Book V.
That the Laws Given by the Legislator Ought to Be in Relation to the Principle
of Government.
5.1. 1. Idea of this Book.
That the laws of education should relate to the principle of each government
has been shown in the preceding book. Now the same may be said of those
which the legislator gives to the whole society. The relation of laws to this
principle strengthens the several springs of government; and this principle derives
thence, in its turn, a new degree of vigour. And thus it is in mechanics, that action
is always followed by reaction.
Our design is, to examine this relation in each government,
beginning with the republican state, the principle of which is virtue.
5.2. 2. What is meant by Virtue in a political State.
Virtue in a republic is a most simple thing: it is a love of the republic; it is a sensation,
and not a consequence of acquired knowledge: a sensation that may be
felt by the meanest as well as by the highest person in the state. When
the common people adopt good maxims, they adhere to them more steadily
than those whom we call gentlemen. It is very rarely that corruption
commences with the former: nay, they frequently derive from their
imperfect light a stronger attachment to the established laws and
customs.
The love of our country is conducive to a purity of morals, and the
latter is again conducive to the former. The less we are able to satisfy
our private passions, the more we abandon ourselves to those of a
general nature. How comes it that monks are so fond of their order? It
is owing to the very cause that renders the order insupportable. Their
rule debars them from all those things by which the ordinary passions
are fed; there remains therefore only this passion for the very rule
that torments them. The more austere it is, that is, the more it curbs
their inclinations, the more force it gives to the only passion left
them.
5.3. 3. What is meant by a Love of the Republic in a Democracy.
A love of the republic in a democracy is a love of the democracy; as
the latter is that of equality.
A love of the democracy is likewise that of frugality. Since every
individual ought here to enjoy the same happiness and the same
advantages, they should consequently taste the same pleasures and form
the same hopes, which cannot be expected but from a general frugality.
The love of equality in a democracy limits ambition to the sole
desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country
than the rest of our fellow-citizens. They cannot all render her equal
services, but they all ought to serve her with equal alacrity. At our
coming into the world, we contract an immense debt to our country, which
we can never discharge.
Hence distinctions here arise from the principle of equality, even
when it seems to be removed by signal services or superior abilities.
The love of frugality limits thed desire of having to the study of
procuring necessaries to our family, and superfluities to our country.
Riches give a power which a citizen cannot use for himself, for then he
would be no longer equal. They likewise procure pleasures which he ought
not to enjoy, because these would be also repugnant to the equality.
Thus well-regulated democracies, by establishing domestic frugality,
made way at the same time for public expenses, as was the case at Rome
and Athens, when magnificence and profusion arose from the very fund of
frugality. And as religion commands us to have pure and unspotted hands
when we make our offerings to the gods, the laws required a frugality of
life to enable them to be liberal to our country.
The good sense and happiness of individuals depend greatly upon the
mediocrity of their abilities and fortunes. Therefore, as a republic,
where the laws have placed many in a middling station, is composed of
wise men, it will be wisely governed; as it is composed of happy men, it
will be extremely happy.
5.4. 4. In what Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is inspired.
The love of equality and of a frugal economy is greatly excited by
equality and frugality themselves, in societies where both these virtues
are established by law.
In monarchies and despotic governments, nobody aims at equality;
this does not so much as enter their thoughts; they all aspire to
superiority. People of the very lowest condition desire to emerge from
their obscurity, only to lord it over their fellow-subjects.
It is the same with respect to frugality. To love it, we must
practise and enjoy it. It is not those who are enervated by pleasure
that are fond of a frugal life; were this natural and common, Alcibiades
would never have been the admiration of the universe. Neither is it
those who envy or admire the luxury of the great; people that have
present to their view none but rich men, or men miserable like
themselves, detest their wretched condition, without loving or knowing
the real term or point of misery.
A true maxim it is, therefore, that in order to love equality and
frugality in a republic, these virtues must have been previously
established by law.
5.5. 5. In what Manner the Laws establish Equality in a Democracy.
Some ancient legislators, as Lycurgus and Romulus, made an equal
division of lands. A settlement of this kind can never take place except
upon the foundation of a new republic; or when the old one is so
corrupt, and the minds of the people are so disposed, that the poor
think themselves obliged to demand, and the rich obliged to consent to a
remedy of this nature.
If the legislator, in making a division of this kind, does not enact
laws at the same time to support it, he forms only a temporary
constitution; inequality will break in where the laws have not precluded
it, and the republic will be utterly undone.
Hence for the preservation of this equality it is absolutely
necessary there should be some regulation in respect to women's dowries,
donations, successions, testamentary settlements, and all other forms of
contracting. For were we once allowed to dispose of our property to whom
and how we pleased, the will of each individual would disturb the order
of the fundamental law.
Solon, by permitting the Athenians, upon failure of issue
[1]
to leave their estates to whom they pleased, acted contrary to the ancient
laws, by which the estates were ordered to continue in the family of the
testator;
[2]
and even contrary to his own laws, for by abolishing debts he had aimed at
equality.
The law which prohibited people having two inheritances
[3]
was extremely well adapted for a democracy. It derived its origin from the
equal distribution of lands and portions made to each citizen. The law
would not permit a single man to possess more than a single portion.
From the same source arose those laws by which the next relative was
ordered to marry the heiress. This law was given to the Jews after the
like distribution. Plato,
[4]
who grounds his laws on this division, made the same regulation which had
been received as a law by the Athenians.
At Athens there was a law whose spirit, in my opinion, has not been
hitherto rightly understood. It was lawful to marry a sister only by the
father's side, but it was not permitted to espouse a sister by the same
venter.
[5]
This custom was originally owing to republics, whose spirit
would not permit that two portions of land, and consequently two
inheritances, should devolve on the same person. A man who married his
sister only by the father's side could inherit but one estate, namely,
that of his father; but by espousing his sister by the same venter, it
might happen that this sister's father, having no male issue, might
leave her his estate, and consequently the brother who married her might
be possessed of two.
Little will it avail to object to what Philo says,
[6]
that although the Athenians were allowed to marry a sister by the father's side, and
not by the mother's, yet the contrary practice prevailed among the
Lacedmonians, who were permitted to espouse a sister by the mother's
side, and not by the father's. For I find in Strabo
[7]
that at Sparta, whenever a woman was married to her brother she had half his portion for
her dowry. Plain is it that this second law was made in order to prevent
the bad consequences of the former. That the estate belonging to the
sister's family might not devolve on the brother's, they gave half the
brother's estate to the sister for her dowry.
Seneca
[8]
speaking of Silanus, who had married his sister, says that
the permission was limited at Athens, but general at Alexandria. In a
monarchical government there was very little concern about any such
thing as a division of estates.
