24. Ideas of substances must be conformable to things.
Fourthly, But, though definitions will serve to explain
the names of substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they
stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately
to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as
with men's ideas. And therefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly
received as the signification of that word, but must go a little further, and inquire into the nature and properties of
the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species; or else learn
them from such as are used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it is intended their names
should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex
idea in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for, therefore, to define their names
right, natural history is to be inquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out.
For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in discourse and arguings about natural bodies and
substantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, but confused, or very
imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by
acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex idea belonging to each
specific name; and in discourse with others, (if we find them mistake us), we ought to tell what the complex idea
is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after
knowledge and philosophical verity, in that children, being taught words, whilst they have but imperfect notions
of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified
by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation)
they are apt to continue when they are men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but
make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that
men speaking the language of their country, i.e., according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very
improperly of things themselves; and, by their arguing one with another, make but small progress in the
discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our
imaginations; and it matters not much for the improvement of our knowledge how they are called.