University of Virginia Library

Search this document 
  
expand section 
  
expand section 
  

expand section1. 
expand section2. 
expand section3. 
expand section4. 
expand section5. 
expand section6. 
expand section7. 
expand section8. 
expand section9. 
expand section10. 
expand section11. 
expand section12. 
expand section13. 
expand section14. 
expand section15. 
expand section16. 
expand section17. 
expand section18. 
expand section19. 
collapse section20. 
collapse section20.1. 
  
  
expand section20.2. 
 20.3. 
expand section20.4. 
expand section20.5. 
 20.6. 
 20.7. 
 20.8. 
expand section20.9. 
 20.10. 
 20.11. 
expand section20.12. 
 20.13. 
expand section20.14. 
expand section20.15. 
 20.16. 
expand section20.17. 
expand section20.18. 
expand section20.19. 
 20.20. 
expand section20.21. 
expand section20.22. 
 20.23. 
expand section21. 
expand section22. 
expand section23. 
expand section24. 
expand section25. 
expand section26. 
expand section27. 
expand section28. 
expand section29. 
expand section30. 
expand section31. 

Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling: and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities.

But if the spirit of commerce unites nations, it does not in the same manner unite individuals. We see that in countries [2] where the people move only by the spirit of commerce, they make a traffic of all the humane, all the moral virtues; the most trifling things, those which humanity would demand, are there done, or there given, only for money.

The spirit of trade produces in the mind of a man a certain sense of exact justice, opposite, on the one hand, to robbery, and on the other to those moral virtues which forbid our always adhering rigidly to the rules of private interest, and suffer us to neglect this for the advantage of others.

The total privation of trade, on the contrary, produces robbery, which Aristotle ranks in the number of means of acquiring; yet it is not at all inconsistent with certain moral virtues. Hospitality, for instance, is most rare in trading countries, while it is found in the most admirable perfection among nations of vagabonds.

It is a sacrilege, says Tacitus, for a German to shut his door against any man whomsoever, whether known or unknown. He who has behaved with hospitality to a stranger goes to show him another house where this hospitality is also practised; and he is there received with the same humanity. [3] But when the Germans had founded kingdoms, hospitality had become burdensome. This appears by two laws of the code of the Burgundians; [4] one of which inflicted a penalty on every barbarian who presumed to show a stranger the house of a Roman; and the other decreed that whoever received a stranger should be indemnified by the inhabitants, every one being obliged to pay his proper proportion.