Excellent was that law which, in order to maintain this division of
lands in a democracy, ordained that a father who had several children
should pitch upon one of them to inherit his portion,
[9]
and leave the others to be adopted, to the end that the numbers of citizens might
always be kept upon an equality with that of the divisions.
Phaleas of Chalcedon
[10]
contrived a very extraordinary method of rendering all fortunes equal, in
a republic where there was the greatest inequality. This was that the rich
should give fortunes with their daughters to the poor, but receive none
themselves; and that the poor should receive money for their daughters,
instead of giving them fortunes. But I do not remember that a regulation of
this kind ever took place in any republic. It lays the citizens under such hard and
oppressive conditions as would make them detest the very equality which
they designed to establish. It is proper sometimes that the laws should
not seem to tend so directly to the end they propose.
Though real equality be the very soul of a democracy, it is so
difficult to establish that an extreme exactness in this respect would
not be always convenient. Sufficient is it to establish a census
[11]
which shall reduce or fix the differences to a certain point: it is
afterwards the business of particular laws to level, as it were, the
inequalities, by the duties laid upon the rich, and by the ease afforded
to the poor. It is moderate riches alone that can give or suffer this
sort of compensation; for as to men of overgrown estates, everything
which does not contribute to advance their power and honour is
considered by them as an injury.
All inequality in democracies ought to be derived from the nature of
the government, and even from the principle of equality. For example, it
may be apprehended that people who are obliged to live by their labour
would be too much impoverished by a public employment, or neglect the
duties attending it; that artisans would grow insolent, and that too
great a number of freemen would overpower the ancient citizens. In this
case the equality
[12]
in a democracy may be suppressed for the good of the state. But this is
only an apparent equality; for a man ruined by a public employment would
be in a worse condition than his fellow-citizens; and this same man, being
obliged to neglect his duty, would reduce the rest to a worse condition than
himself, and so on.
Footnotes
[1]
Plutarch, "Life of Solon."
[3]
Philolaus of Corinth made a law at Athens that the number of the
portions of land and that of inheritances should be always the same. --
Aristotle, Politics, ii. 7, 12.
[5]
Cornelius Nepos, preface. This custom began in the earliest
times. Thus Abraham says of Sarah, "She is my sister, my father's
daughter, but not my mother's." The same reasons occasioned the
establishing the same law among different nations.
[6]
De specialibus legibus quæ pertinent ad præceptar Decalogi.
[8]
Athenis dimidium licet, Alexandriæ totum. — Seneca, De Morte
Claudii.
[9]
Plato has a law of this kind. Laws, v.
[11]
Solon made four classes: the first, of those who had an income
of 500 minas either in corn or liquid fruits; the second, of those who
had 300, and were able to keep a horse; the third, of such as had only
200; the fourth, of all those who lived by their manual labour. --
Plutarch, Solon.
[12]
Solon excludes from public employments all those of the fourth
class.
5.6. 6. In what Manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality in a Democracy.
It is not sufficient in a well-regulated democracy that the
divisions of land be equal; they ought also to be small, as was
customary among the Romans. "God forbid," said Curius to his
soldiers,
[13]
"that a citizen should look upon that as a small piece of
land which is sufficient to maintain him."
As equality of fortunes supports frugality, so the latter maintains
the former. These things, though in themselves different, are of such a
nature as to be unable to subsist separately; they reciprocally act upon
each other; if one withdraws itself from a democracy, the other surely
follows it.
True is it that when a democracy is founded on commerce, private
people may acquire vast riches without a corruption of morals.
This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with
that of frugality, economy, moderation, labour, prudence, tranquillity,
order, and rule. So long as this spirit subsists, the riches it produces
have no bad effect. The mischief is, when excessive wealth destroys the
spirit of commerce, then it is that the inconveniences of inequality
begin to be felt.
In order to support this spirit, commerce should be carried on by
the principal citizens; this should be their sole aim and study; this
the chief object of the laws: and these very laws, by dividing the
estates of individuals in proportion to the increase of commerce, should
set every poor citizen so far at his ease as to be able to work like the
rest, and every wealthy citizen in such a mediocrity as to be obliged to
take some pains either in preserving or acquiring a fortune.
It is an excellent law in a trading republic to make an equal
division of the paternal estate among the children. The consequence of
this is that how great soever a fortune the father has made, his
children, being not so rich as he, are induced to avoid luxury, and to
work as he has done. I speak here only of trading republics; as to those
that have no commerce, the legislator must pursue quite different
measures.
[14]
In Greece there were two sorts of republics: the one military, like
Sparta; the other commercial, as Athens. In the former, the citizens
were obliged to be idle; in the latter, endeavours were used to inspire
them with the love of industry and labour. Solon made idleness a crime,
and insisted that each citizen should give an account of his manner of
getting a livelihood. And, indeed, in a well-regulated democracy, where
people's expenses should extend only to what is necessary, every one
ought to have it; for how should their wants be otherwise supplied?
Footnotes
[13]
They insisted upon a larger division of the conquered lands. --
Plutarch, "Lives of the ancient Kings and Commanders."
[14]
In these, the portions or fortunes of women ought to be very
much limited.
5.7. 7. Other Methods of favouring the Principle of Democracy.
An equal division of lands cannot be established in all democracies.
There are some circumstances in which a regulation of this nature would
be impracticable, dangerous, and even subversive of the constitution. We
are not always obliged to proceed to extremes. If it appears that this
division of lands, which was designed to preserve the people's morals,
does not suit the democracy, recourse must be had to other methods.
If a permanent body be established to serve as a rule and pattern of
manners; a senate, to which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent services
procure admittance; the senators, by being exposed to public view like
the statues of the gods, must naturally inspire every family with
sentiments of virtue.
Above all, this senate must steadily adhere to the ancient
institutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve
from them.
The preservation of the ancient customs is a very considerable point
in respect to manners. Since a corrupt people seldom perform any
memorable actions, seldom establish societies, build cities, or enact
laws; on the contrary, since most institutions are derived from people
whose manners are plain and simple, to keep up the ancient customs is
the way to preserve the original purity of morals.
Besides, if by some revolution the state has happened to assume a
new form, this seldom can be effected without infinite pains and labour,
and hardly ever by idle and debauched persons. Even those who had been
the instruments of the revolution were desirous it should be relished,
which is difficult to compass without good laws. Hence it is that
ancient institutions generally tend to reform the people's manners, and
those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long
administration, the descent to vice is insensible; but there is no
reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.
