The customs of an enslaved people are a part of
their servitude, those of a free people are a part of their liberty.
I have spoken in the eleventh book
[37]
of a free people, and have
given the principles of their constitution: let us now see the effects
which follow from this liberty, the character it is capable of forming,
and the customs which naturally result from it.
I do not deny that the climate may have produced a great part of the
laws, manners, and customs of this nation; but I maintain that its
manners and customs have a close connection with its laws.
As there are in this state two visible powers — the legislative and
executive, and as every citizen has a will of his own, and may at
pleasure assert his independence, most men have a greater fondness for
one of these powers than for the other, and the multitude have commonly
neither equity nor sense enough to show an equal affection to both.
And as the executive power, by disposing of all employments, may
give great hopes, and no fears, every man who obtains any favour from it
is ready to espouse its cause; while it is liable to be attacked by
those who have nothing to hope from it.
All the passions being unrestrained, hatred, envy, jealousy, and an
ambitious desire of riches and honours, appears in their extent; were it
otherwise, the state would be in the condition of a man weakened by
sickness, who is without passions because he is without strength.
The hatred which arises between the two parties will always subsist,
because it will always be impotent.
These parties being composed of freemen, if the one becomes too
powerful for the other, as a consequence of liberty, this other is
depressed; while the citizens take the weaker side with the same
readiness as the hands lend their assistance to remove the infirmities
and disorders of the body.
Every individual is independent, and being commonly led by caprice
and humour, frequently changes parties; he abandons one where he left
all his friends, to unite himself to another in which he finds all his
enemies: so that in this nation it frequently happens that the people
forget the laws of friendship, as well as those of hatred.
The sovereign is here in the same case with a private person; and
against the ordinary maxims of prudence is frequently obliged to give
his confidence to those who have most offended him, and to disgrace the
men who have best served him: he does that by necessity which other
princes do by choice.
As we are afraid of being deprived of the blessing we already enjoy,
and which may be disguised and misrepresented to us; and as fear always
enlarges objects, the people are uneasy under such a situation, and
believe themselves in danger, even in those moments when they are most
secure.
As those who with the greatest warmth oppose the executive power
dare not avow the self-interested motives of their opposition, so much
the more do they increase the terrors of the people, who can never be
certain whether they are in danger or not. But even this contributes to
make them avoid the real dangers, to which they may, in the end, be
exposed.
But the legislative body having the confidence of the people, and
being more enlightened than they, may calm their uneasiness, and make
them recover from the bad impressions they have entertained.
This is the great advantage which this government has over the
ancient democracies, in which the people had an immediate power; for
when they were moved and agitated by the orators, these agitations
always produced their effect.
But when an impression of terror has no certain object, it produces
only clamour and abuse; it has, however, this good effect, that it puts
all the springs of government into motion, and fixes the attention of
every citizen. But if it arises from a violation of the fundamental
laws, it is sullen, cruel, and produces the most dreadful catastrophes.
Soon we should see a frightful calm, during which every one would
unite against that power which had violated the laws.
If, when the uneasiness proceeds from no certain object, some
foreign power should threaten the state, or put its prosperity or its
glory in danger, the little interests of party would then yield to the
more strong and binding, and there would be a perfect coalition in
favour of the executive power.
But if the disputes were occasioned by a violation of the
fundamental laws, and a foreign power should appear, there would be a
revolution that would neither alter the constitution nor the form of
government. For a revolution formed by liberty becomes a confirmation
of liberty.
A free nation may have a deliverer: a nation enslaved can have only
another oppressor.
For whoever is able to dethrone an absolute prince has a power
sufficient to become absolute himself.
As the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation,
consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and to lay
open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or write whatever
the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or written.
A people like this, being always in a ferment, are more easily
conducted by their passions than by reason, which never produces any
great effect in the mind of man; it is therefore easy for those who
govern to make them undertake enterprises contrary to their true
interest.
This nation is passionately fond of liberty, because this liberty is
real; and it is possible for it, in its defence, to sacrifice its
wealth, its ease, its interest, and to support the burden of the
heaviest taxes, even such as a despotic prince durst not lay upon his
subjects.
But as the people have a certain knowledge of the necessity of
submitting to those taxes, they pay them from the well-founded hope of
their discontinuance; their burdens are heavy, but they do not feel
their weight; whilst in other states the uneasiness is infinitely
greater than the evil.
This nation must therefore have a fixed and certain credit, because
it borrows of itself and pays itself. It is possible for it to undertake
things above its natural strength, and employ against its enemies
immense sums of fictitious riches, which the credit and nature of the
government may render real.
To preserve its liberty, it borrows of its subjects: and the
subjects, seeing that its credit would be lost if ever it were
conquered, have a new motive to make fresh efforts in defence of its
liberty.
