University of Virginia Library

Dr. James J. Putnam, of Boston, read a paper entitled, "The Necessity of Metaphysics."[1]

DISCUSSION

DR. MORTON PRINCE, Boston: I sympathize with Dr. Putnam in his interest in philosophical problems, my only conflict with his point of view being with what I conceive to be a mixing of problems. I suppose that if we want an explanation of the universe it must be in terms of philosophy or metaphysics. The only alternative is to accept it as a phenomenal universe, as it is. You will remember that when it was reported to Carlisle that Margaret Fuller said she "accepted the universe," he replied "Gad! I think she had better!". So we have got either to explain the universe in terms of philosophy or accept it as it is.

I have no objection to introducing philosophical problems if we do not confuse those problems with our psychological problems. They are entirely distinct. This distinction between philosophy and science the physicists and chemists clearly recognize. One of their problems is the ultimate nature of matter, but it is not a problem of practical physics and chemistry. These deal, let us say, with phenomenal atoms and molecules, with their attractions and repulsions, etc. In dealing with the problem of the ultimate nature of matter the chemist analyzes matter and finds that it can be reduced to atoms, and then analyzes the atoms and finds them composed of electrons flying about within the circumscribed space of an atom. Then he analyzes the electron and reduces it to negative electricity, and when asked what negative electricity is he says it is a form of the

energy of the universe, and stops there and says—"I don't know," when asked to explain energy.

Here the problem of the ultimate nature of matter becomes a question of philosophy and metaphysics. It is a field of research by itself. The chemist never confuses that problem with the specific problems of his particular science. These deal with empirical atoms and molecules as he finds them. No chemist would undertake to give the chemical formula of the union of sulphuric acid and zinc by a formula which expressed the ultimate nature of atoms or negative electricity. If he did so he would confuse his problems. And so I think we confuse our problems when we attempt to explain empirical psychological phenomena in philosophical or ultimate terms. We must treat our psychological elements—ideas, wishes, emotions, etc,—as the chemist treats atoms and molecules. But, just as the latter may take up ultimate problems as a special field of investigation so may we do, if we like, but we must not treat them as psychological problems.

This confusion of problems is, I think, the fundamental error of Jung and others in treating of the libido when he and they attempt to explain specific phenomena as empirically observed. Jung undertakes to resolve libido into the energy of the universe. Of course this is possible. All forces can be ultimately so resolved, including the forces of mind and body. Emotions such as anger and fear are forces and each of these forces, with great probability, can be reduced in the ultimate analysis to a form of energy. But this is not to admit that we are justified in explaining specific concrete psychological phenomena, with which we are dealing, in philosophical terms. We must explain them in terms of the phenomena themselves. As a monist and pan-psychist, for example, I may believe that conscious processes can be reduced to, or be identified with the ultimate nature of matter, the thing-in-itself. And conversely atoms and electrons may be reduced to a force which may be identified with psychic force, but I would not attempt to explain psychological behaviour in terms of such a philosophical concept but only through phenomenal psychological forces, let us say, wishes. In other words, I would not

undertake to introduce pan-psychism into the problem at all as an explanation of a particular phobia. I think, therefore, that when Jung and others attempt to explain phobias and other psychological phenomena through a philosophical concept of the libido as analyzed into an élan vitale or the energy of the universe, they not only confuse their problems but introduce such a mixing up of terms that the resulting explanation becomes little more than nonsense. The libido, whatever it may be, must be treated as a psycho-physiological force just like any of the other emotions. Otherwise psychology ceases to be a science.

Now one word about conflicts. Undoubtedly conflicts play a most important part in such psychological disturbances as we have to deal with in the psycho-neuroses, but I cannot agree that psychological conflicts conform only to, or are synonymous with ethical conflicts. Undoubtedly there are a large number of conflicts between ideas and sentiments which we have all agreed to label as ethical, but there are also a large number of conflicts between sentiments which cannot be pigeon-holed as ethical. For example, the mother whose child is threatened with danger and who herself would incur danger in rescuing her child, undergoes a conflict between her fear instinct, on the one hand, and her love on the other, exciting also her anger emotion. The anger and love conflict with the fear, down and repress it. There you have a conflict but I think it could not be classed as an ethical conflict. It is a general law, whenever one instinct antagonizes another instinct there is a conflict. It is a conflict which has its prototype in the lower organic processes. Thus Sherrington's spinal reflexes, that he has worked out so beautifully, involve conflicts between opposing organic impulses. In the scratch reflex, for instance, the impulse which excites the flexor muscles inhibits the excitation of the extensor muscles. I believe this principle underlies the higher processes and upon it is built up the whole of the psycho-physiological mechanisms.

