borrowed from
the Jews the shrewd device of sneaking in the concepts, “God,”
“the will of God” and “the revelation of God” at this
place. Kant, too, with his categorical imperative, was on the same road: this
was hispractical reason.[2] There are
questions regarding the truth or untruth of which it is not for man
to decide; all the capital questions, all the capital problems of valuation,
are beyond human reason. . . . To know the limits of reason—that
alone is genuine philosophy. Why did God make a revelation to man? Would
God have done anything superfluous? Man could not find out for
himself what was good and what was evil, so God taught him His will. Moral:
the priest does not lie—the question, “true”
or “untrue,” has nothing to do with such things as the priest
discusses; it is impossible to lie about these things. In order to lie here it
would be necessary to knowwhat is true. But this is more than man
can know; therefore, the priest is simply the mouth-piece of
God.—Such a priestly syllogism is by no means merely Jewish and Christian;
the right to lie and the shrewd dodge of “revelation”
belong to the general priestly type—to the priest of the
décadence as well as to the
priest of pagan times (—Pagans are all those who say yes to life, and
to whom “God” is a word signifying acquiescence in all
things).—The “law,” the “will of God,” the
“holy book,” and “inspiration”—all these things
are merely words for the conditionsunder which the priest comes to
power and with which he maintains his power,—these concepts are
to be found at the bottom of all priestly organizations, and of all priestly or
priestly-philosophical schemes of governments. The “holy lie”—common
alike to Confucius, to the Code of Manu, to Mohammed and to the Christian
church—is not even wanting in Plato. “Truth is here”: this
means, no matter where it is heard, the priest lies. . . .
Footnotes
[1]
. The aphorism, which is headed “The Enemies of
Truth,” makes the direct statement: “Convictions are more dangerous
enemies of truth than lies.”
[2]
. A reference, of course, to Kant's “
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft” (Critique of Practical Reason).