It has been questioned whether the members of the senate we are
speaking of ought to be for life or only chosen for a time. Doubtless
they ought to be for life, as was the custom at Rome,
[15]
at Sparta,
[16]
and even at Athens. For we must not confound the senate at Athens, which
was a body that changed every three months, with the Areopagus, whose
members, as standing patterns, were established for life.
Let this be therefore a general maxim; that in a senate designed to
be a rule, and the depository, as it were, of manners, the members ought
to be chosen for life: in a senate intended for the administration of
affairs, the members may be changed.
The spirit, says Aristotle, waxes old as well as the body. This
reflection holds good only in regard to a single magistrate, but cannot
be applied to a senatorial assembly.
At Athens, besides the Areopagus, there were guardians of the public
morals, as well as of the laws.
[17]
At Sparta, all the old men were censors. At Rome, the censorship was
committed to two particular magistrates. As the senate watched over the people,
the censors were to have an eye over the people and the senate. Their office was to reform
the corruptions of the republic, to stigmatise indolence, to censure
neglects, and to correct mistakes; as to flagrant crimes, these were
left to the punishment of the laws.
That Roman law which required the accusations in cases of adultery
to be public was admirably well calculated for preserving the purity of
morals; it intimidated married women, as well as those who were to watch
over their conduct.
Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an
extreme subordination of the young to the old. Thus they are both
restrained, the former by their respect for those of advanced age, and
the latter by their regard for themselves.
Nothing gives a greater force to the law than a perfect
subordination between the citizens and the magistrate. "The great
difference which Lycurgus established between Sparta and the other
cities," says Xenophon,
[18]
"consists chiefly in the obedience the citizens show to their laws;
they run when the magistrate calls them. But at Athens a rich man would be
highly displeased to be thought dependent on the magistrate."
Paternal authority is likewise of great use towards the preservation
of morals. We have already observed that in a republic there is not so
coercive a force as in other governments. The laws must therefore
endeavour to supply this defect by some means or other; and this is done
by paternal authority.
Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death over their
children.
[19]
At Sparta, every father had a right to correct another
man's child.
Paternal authority ended at Rome together with the republic. In
monarchies, where such a purity of morals is not required, they are
controlled by no other authority than that of the magistrates.
The Roman laws, which accustomed young people to dependence,
established a long minority. Perhaps we are mistaken in conforming to
this custom; there is no necessity for so much constraint in monarchies.
This very subordination in a republic might make it necessary for
the father to continue in the possession of his children's fortune
during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the
spirit of monarchy.
Footnotes
[15]
The magistrates there were annual, and the senators for life.
[16]
Lycurgus, says Xenophon, De Repub. Lacedœm., 10.1, 2,
ordained that the senators should be chosen from amongst the old men, to
the end that they might not be neglected in the decline of life; thus by
making them judges of the courage of young people, he rendered the old
age of the former more honourable than the strength and vigour of the
latter.
[17]
Even the Areopagus itself was subject to their censure.
[18]
De Repub. Lacedæm., 8.
[19]
We may see in the Roman History how useful this power was to the
republic. I shall give an instance even in the time of its greatest
corruption. Aulus Fulvius was set out on his journey in order to join
Catiline; his father called him back, and put him to death. — Sallust,
De Bello Catil., xxxiv.
5.8. 8. In what Manner the Laws should relate to the Principle of Government
in an Aristocracy.
If the people are virtuous in an aristocracy, they enjoy very nearly
the same happiness as in a popular government, and the state grows
powerful. But as a great share of virtue is very rare where men's
fortunes are so unequal, the laws must tend as much as possible to
infuse a spirit of moderation, and endeavour to re-establish that
equality which was necessarily removed by the constitution.
The spirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an aristocracy;
it supplies the place of the spirit of equality in a popular state.
As the pomp and splendour with which kings are surrounded form a
part of their power, so modesty and simplicity of manners constitute the
strength of an aristocratic nobility.
[20]
When they affect no distinction, when they mix with the people, dress like them, and with
them share all their pleasures, the people are apt to forget their
subjection and weakness.
Every government has its nature and principle. An aristocracy must
not therefore assume the nature and principle of monarchy; which would
be the case were the nobles to be invested with personal privileges
distinct from those of their body; privileges ought to be for the
senate, and simple respect for the senators.
In aristocratic governments there are two principal sources of
disorder: excessive inequality between the governors and the governed;
and the same inequality between the different members of the body that
governs. From these two inequalities, hatreds and jealousies arise,
which the laws ought ever to prevent or repress.
The first inequality is chiefly when the privileges of the nobility
are honourable only as they are ignominious to the people. Such was the
law at Rome by which the patricians were forbidden to marry
plebeians;
[21]
a law that had no other effect than to render the
patricians on the one side more haughty, and on the other more odious.
The reader may see what advantages the tribunes derived thence in their
harangues.
This inequality occurs likewise when the condition of the citizens
differs with regard to taxes, which may happen in four different ways:
when the nobles assume the privilege of paying none; when they commit
frauds to exempt themselves;
[22]
when they engross the public money, under pretence of rewards or appointments
for their respective employments; in fine, when they render the common people
tributary, and divide among their own body the profits arising from the several
subsidies. This last case is very rare; an aristocracy so instituted
would be the most intolerable of all governments.
While Rome inclined towards aristocracy, she avoided all these
inconveniences. The magistrates never received any emoluments from their
office. The chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest, nay,
more heavily; and sometimes the taxes fell upon them alone. In fine, far
from sharing among themselves the revenues of the state, all they could
draw from the public treasure, and all the wealth that fortune flung
into their laps, they bestowed freely on the people, to be excused from
accepting public honours.
[23]
It is a fundamental maxim that largesses are pernicious to the
people in a democracy, but salutary in an aristocratic government. The
former make them forget they are citizens, the latter bring them to a
sense of it. If the revenues of the state are not distributed among the
people, they must be convinced at least of their being well
administered: to feast their eyes with the public treasure is with them
the same thing almost as enjoying it. The golden chain displayed at
Venice, the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs, the treasures
preserved in the temple of Saturn, were in reality the wealth of the
people.
It is a very essential point in an aristocracy that the nobles
themselves should not levy the taxes. The first order of the state in
Rome never concerned themselves with it; the levying of the taxes was
committed to the second, and even this in process of time was attended
with great inconveniences. In an aristocracy of this kind, where the
nobles levied the taxes, the private people would be all at the
discretion of persons in public employments; and there would be no such
thing as a superior tribunal to check their power. The members appointed
to remove the abuses would rather enjoy them. The nobles would be like
the princes of despotic governments, who confiscate whatever estates
they please.
