35. Men determine the sorts of substances, which may be sorted variously.
From what has been said, it is evident
that men make sorts of things. For, it being different essences alone that make different species, it is plain that
they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal essences do thereby make the species, or sort. Should
there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness, it would no doubt be made a
question whether it were gold or not, i.e., whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that
abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that
species, who included not malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound gold; and on the other side
it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him who included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I
pray, is it that makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but men that make two different
abstract ideas, consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to imagine
that a body may exist wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain
that gold itself will be sometimes so eager, (as artists call it), that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself.
What we have said of the putting in, or leaving out of malleableness, in the complex idea the name gold is by any
one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the like qualities: for whatever is
left out, or put in, it is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makes the species: and as any
particular parcel of matter answers that idea, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species.
And thus anything is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination of the species, it is plain, depends on the
understanding of man, making this or that complex idea.