This nation, inhabiting an island, is not fond of conquering,
because it would be weakened by distant conquests — especially as the
soil of the island is good, for it has then no need of enriching itself
by war; and as no citizen is subject to another, each sets a greater
value on his own liberty than on the glory of one or any number of
citizens.
Military men are there regarded as belonging to a profession which
may be useful but is often dangerous, and as men whose very services are
burdensome to the nation: civil qualifications are therefore more
esteemed than the military.
This nation, which liberty and the laws render easy, on being freed
from pernicious prejudices, has become a trading people; and as it has
some of those primitive materials of trade out of which are manufactured
such things as from the artist's hand receive a considerable value, it
has made settlements proper to procure the enjoyment of this gift of
heaven in its fullest extent.
As this nation is situated towards the north, and has many
superfluous commodities, it must want also a great amount of merchandise
which its climate will not produce: it has therefore entered into a
great and necessary intercourse with the southern nations; and making
choice of those states whom it is willing to favour with an advantageous
commerce, it enters into such treaties with the nation it has chosen as
are reciprocally useful to both.
In a state where, on the one hand, the opulence is extreme, and on
the other the taxes are excessive, they are hardly able to live on a
small fortune without industry. Many, therefore, under a pretence of
travelling, or of health, retire from among them, and go in search of
plenty, even to the countries of slavery.
A trading nation has a prodigious number of little particular
interests; it may then injure or be injured in an infinite number of
ways. Thus it becomes immoderately jealous, and is more afflicted at the
prosperity of others than it rejoices at its own.
And its laws, otherwise mild and easy, may be so rigid with respect
to the trade and navigation carried on with it, that it may seem to
trade only with enemies.
If this nation sends colonies abroad, it must rather be to extend
its commerce than its dominion.
As men are fond of introducing into other places what they have
established among themselves, they have given the people of the colonies
their own form of government; and this government carrying prosperity
along with it, they have raised great nations in the forests they were
sent to inhabit.
Having formerly subdued a neighbouring nation, which by its
situation, the goodness of its ports, and the nature of its products,
inspires it with jealousy, though it has given this nation its own laws,
yet it holds it in great dependence: the subjects there are free and the
state itself in slavery.
The conquered state has an excellent civil government, but is
oppressed by the law of nations. Laws are imposed by one country on the
other, and these are such as render its prosperity precarious and
dependent on the will of a master.
The ruling nation inhabiting a large island, and being in possession
of a great trade, has with extraordinary ease grown powerful at sea; and
as the preservation of its liberties requires that it should have
neither strongholds nor fortresses nor land forces, it has occasion for
a formidable navy to defend it against invasions; a navy which must be
superior to that of all other powers, who, employing their treasures in
wars on land, have not sufficient for those at sea.
The empire of the sea has always given those who have enjoyed it a
natural pride; because, thinking themselves capable of extending their
insults wherever they please, they imagine that their power is as
boundless as the ocean.
This nation has a great influence in the affairs of its neighbours;
for as its power is not employed in conquests, its friendship is more
courted, and its resentment more dreaded, than could naturally be
expected from the inconstancy of its government, and its domestic
divisions.
Thus it is the fate of the executive power to be almost always
disturbed at home and respected abroad.
Should this nation on some occasions become the centre of the
negotiations of Europe, probity and good faith would be carried to a
greater height than in other places; because the ministers being
frequently obliged to justify their conduct before a popular council,
their negotiations could not be secret; and they would be forced to be,
in this respect, a little more honest.
Besides, as they would in some sort be answerable for the events
which an irregular conduct might produce, the surest, the safest way for
them would be to take the straightest path.
If the nobles were formerly possessed of an immoderate power, and
the monarch had found the means of abasing them by raising the people,
the point of extreme servitude must have been that between humbling the
nobility and that in which the people began to feel their power.
Thus this nation, having been formerly subject to an arbitrary
power, on many occasions preserves the style of it, in such a manner as
to let us frequently see upon the foundation of a free government the
form of an absolute monarchy.
With regard to religion, as in this state every subject has a free
will, and must consequently be either conducted by the light of his own
mind or by the caprice of fancy, it necessarily follows that every one
must either look upon all religion with indifference, by which means
they are led to embrace the established religion, or they must be
zealous for religion in general, by which means the number of sects is
increased.
It is not impossible but that in this nation there may be men of no
religion, who would not, however, bear to be obliged to change that
which they would choose, if they cared to choose any; for they would
immediately perceive that their lives and fortunes are not more
peculiarly theirs than their manner of thinking, and that whoever would
deprive them of the one might even with better reason take away the
other.
If, among the different religions, there is one that has been
attempted to be established by methods of slavery, it must there be
odious; because as we judge of things by the appendages we join with
them, it could never present itself to the mind in conjunction with the
idea of liberty.