Soon would the profits hence arising be considered as a patrimony,
which avarice would enlarge at pleasure. The farms would be lowered, and
the public revenues reduced to nothing. This is the reason that some
governments, without having ever received any remarkable shock, have
dwindled away to such a degree as not only their neighbours, but even
their own subjects, have been surprised at it.
The laws should likewise forbid the nobles all kinds of commerce:
merchants of such unbounded credit would monopolise all to themselves.
Commerce is a profession of people who are upon an equality; hence among
despotic states the most miserable are those in which the prince applies
himself to trade.
The laws of Venice debar
[24]
the nobles from commerce, by which they might even innocently acquire exorbitant wealth.
The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the
nobles do justice to the people. If they have not established a tribune,
they ought to be a tribune themselves.
Every sort of asylum in opposition to the execution of the laws
destroys aristocracy, and is soon succeeded by tyranny. They ought
always to mortify the lust of dominion. There should be either a
temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the nobles in awe, as the
Ephori at Sparta and the State Inquisitors at Venice — magistrates
subject to no formalities. This sort of government stands in need of the
strongest springs: thus a mouth of stone
[25]
is open to every informer at Venice — a mouth to which one would be apt to
give the appellation of tyranny.
These arbitrary magistrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to
the censorship in democracies, which of its own nature is equally
independent. And, indeed, the censors ought to be subject to no inquiry
in relation to their conduct during their office; they should meet with
a thorough confidence, and never be discouraged. In this respect the
practice of the Romans deserved admiration; magistrates of all
denominations were accountable for their administration,
[26]
except the censors.
[27]
There are two very pernicious things in an aristocracy — excess
either of poverty, or of wealth in the nobility. To prevent their
poverty, it is necessary, above all things, to oblige them to pay their
debts in time. To moderate the excess of wealth, prudent and gradual
regulations should be made; but no confiscations, no agrarian laws, no
expunging of debts; these are productive of infinite mischief.
The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the
nobles
[28]
to the end that by a continual division of the inheritances
their fortunes may be always upon a level.
There should be no substitutions, no powers of redemption, no rights
of Majorasgo, or adoption. The contrivances for perpetuating the
grandeur of families in monarchical governments ought never to be
employed in aristocracies.
[29]
When the laws have compassed the equality of families, the next
thing is to preserve a proper harmony and union among them. The quarrels
of the nobility ought to be quickly decided; otherwise the contests of
individuals become those of families. Arbiters may terminate, or even
prevent, the rise ot disputes.
In fine, the laws must not favour the distinctions raised by vanity
among families, under pretence that they are more noble or ancient than
others. Pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weaknesses
of private persons.
We have only to cast an eye upon Sparta; there we may see how the
Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings, as well as those of
the nobility and common people.
Footnotes
[20]
In our days the Venetians, who in many respects may be said to
have a very wise government, decided a dispute between a noble Venetian
and a gentleman of Terra Firma in respect to precedency in a church, by
declaring that out of Venice a noble Venetian had no pre-eminence over
any other citizen.
[21]
It was inserted by the decemvirs in the two last tables. See
Dionysius Helicarnassus, x.
[22]
As in some aristocracies in our time; nothing is more
prejudicial to the government.
[23]
See in Strabo, xiv., in what manner the Rhodians behaved in this
respect.
[24]
"Amelot de la Houssaye," of the "Government of Venice," part III.
The Claudian law forbade the senators to have any ship at sea that held
above forty bushels. — Livy, xxi. 63.
[25]
The informers throw their scrolls into it.
[26]
See Livy, xlix. A censor could not be troubled even by a censor;
each made his remark without taking the opinion of his colleague; and
when it otherwise happened, the censorship was in a manner abolished.
[27]
At Athens the Logistæ, who made all the magistrates accountable
for their conduct, gave no account themselves.
[28]
It is so practised at Venice. — "Amelot de la Houssaye," pp. 30,
31.
[29]
The main design of some aristocracies seems to be less the
support of the state than of their nobility.
5.9. 9. In what Manner the Laws are in relation to their Principle in
Monarchies.
As honour is the principle of a monarchical government, the laws
ought to be in relation to this principle.
They should endeavour to support the nobility, in respect to whom
honour may be, in some measure, deemed both child and parent.
They should render the nobility hereditary, not as a boundary
between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people, but as
the link which connects them both.
In this government, substitutions which preserve the estates of
families undivided are extremely useful, though in others not so proper.
Here the power of redemption is of service, as it restores to noble
families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a
parent.
The land of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their
persons. The monarch's dignity is inseparable from that of his kingdom;
and-the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief.
All these privileges must be peculiar to the nobility, and
incommunicable to the people, unless we intend to act contrary to the
principle of government, and to diminish the power of the nobles
together with that of the people.
Substitutions are a restraint to commerce, the power of redemption
produces an infinite number of processes; every estate in land that is
sold throughout the kingdom is in some measure without an owner for the
space of a year. Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power very
burdensome to those governments which tolerate them. These are the
inconveniences of nobility — inconveniences, however, that vanish when
confronted with its general utility: but when these privileges are
communicated to the people, every principle of government is wantonly
violated.
In monarchies a person may leave the bulk of his estate to one of
his children — a permission improper in any other government.
The laws ought to favour all kinds of commerce
[30]
consistent with the constitution, to the end that the subjects may, without ruining
themselves, be able to satisfy the continual cravings of the prince and
his court.
They should establish some regulation that the manner of collecting
the taxes may not be more burdensome than the taxes themselves.
The weight of duties produces labour, labour weariness, and
weariness the spirit of indolence.
Footnotes
[30]
It is tolerated only in the common people. See Leg. 3, Cod. de
comm. et mercatoribus, which is full of good sense.
5.10. 10. Of the Expedition peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies.
Great is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a
republic: as the state is conducted by a single person, the executive
power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition. But as this
expedition may degenerate into rapidity, the laws should use some
contrivance to slacken it. They ought not only to favour the nature of
each constitution, but likewise to remedy the abuses that might result
from this very nature.
Cardinal Richelieu
[31]
advises monarchs to permit no such things a ssocieties or communities that
raise difficulties upon every trifle. If this man's heart had not been
bewitched with the love of despotic power, still these arbitrary notions would
have filled his head.
The bodies entrusted with the deposition of the laws are never more
obedient than when they proceed slowly, and use that reflection in the
prince's affairs which can scarcely be expected from the ignorance of a
court, or from the precipitation of its councils.
[32]
What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world if the
magistrates, by their delays, their complaints, and entreaties, had not
checked the rapidity even of their princes' virtues, when these
monarchs, consulting only the generous impulse of their minds, would
fain have given a boundless reward to services performed with an
unlimited courage and fidelity?
Footnotes
[32]
"Barbaris cunctatio servilis, statim exequi regium videtur." --
Tacitus, Annals., v. 32.
