43. Difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those abstract ideas we give them.
I
must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this subject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I
desire it may be considered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things, stripped of
those specifical differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I
thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species; and so
cross my purpose. For, to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the name
man, which is our complex idea usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as
he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or real essence, that is, by something he knows
not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species
of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing
signified by the general names which substances are called by. But because it is difficult by known familiar names
to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific
names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to
archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings, or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to
their received names; and sometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always
refers its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the signification of their names, as to the
archetypes; and also to make plain the nature of species or sorting of things, as apprehended and made use of by
us; and of the essences belonging to those species: which is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and
certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine.