The laws against those who profess this religion could not, however,
be of the sanguinary kind; for liberty can never inflict such
punishments; but they may be so rigorous as to do all the mischief that
can be done in cold blood.
It is possible that a thousand circumstances might concur to give
the clergy so little credit, that other citizens may have more.
Therefore, instead of a separation, they have chosen rather to support
the same burdens as the laity, and in this respect to make only one body
with them; but as they always seek to conciliate the respect of the
people, they distinguish themselves by a more retired life, a conduct
more reserved, and a greater purity of manners.
The clergy not being able to protect religion, nor to be protected
by it, only seek to persuade; their pens therefore furnish us with
excellent works in proof of a revelation and of the providence of the
Supreme Being.
Yet the state prevents the sitting of their assemblies, and does not
suffer them to correct their own abuses; it chooses thus, through a
caprice of liberty, rather to leave their reformation imperfect than to
suffer the clergy to be the reformers.
Those dignities which make a fundamental part of the constitution
are more fixed than elsewhere; but, on the other hand, the great in this
country of liberty are nearer upon a level with the people; their ranks
are more separated, and their persons more confounded.
As those who govern have a power which, in some measure, has need of
fresh vigour every day, they have a greater regard for such as are
useful to them than for those who only contribute to their amusement: we
see, therefore, fewer courtiers, flatterers, and parasites; in short,
fewer of all those who make their own advantage of the folly of the
great.
Men are less esteemed for frivolous talents and attainments than for
essential qualities; and of this kind there are but two, riches and
personal merit.
They enjoy a solid luxury, founded, not on the refinements of
vanity, but on that of real wants; they ask nothing of nature but what
nature can bestow.
The rich enjoy a great superfluity of fortune, and yet have no
relish for frivolous amusements; thus, many having more wealth than
opportunities of expense, employ it in a fantastic manner: in this
nation they have more judgment than taste.
As they are always employed about their own interest, they have not
that politeness which is founded on indolence; and they really have not
leisure to attain it.
The era of Roman politeness is the same as that of the establishment
of arbitrary power. An absolute government produces indolence, and this
gives birth to politeness.
The more people there are in a nation who require circumspect
behaviour, and care not to displease, the more there is of politeness.
But it is rather the politeness of morals than that of manners which
ought to distinguish us from barbarous nations.
In a country where every man has, in some sort, a share in the
administration of the government, the women ought scarcely to live with
the men. They are therefore modest, that is, timid; and this timidity
constitutes their virtue: whilst the men without a taste for gallantry
plunge themselves into a debauchery, which leaves them at leisure, and
in the enjoyment of their full liberty.
Their laws not being made for one individual more than another, each
considers himself a monarch; and, indeed, the men of this nation are
rather confederates than fellow-subjects.
As the climate has given many persons a restless spirit and extended
views, in a country where the constitution gives every man a share in
its government and political interests, conversation generally turns
upon politics: and we see men spend their lives in the calculation of
events which, considering the nature of things and the caprices of
fortune, or rather of men, can scarcely be thought subject to the rules
of calculation.
In a free nation it is very often a matter of indifference whether
individuals reason well or ill; it is sufficient that they do reason:
hence springs that liberty which is a security from the effects of these
reasonings.
But in a despotic government, it is equally pernicious whether they
reason well or ill; their reasoning is alone sufficient to shock the
principle of that government.
Many people who have no desire of pleasing abandon themselves to
their own particular humour; and most of those who have wit and
ingenuity are ingenious in tormenting themselves: filled with contempt
or disgust for all things, they are unhappy amidst all the blessings
that can possibly contribute to promote their felicity.
As no subject fears another, the whole nation is proud; for the
pride of kings is founded only on their independence.
Free nations are haughty; others may more properly be called vain.
But as these men who are naturally so proud live much by themselves,
they are commonly bashful when they appear among strangers; and we
frequently see them behave for a considerable time with an odd mixture
of pride and ill-placed shame.
The character of the nation is more particularly discovered in their
literary performances, in which we find the men of thought and deep
meditation.
As society gives us a sense of the ridicule of mankind, retirement
renders us more fit to reflect on the folly of vice. Their satirical
writings are sharp and severe, and we find among them many Juvenals,
without discovering one Horace.
In monarchies extremely absolute, historians betray the truth,
because they are not at liberty to speak it; in states remarkably free,
they betray the truth, because of their liberty itself; which always
produces divisions, every one becoming as great a slave to the
prejudices of his faction as he could be in a despotic state.
Their poets have more frequently an original rudeness of invention
than that particular kind of delicacy which springs from taste; we there
find something which approaches nearer to the bold strength of a Michl
Angelo than to the softer graces of a Raphl.
