1. Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our knowledge: 1. Intuitive.
All our knowledge consisting, as I
have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our
faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its
evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind
has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we
will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by
themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the
mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed
towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than
two and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by
bare intuition; without the intervention of any other idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most
certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces
itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for
hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition
that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge; Which certainty every one finds to be so great,
that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater
certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he
perceives a difference, are different and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater certainty than this,
demands he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so.
Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that, in the next degree of knowledge which I call demonstrative,
this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain
knowledge and certainty.