5.11. 11. Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government.
Monarchy has a great advantage over a despotic government. As it
naturally requires there should be several orders or ranks of subjects,
the state is more permanent, the constitution more steady, and the
person of him who governs more secure.
Cicero is of opinion that the establishing of the tribunes preserved
the republic. "And indeed," says he, "the violence of a headless people
is more terrible. A chief or head is sensible that the affair depends
upon himself, and therefore he thinks; but the people in their
impetuosity are ignorant of the danger into which they hurry
themselves." This reflection may be applied to a despotic government,
which is a people without tribunes; and to a monarchy, where the people
have some sort of tribunes.
Accordingly it is observable that in the commotions of a despotic
government, the people, hurried away by their passions, are apt to push
things as far as they can go. The disorders they commit are all extreme;
whereas in monarchies matters are seldom carried to excess. The chiefs
are apprehensive on their own account; they are afraid of being
abandoned, and the intermediate dependent powers do not choose that the
populace should have too much the upper hand. It rarely happens that the
states of the kingdom are entirely corrupted: the prince adheres to
these; and the seditious, who have neither will nor hopes to subvert the
government, have neither power nor will to dethrone the prince.
In these circumstances men of prudence and authority interfere;
moderate measures are first proposed, then complied with, and things at
length are redressed; the laws resume their vigour, and command
submission.
Thus all our histories are full of civil wars without revolutions,
while the histories of despotic governments abound with revolutions
without civil wars.
The writers of the history of the civil wars of some countries, even
those who fomented them, sufficiently demonstrate the little foundation
princes have to suspect the authority with which they invest particular
bodies of men; since, even under the unhappy circumstance of their
errors, they sighed only after the laws and their duty; and restrained,
more than they were capable of inflaming, the impetuosity of the
revolted.
[33]
Cardinal Richelieu, reflecting perhaps that he had too
much reduced the states of the kingdom, has recourse to the virtues of
the prince and of his ministers for the support
[34]
of government: but he requires so many things, that indeed there is none but an angel
capable of such attention, such resolution and knowledge; and scarcely
can we flatter ourselves that we shall ever see such a prince and
ministers while monarchy subsists.
As people who live under a good government are happier than those
who without rule or leaders wander about the forests, so monarchs who
live under the fundamental laws of their country are far happier than
despotic princes who have nothing to regulate, neither their own
passions nor those of their subjects.
[33]
"Memoirs of Cardinal de Retz," and other histories.
5.12. 12. The same Subject continued.
Let us not look for magnanimity in despotic governments; the prince
cannot impart a greatness which he has not himself; with him there is no
such thing as glory.
It is in monarchies that we behold the subjects encircling the
throne, and cheered by the irradiancy of the sovereign; there it is that
each person filling, as it were, a larger space, is capable of
exercising those virtues which adorn the soul, not with independence,
but with true dignity and greatness.
5.13. 13. An Idea of Despotic Power.
When the savages of Louisiana are desirous of fruit, they cut the tree to
the root, and gather the fruit.
[35]
This is an emblem of despotic government.
[35]
"Edifying Letters," col. ii, p. 315.
5.14. 14. In what Manner the Laws are in relation to the Principles of
Despotic Government.
The principle of despotic government is fear; but a timid, ignorant, and faint-spirited
people have no occasion for a great number of laws.
Everything ought to depend here on two or three ideas; hence there
is no necessity that any new notions should be added. When we want to
break a horse, we take care not to let him change his master, his
lesson, or his pace. Thus an impression is made on his brain by two or
three motions, and no more.
If a prince is shut up in a seraglio, he cannot leave his voluptuous
abode without alarming those who keep him confined. Thev will not bear
that his person and power should pass into other hands. He seldom
therefore wages war in person, and hardly ventures to entrust the
command to his generals.
A prince of this stamp, unaccustomed to resistance in his palace, is
enraged to see his will opposed by armed force; hence he is generally
governed by wrath or vengeance. Besides, he can have no notion of true
glory. War therefore is carried on under such a government in its full
natural fury, and less extent is given to the law of nations than in
other states.
Such a prince has so many imperfections that they are afraid to
expose his natural stupidity to public view. He is concealed in his
palace, and the people are ignorant of his situation. It is lucky for
him that the inhabitants of those countries need only the name of a
prince to govern them.
When Charles XII was at Bender, he met with some opposition from the
senate of Sweden; upon which he wrote word home that he would send one
of his boots to command them. This boot would have governed like a
despotic prince.
If the prince is a prisoner, he is supposed to be dead, and another
mounts the throne. The treaties made by the prisoner are void, his
successor will not ratify them; and indeed, as he is the law, the state,
and the prince: when he is no longer a prince, he is nothing: were he
not therefore deemed to be deceased, the state would be subverted.
One thing which chiefly determined the Turks to conclude a separate
peace with Peter I was the Muscovites telling the Vizir that in Sweden
another prince had been placed upon the throne.
[36]
The preservation of the state is only the preservation of the
prince, or rather of the palace where he is confined. Whatever does not
directly menace this palace or the capital makes no impression on
ignorant, proud, and prejudiced minds; and as for the concatenation of
events, they are unable to trace, to foresee, or even to conceive it.
Politics, with its several springs and laws, must here be very much
limited; the political government is as simple as the civil.
[37]
The whole is reduced to reconciling the political and civil
administration to the domestic government, the officers of state to
those of the seraglio.
Such a state is happiest when it can look upon itself as the only
one in the world, when it is environed with deserts, and separated from
those people whom they call Barbarians. Since it cannot depend on the
militia, it is proper it should destroy a part of itself.
As fear is the principle of despotic government, its end is
tranquillity; but this tranquillity cannot be called a peace: no, it is
only the silence of those towns which the enemy is ready to invade.
Since strength does not lie in the state, but in the army that
founded it, in order to defend the state the army must be preserved, how
formidable soever to the prince. How, then, can we reconcile the
security of the government to that of the prince's person?
Observe how industriously the Russian government endeavours to
temper its arbitrary power, which it finds more burdensome than the
people themselves. They have broken their numerous guards, mitigated
criminal punishments, erected tribunals, entered into a knowledge of the
laws, and instructed the people. But there are particular causes that
will probably once more involve them in the very misery which they now
endeavour to avoid.
In those states religion has more influence than anywhere else; it
is fear added to fear. In Mahomedan countries, it is partly from their
religion that the people derive the surprising veneration they have for
their prince.
It is religion that amends in some measure the Turkish constitution.
The subjects, who have no attachment of honour to the glory and grandeur
of the state, are connected with it by the force and principle of
religion.
