4. A distinct name for every particular thing, not fitted for enlargement of knowledge.
Thirdly, But yet, granting
this also feasible, (which I think is not), yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great
use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general
views; to which things reduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient. These, with the names
belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind
can contain, or use requires. And therefore, in these, men have for the most part stopped: but yet not so as to
hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it.
And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to
mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct
denominations.