DR. TOM A. WILLIAMS, Washington, D. C.: I want Dr. Putnam to reply to two objections to his position. One, the manifestations of functional capacities which are themselves

dependent upon structural differences. I am not talking now of psychogenetic determinants, but alone of the trends of which Dr. Putnam has spoken. Is he not assuming the contrary to Darwin when he says that function precedes structure? Are not the potentials dependent upon the variation which has determined this function? I am speaking now in the broadest possible terms and not confining myself to the cerebrum. Do we not find it in the tadpole who is prepared for breathing not because he wants to breathe, but because he is going to have a new kind of breathing apparatus and the duck who takes to the water because he has the mechanism to swim?

Two, in regard to Hegel and the appeal to the ethical as being of a different type from the motive of biological satisfaction. Is not that difficulty only apparent, and is it not answered by Dr. Putnam's own appeal that these matters should be settled independently, and is not it the case that the average sexual man would settle it very differently from Dr. Putnam himself and most of us; and is not it true that, though the ethical determinants of behaviour are not auspicious for the average sexual satisfactions of man, yet are they not themselves forms of hedonistic satisfactions? For a man who would behave unethically would be miserable in doing so by the loss of his own self-respect. So that he already has a hedonistic determinant for his own conduct which is in harmony with the biological concepts of Aristotle.

DR. JAMES J. PUTNAM, Boston: I should be very sorry to be taken as wishing to put myself in the sort of adverse position which Dr. Prince and Dr. Williams believe me to assume. I accept, of course, the proposition that there are conflicts which are not ethical, and, as Dr. Williams says, the average man would naturally come to different conclusions from those of the trained man in ethical matters. I want to make a slight movement towards restoring a balance which it seemed to me had become tipped too far one way. Psychoanalysts, for example, actually deal with metaphysics and yet they do not really study out what this involves. If we were nothing but scientific men we could say, "very well, let metaphysics go." But we are not. We are dealing with individuals who are thrilling with desires, hopes and

fears, the movements of which cannot be expressed in scientific formulae. Dr. Williams speaks of Darwin. It can be asserted with justice, however, that the genetic method of investigation which is exemplified by Darwin's study of evolution is an imperfect method for discovering the aims of human beings. I refer to the interesting book of Prince Kropotkin in which he studies mutual aid as a factor in evolution, mutual aid being something not adequately contemplated by Darwin, who considers conflict as the essential influence in evolution. Prof. Judd showed in a paper a few years ago the change which has taken place in the attitude of a good many students of economics through the introduction of human intelligence and desires as something quite distinct from the conflicts of interests, and similar arguments have been brought forward by students of evolution. Among others Prof. Cope, the distinguished Zoölogist of Philadelphia and Prof. Hyatt of Boston, showed very clearly how the course of evolution becomes materially changed when desires and will become prominent as factors. I agree that, as a partial motive, structure does limit and determine function. There is no question about that. I merely want to say that logically function precedes structure, inasmuch as the wish and desire to do a thing precedes the means by which we secure for ourselves the power to do it. But of course all energies must work through structural media. In regard to hedonism, one must recognize that pleasure counts as a partial motive, but when it comes to taking it as the final motive it fails utterly. Our lives contain determinants which we cannot range under the category of pleasure. We act in certain ways because our structure and our functions and our wills are what they are, and not exclusively by our temporary wishes. Our "meanings," when thoroughly studied are found to coincide with the meaning of the universe as a whole. It is only through getting hold of the entire scheme that you have something that you can use as a criteria. The nearest approach to this is obtained through the study of the most broadly developed, public spirited men, and such men do not work in accordance with hedonistic principles.