Of all despotic governments there is none that labours more under
its own weight than that wherein the prince declares himself proprietor
of all the lands, and heir to all his subjects. Hence the neglect of
agriculture arises; and if the prince intermeddles likewise in trade,
all manner of industry is ruined.
Under this sort of government, nothing is repaired or improved.
[38]
Houses are built only for the necessity of habitation; there is no
digging of ditches or planting of trees; everything is drawn from, but
nothing restored to, the earth; the ground lies untilled, and the whole
country becomes a desert.
Is it to be imagined that the laws which abolish the property of
land and the succession of estates will diminish the avarice and
cupidity of the great? By no means. They will rather stimulate this
cupidity and avarice. The great men will be prompted to use a thousand
oppressive methods, imagining they have no other property than the gold
and silver which they are able to seize upon by violence, or to conceal.
To prevent, therefore, the utter ruin of the state, the avidity of
the prince ought to be moderated by some established custom. Thus, in
Turkey, the sovereign is satisfied with the right of three per cent on
the value of inheritances.
[39]
But as he gives the greatest part of the lands to his soldiery, and disposes
of them as he pleases; as he seizes on all the inheritances of the officers
of the empire at their decease; as he has the property of the possessions of
those who die without issue, and the daughters have only the usufruct; it
thence follows that the greatest part of the estates of the country are held in
a precarious manner.
By the laws of Bantam,
[40]
the king seizes on the whole inheritance, even wife, children, and habitation.
In order to elude the cruelest part of this law, they are obliged to marry
their children at eight, nine, or ten years of age, and sometimes younger,
to the end that they may not be a wretched part of the father's succession.
In countries where there are no fundamental laws, the succession to
the empire cannot be fixed. The crown is then elective, and the right of
electing is in the prince, who names a successor either of his own or of
some other family. In vain would it be to establish here the succession
of the eldest son; the prince might always choose another. The successor
is declared by the prince himself, or by a civil war. Hence a despotic
state is, upon another account, more liable than a monarchical
government to dissolution.
As every prince of the royal family is held equally capable of being
chosen, hence it follows that the prince who ascends the throne
immediately strangles his brothers, as in Turkey; or puts out their
eyes, as in Persia; or bereaves them of their understanding, as in the
Mogul's country; or if these precautions are not used, as in Morocco,
the vacancy of the throne is always attended with the horrors of a civil
war.
By the constitution of Russia
[41]
the Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his successor, whether of his
own or of a strange family. Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions,
and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary. The right
of succession being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know,
the best is that which most sensibly strikes them. Such as a certain
order of birth. A settlement of this kind puts a stop to intrigues, and
stifles ambition; the mind of a weak prince is no longer enslaved, nor
is he made to speak his will as he is just expiring.
When the succession is established by a fundamental law, only one
prince is the successor, and his brothers have neither a real nor
apparent right to dispute the crown with him. They can neither pretend
to nor take any advantage of the will of a father. There is then no more
occasion to confine or kill the king's brother than any other subject.
But in despotic governments, where the prince's brothers are equally
his slaves and his rivals, prudence requires that their persons be
secured; especially in Mahomedan countries, where religion considers
victory or success as a divine decision in their favour; so that they
have no such thing as a monarch de jure,
but only de facto.
There is a far greater incentive to ambition in countries where the
princes of the blood are sensible that if they do not ascend the throne
they must be either imprisoned or put to death, than among us, where
they are placed in such a station as may satisfy, if not their ambition,
at least their moderate desires.
The princes of despotic governments have ever perverted the use of
marriage. They generally take a great many wives, especially in that
part of the world where absolute power is in some measure naturalised,
namely, Asia. Hence they come to have such a multitude of children that
they can hardly have any great affection for them, nor the children for
one another.
The reigning family resembles the state; it is too weak itself, and
its head too powerful; it seems very numerous and extensive, and yet is
suddenly extinct. Artaxerxes
[42]
put all his children to death for conspiring against him.
It is not at all probable that fifty children would conspire against
their father, and much less that this conspiracy would be owing to his
having refused to resign his concubine to his eldest son. It is more
natural to believe that the whole was an intrigue of those oriental
seraglios, where fraud, treachery, and deceit reign in silence and
darkness; and where an old prince, grown every day more infirm, is the
first prisoner of the palace.
After what has been said, one would imagine that human nature should
perpetually rise up against despotism. But notwithstanding the love of
liberty, so natural to mankind, notwithstanding their innate detestation
of force and violence, most nations are subject to this very government.
This is easily accounted for. To form a moderate government, it is
necessary to combine the several powers; to regulate, temper, and set
them in motion; to give, as it were, ballast to one, in order to enable
it to counterpoise the other. This is a masterpiece of legislation;
rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by prudence. On the
contrary, a despotic government offers itself, as it were, at first
sight; it is uniform throughout; and as passions only are requisite to
establish it, this is what every capacity may reach.
Footnotes
[36]
Continuation of Pufendorf's "Introduction to the History of
Europe," in the article of Sweden, 10.
[37]
According to Sir John Chardin, there is no council of state in
Persia.
[38]
See Ricaut, State of the Ottoman Empire, p. 196.
[39]
See concerning the inheritances of the Turks, Ancient and Modern
Sparta. See also Ricaut on the Ottoman empire.
[40]
"Collection of Voyages that Contributed to the Establishment of
the East India Company," i. The law of Pegu is less cruel; if there
happen to be children, the king succeeds only to two-thirds. Ibid., iii,
p. 1.
[41]
See the different constitutions, especially that of 1722.
5.15. 15. The same Subject continued.
In warm climates, where despotic power generally prevails, the
passions disclose themselves earlier, and are sooner extinguished;
[43]
the understanding is sooner ripened; they are less in danger of
squandering their fortunes; there is less facility of distinguishing
themselves in the world; less communication between young people, who
are confined at home; they marry much earlier, and consequently may be
sooner of age than in our European climates. In Turkey they are of age
at fifteen.
[44]
They have no such thing as a cession of goods; in a government where
there is no fixed property, people depend rather on the person than on
his estate.
The cession of goods is naturally admitted in moderate governments,
[45]
but especially in republics, because of the greater confidence usually
placed in the probity of the citizens, and the lenity and moderation arising
from a form of government which every subject seems to nave preferred to all
others.
Had the legislators of the Roman republic established the cession of
goods,
[46]
they never would have been exposed to so many seditions and
civil discords; neither would they have experienced the danger of the
evils, nor the inconvenience of the remedies.
Poverty and the precariousness of property in a despotic state
render usury natural, each person raising the value of his money in
proportion to the danger he sees in lending it. Misery therefore pours
from all parts into those unhappy countries; they are bereft of
everything, even of the resource of borrowing.
