1. Truth and falsehood properly belong to propositions, not to ideas.
Though truth and falsehood belong, in
propriety of speech, only to propositions: yet ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as what words are there
that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though
I think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is
the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to
be called true or false. In all which we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that
denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances, or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly
and simply in themselves be said to be true or false, no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true
or false.
