3. No idea, as an appearance in the mind, either true or false.
But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth
which we inquire here, when we examine, whether our ideas are capable of being true or false, but in the more
ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say that the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or
appearances there, none of them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in
our minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper.
For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable,
any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of
them.