Hence it is that a merchant under this government is unable to carry
on an extensive commerce; he lives from hand to mouth; and were he to
encumber himself with a large quantity of merchandise, he would lose
more by the exorbitant interest he must give for money than he could
possibly get by the goods. Hence they have no laws here relating to
commerce; they are all reduced to what is called the bare police.
A government cannot be unjust without having hands to exercise its
injustice. Now, it is impossible but that these hands will be grasping
for themselves. The embezzling of the public money is therefore natural
in despotic states.
As this is a common crime under such a government, confiscations are
very useful. By these the people are eased; the money drawn by this
method being a considerable tribute which could hardly be raised on the
exhausted subject: neither is there in those countries any one family
which the prince would be glad to preserve.
In moderate governments it is quite a different thing. Confiscations
would render property uncertain, would strip innocent children, would
destroy a whole family, instead of punishing a single criminal. In
republics they would be attended with the mischief of subverting
equality, which is the very soul of this government, by depriving a
citizen of his necessary subsistence.
[47]
There is a Roman law
[48]
against confiscations, except in the case of crimen majestatis,
or high treason of the most heinous nature. It would be a prudent thing to follow
the spirit of this law, and to limit confiscations to particular crimes.
In countries where a local custom has rendered real estates alienable, Bodin
very justly observes that confiscations should extend only to such as are purchased or
acquired.
[49]
Footnotes
[43]
See the book of laws as relative to the nature of the climate.
Book xiv, below.
[44]
Laquilletiere, "Ancient and Modern Sparta," p. 463.
[45]
The same may be said of compositions in regard to fair
bankrupts.
[46]
There was no such establishment made till the Julian law, De
Cessione bonorum; which preserved them from prison and from an
ignominious division of their goods. — Cod., ii. tit. 12.
[47]
They seem to have been too fond of confiscations in the republic
of Athens.
[48]
Authentica bona damnatorum. — Cod. de bon. proscript. seu damn.
[49]
De la Republique, v. 3.
5.16. 16. Of the Communication of Power.
In a despotic government the power is communicated entire to the person entrusted with it.
The vizir himself is the despotic prince; and each particular officer is the vizir. In
monarchies the power is less immediately applied, being tempered by the
monarch as he gives it.
[50]
He makes such a distribution of his authority as never to communicate a part of it
without reserving a greater share to himself.
Hence in monarchies the governors of towns are not so dependent on
the governor of the province as not to be still more so on the prince;
and the private officers or military bodies are not so far subject to
their general as not to owe still a greater subjection to their
sovereign.
In most monarchies it has been wisely regulated that those who have
an extensive command should not belong to any military corps; so that as
they have no authority but through the prince's pleasure, and as they
may be employed or not, they are in some measure in the service, and in
some measure out of it.
This is incompatible with a despotic government. For if those who
are not actually employed were still invested with privileges and
titles, the consequence must be that there would be men in the state who
might be said to be great of themselves; a thing directly opposite to
the nature of this government.
Were the governor of a town independent of the pasha, expedients
would be daily necessary to make them agree; which is highly absurd in a
despotic state. Besides, if a particular governor should refuse to obey,
how could the other answer for his province with his head?
In this kind of government, authority must ever be wavering; nor is
that of the lowest magistrate more steady than that of the despotic
prince. Under moderate governments, the law is prudent in all its
parts, and perfectly well known, so that even the pettiest magistrates
are capable of following it. But in a despotic state, where the prince's
will is the law, though the prince were wise, yet how could the
magistrate follow a will he does not know? He must certainly follow his
own.
Again, as the law is only the prince's will, and as the prince can
only will what he knows, the consequence is that there are an infinite
number of people who must will for him, and make their wills keep pace
with his. In fine, as the law is the momentary will of the prince, it is
necessary that those who will for him should follow his sudden manner of
willing.
Footnotes
[50]
Ut esse Phœbi dulcius lumen solet Jamjam cadentis -- Seneca,
Troas, V. i. 1.
5.17. 17. Of Presents.
It is a received custom in despotic countries never to
address any superior whomsoever, not excepting their kings, without
making them a present. The Mogul
[51]
never receives the petitions of his subjects if they come with empty hands.
These princes spoil even their own favours.
But thus it must ever be in a government where no man is a citizen;
where they have all a notion that a superior is under no obligation to
an inferior; where men imagine themselves bound by no other tie than the
chastisements inflicted by one party upon another; where, in fine, there
is very little to do, and where the people have seldom an occasion of
presenting themselves before the great, of offering their petitions, and
much less their complaints.
In a republic, presents are odious, because virtue stands in no need
of them. In monarchies, honour is a much stronger incentive than
presents. But in a despotic government, where there is neither honour
nor virtue, people cannot be determined to act but through hope of the
conveniences of life.
It is in conformity with republican ideas that Plato
[52]
ordered those who received presents for doing their duty to be punished with
death. "They must not take presents," says he, "neither for good nor
for evil actions."
A very bad law was that among the Romans
[53]
which gave the magistrates leave to accept small presents
[54]
provided they did not exceed one hundred crowns in the whole year. They who
receive nothing expect nothing; they who receive a little soon covet more, till at
length their desires swell to an exorbitant height.
Besides, it is much easier to convict a man who knows himself
obliged to accept no present at all, and yet will accept something, than
a person who takes more when he ought to take less, and who always finds
pretexts, excuses, and plausible reasons in justification of his
conduct.
Footnotes
[51]
"Collection of Voyages that Contributed to the Establishment of
the East India Company," i, p. 80.
[53]
Leg. 6, 2; Dig. ad leg. Jul. repet.
5.18. 18. Of Rewards conferred by the Sovereign.
In despotic governments, where, as we have already observed, the principal motive of action is
the hope of the conveniences of life, the prince who confers rewards has
nothing to bestow but money. In monarchies, where honour alone
predominates, the prince's rewards would consist only of marks of
distinction, if the distinctions established by honour were not attended
with luxury, which necessarily brings on its wants: the prince therefore
is obliged to confer such honours as lead to wealth. But in a republic
where virtue reigns — a motive self-sufficient, and which excludes all
others — the recompenses of the state consist only of public
attestations of this virtue.
It is a general rule that great rewards in monarchies and republics
are a sign of their decline; because they are a proof of their
principles being corrupted, and that the idea of honour has no longer
the same force in a monarchy, nor the title of citizen the same weight
in a republic.
The very worst Roman emperors were those who were most profuse in
their largesses; for example, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Otho, Vitellius,
Commodus, Heliogabalus, and Caracalla. The best, as Augustus, Vespasian,
Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Pertinax, were economists. Under
good emperors the state resumed its principles; all other treasures were
supplied by that of honour.
