11. Simple ideas, why undefinable, further explained.
Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by
those impressions objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort. If they are
not received this way, all the words in the world, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will never
be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For, words being sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas
than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which is known to be between
them and those simple ideas which common use has made them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try
if any words can give him the taste of a pine-apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that
celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas already
in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that
resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas by
their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours,
and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and
arbitrary. And no definition of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the
sound light or red, by itself. For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however formed, is to
expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible; and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses.
Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort of philosophy worthy only of
Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into
his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification
of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only
way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the
name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the
explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours which often came in his way,
bragged one day, That he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet
was? The blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any
other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain
it.