5.19. 19. New Consequences of the Principles of the three Governments.
I cannot conclude this book without making some applications of my
three principles.
1st Question. It is a question whether the laws ought to oblige a
subject to accept a public employment. My opinion is that they ought in
a republic, but not in a monarchical government. In the former, public
employments are attestations of virtue, depositions with which a citizen
is entrusted by his country, for whose sake alone he ought to live, to
act, and to think, consequently lie cannot refuse them.
[55]
In the latter, public offices are testimonials of honour; now such is the
capriciousness of honour that it chooses to accept none of these
testimonies but when and in what manner it pleases.
The late King of Sardinia
[56]
inflicted punishments on his subjects who refused the dignities and public
offices of the state. In this he unknowingly followed republican ideas: but
his method of governing in other respects sufficiently proves that this was
not his intention.
2nd Question. Secondly, it is questioned whether a subject should
be obliged to accept a post in the army inferior to that which he held
before. Among the Romans it was usual to see a captain serve the next
year under his lieutenant.
[57]
This is because virtue in republics requires a continual sacrifice of our
persons and of our repugnances for the good of the state. But in monarchies,
honour, true or false, will never bear with what it calls degrading itself.
In despotic governments, where honour, posts, and ranks are equally
abused, they indiscriminately make a prince a scullion, and a scullion a
prince.
3rd Question. Thirdly, it may be inquired, whether civil and
military employments should be conferred on the same person. In
republics I think they should be joined, but in monarchies separated. In
the former it would be extremely dangerous to make the profession of
arms a particular state, distinct from that of civil functions; and in
the latter, no less dangerous would it be to confer these two
employments on the same person.
In republics a person takes up arms only with a view to defend his
country and its laws; it is because he is a citizen he makes himself for
a while a soldier. Were these two distinct states, the person who under
arms thinks himself a citizen would soon be made sensible he is only a
soldier.
In monarchies, they whose condition engages them in the profession
of arms have nothing but glory, or at least honour or fortune, in view.
To men, therefore, like these, the prince should never give any civil
employments; on the contrary, they ought to be checked by the civil
magistrate, that the same persons may not have at the same time the
confidence of the people and the power to abuse it.
[58]
We have only to cast an eye on a nation that may be justly called a
republic, disguised under the form of monarchy, and we shall see how
jealous they are of making a separate order of the profession of arms,
and how the military state is constantly allied with that of the
citizen, and even sometimes of the magistrate, to the end that these
qualities may be a pledge for their country, which should never be
forgotten.
The division of civil and military employments, made by the Romans
after the extinction of the republic, was not an arbitrary thing. It was
a consequence of the change which happened in the constitution of Rome;
it was natural to a monarchical government; and what was only commenced
under Augustus
[59]
succeeding emperors
[60]
were obliged to finish, in order to temper the military government.
Procopius, therefore, the competitor of Valens the emperor, was very
much to blame when, conferring the pro-consular dignity
[61]
upon Hormisdas, a prince of the blood royal of Persia, he restored to this
magistracy the military command of which it had been formerly possessed;
unless indeed he had very particular reasons for so doing. A person that
aspires to the sovereignty concerns himself less about what is
serviceable to the state than what is likely to promote his own
interest.
4th Question. Fourthly, it is a question whether public employments
should be sold. They ought not, I think, in despotic governments, where
the subjects must be instantaneously placed or displaced by the prince.
But in monarchies this custom is not at all improper, by reason it
is an inducement to engage in that as a family employment which would
not be undertaken through a motive of virtue; it fixes likewise every
one in his duty, and renders the several orders of the kingdom more
permanent. Suidas very justly observes that Anastasius had changed the
empire into a kind of aristocracy, by selling all public employments.
Plato
[62]
cannot bear with this prostitution: "This is exactly,"
says he, "as if a person were to be made a mariner or pilot of a ship
for his money. Is it possible that this rule should be bad in every
other employment of life, and hold good only in the administration of a
republic?" But Plato speaks of a republic founded on virtue, and we of a
monarchy. Now, in monarchies (where, though there were no such thing as
a regular sale of public offices, still the indigence and avidity of the
courtier would equally prompt him to expose them to sale) chance will
furnish better subjects than the prince's choice. In short, the method
of attaining to honours through riches inspires and cherishes
industry,
[63]
a thing extremely wanting in this kind of government.
5th Question. The fifth question is in what kind of government
censors are necessary. My answer is, that they are necessary in a
republic, where the principle of government is virtue. We must not
imagine that criminal actions only are destructive of virtue; it is
destroyed also by omissions, by neglects, by a certain coolness in the
love of our country, by bad examples, and by the seeds of corruption:
whatever does not openly violate but elude the laws, does not subvert
but weaken them, ought to fall under the inquiry and correction of the
censors.
We are surprised at the punishment of the Areopagite for killing a
sparrow which, to escape the pursuit of a hawk, had taken shelter in his
bosom. Surprised we are also that an Areopagite should put his son to
death for putting out the eyes of a little bird. But let us reflect that
the question here does not relate to a criminal sentence, but to a
judgment concerning manners in a republic founded on manners.
In monarchies there should be no censors; the former are founded on
honour, and the nature of honour is to have the whole world for its
censor. Every man who fails in this article is subject to the reproaches
even of those who are void of honour.
Here the censors would be spoiled by the very people whom they ought
to correct: they could not prevail against the corruption of a monarchy;
the corruption rather would be too strong against them.
Hence it is obvious that there ought to be no censors in despotic
governments. The example of China seems to derogate from this rule; but
we shall see, in the course of this work, the particular reasons of that
institution.
Footnotes
[55]
Plato, in his "Republic," viii, ranks these refusals among the
marks of the corruption of a republic. In his "Laws," vi, he orders them
to be punished by a fine; at Venice they are punished with banishment.
[57]
Some centurions having appealed to the people for the
employments which they had before enjoyed, "It is just, my comrades,"
said a centurion, "that you should look upon every post as honourable in
which you have an opportunity of defending the republic." — Livy, dec.
5, xlii, 34.
[58]
Ne imperium ad optimos nobilium transferretur, Senatum militia
vetuit Gallienus, etiam adire exercitum.-- Aurelius Victor, De Cæsaribus.
[59]
Augustus deprived the senators, proconsuls, and governors of the
privilege of wearing arms. — Dio, xxxiii.
[60]
Constantine. See Zozimus, ii.
[61]
Ammianus Marcellinus, xxvi, Et Civilia, more veterum, et bella
recturo.
[63]
We see the laziness of Spain, where all public employments are given away.
