SECT. XIOf the love of fame
But beside these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal
influence on the affections. Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and
even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and
sentiments of others. In order to account for this phaenomenon `twill be necessary to take some compass, and first explain
the nature of sympathy.
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to
sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even
contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion propos'd to them; but
also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination,
in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may
observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and `tis much more probable, that this resemblance
arises from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate, which, tho' they continue invariably the same, are not
able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together. A good-natur'd man finds himself in an instant of
the same humour with his company; and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and
acquaintance. A chearful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful
one throws a sudden dump upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I
feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition. So remarkable a phaenomenon merits our
attention, and must be trac'd up to its first principles.
When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the
countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires
such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original
affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and
reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a. philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them.
`Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness
gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go
beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a little vivacity of conception,
according to the foregoing principles; and tho' this relation shou'd not be so strong as that of causation, it must still have a
considerable influence. Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected; especially when by an inference from
cause and effect, and by the observation of external signs, we are inform'd of the real existence of the object, which is
resembling or contiguous.
Now `tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never remark any
passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves. The case is the
same with the fabric of the mind, as with that of the body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and
composition are in general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself amidst all their variety;
and this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others; and embrace them with
facility and pleasure. Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar
similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language;, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is
betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea
the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person.
Nor is resemblance the only relation, which has this effect, but receives new force from other relations, that may accompany
it. The sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov'd from us, and require the relation of contiguity, to make
them communicate themselves entirely. The relations of blood, being a species of causation, may sometimes contribute to
the same effect; as also acquaintance, which operates in the same manner with education and custom; as we shall see more
fully
(5)
afterwards. All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to
the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner.
It has been remark'd in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions, and that these two kinds
of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component part. of
ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees
of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov'd,
in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, `tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by
this means be inliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches is
impression; and `tis certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by
often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and `tis there principally that a lively idea is
converted into an impression. Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any
other impressions; for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of
them. This is the nature and cause of sympathy; and `tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections
of others, whenever we discover them.
What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phaenomena give to the foregoing system
concerning the understanding, and consequently to the present one concerning the passions; since these are analogous to
each other. `Tis indeed evident, that when we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements
appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of
fact. Tis also evident, that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and
that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them. AU this is an object of the plainest experience, and
depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy. That science can only be admitted to explain the phaenomena; tho' at the same
time it must be confest, they are so clear of themselves, that there is but little occasion to employ it. For besides the relation
of cause and effect, by which we are convinc'd of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say,
we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. And
since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so
perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may
serve to strengthen and inliven an idea. In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. This
conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us. Let us compare all these
circumstances, and we shall find, that sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even
contains something more surprizing and extraordinary.
`Tis now time to turn our view from the general consideration of sympathy, to its influence on pride and humility, when
these passions arise from praise and blame, from reputation and infamy. We may observe, that no person is ever prais'd by
another for any quality, which wou'd not, if real, produce, of itself, a pride in the person possest of it. The elogiums either
turn upon his power, or riches, or family, or virtue; all of which are subjects of vanity, that we have already explain'd and
accounted for. `Tis certain, then, that if a person consider'd himself in the same light, in which he appears to his admirer, he
wou'd first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above
explain'd. Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this particular; both from sympathy,
which renders all their sentiments intimately present to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a
kind of argument for what they affirm. These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our opinions; but
must have a peculiar influence, when we judge of our own worth and character. Such judgments are always attended with
passion;
(6)
and nothing tends more to disturb our understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however unreasonable,
than their connexion with passion; which diffuses itself over the imagination, and gives an additional force to every related
idea. To which we may add, that being conscious of great partiality in our own favour, we are peculiarly pleas'd with any
thing, that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves, and are easily shock'd with whatever opposes it.
All this appears very probable in theory; but in order to bestow a full certainty on this reasoning, we must examine the
phaenonena of the passions, and see if they agree with it,
Among these phaenomena we may esteem it a very favourable one to our present purposes that tho' fame in general be
agreeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and
approve of, than of those, whom we hate and despise. In like measure we are principally mortify'd with the contempt of
persons, upon whose judgment we set some value, and are, in a peat measure, indifferent about the opinions of the rest of
mankind. But if the mind receiv'd from any original instinct a desire of fame and aversion to infamy, fame and infamy wou'd
influence us without distinction; and every opinion, according as it were favourabk or unfavourable, wou'd equally excite
that desire or aversion. The judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as that of a wise man, and is only
inferior in its influence on our own judgment.
We are not only better pleas'd with the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool, but receive an additional
satisfaction from the former, when `tis obtain'd after a long and intimate acquaintance. This is accounted for after the same
manner.
The praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities,
in which we chiefly excel. A mere soldier little values the character of eloquence: A gownman of courage: A bishop of
humour: Or a merchant of learning. Whatever esteem a man may have for any quality, abstractedly consider'd; when he is
conscious he is not possest of it; the opinions of the whole world will give him little pleasure in that particular, and that
because they never will be able to draw his own opinion after them.
Nothing is more usual than for men of good families, but narrow circumstances, to leave their friends and country, and
rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers, than among those, who are acquainted
with their birth and education. We shall be unknown, say they, where we go. No body will suspect from what family we are
sprung. We shall be remov'd from all our friends and acquaintance, and our poverty and meanness will by that means sit
more easy upon us. In examining these sentiments, I find they afford many very convincing arguments for my present
purpose.
First, We may infer from them, that the uneasiness of being contemn'd depends on sympathy, and that sympathy depends on
the relation of objects to ourselves; since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons, who are both related to us by
blood, and contiguous in place. Hence we-seek to diminish this sympathy and uneasiness by separating these relations, and
placing ourselves in a contiguity to strangers, and at a distance from relations.
Secondly, We may conclude, that relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely consider'd as relations, but by their
influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments, by means of the association betwixt the
idea of their persons, and that of our own. For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist; but not being united
in the same persons, they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy.
Thirdly, This very circumstance of the diminution of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention.
Suppose I am plac'd in a poor condition among strangers, and consequently am but lightly treated; I yet find myself easier in
that situation, than when I was every day expos'd to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen. Here I feel a double
contempt; from my relations, but they are absent; from those about me, but they are strangers. This double contempt is
likewise strengthen'd by the two relations of kindred and contiguity. But as the persons are not the same, who are connected
with me by those two relations, this difference of ideas separates the impressions arising from the contempt, and keeps them
from running into each other. The contempt of my neighbours has a certain influence; as has also that of my kindred: But
these influences are distinct, and never unite; as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are at once both my
neighbours and kindred. This phaenomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above-explain'd, which may
seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions.
Fourthly, A person in these circumstances naturally conceals his birth from those among whom he lives, and is very uneasy,
if any one suspects him to be of a family, much superior to his present fortune and way of living. Every thing in this world is
judg'd of by comparison. What is an immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince. A peasant wou'd think
himself happy in what cannot afford necessaries for a gentleman. When a man has either been acustom'd to a more splendid
way of living, or thinks himself intitled to it by his birth and quality, every thing below is disagreeable and even shameful;
and `tis with she greatest industry he conceals his pretensions to a better fortune. Here he himself knows his misfortunes; but
as those, with whom he lives. are ignorant of them, he has the disagreeable reflection and comparison suggested only by his
own thoughts, and never receives it by a sympathy with others; which must contribute very much so his ease and
satisfaction.
If there be any objections to this hypothesis, that the pleasure, which we receive from praise, arises from a communication
of sentiments, we shall find, uponexamination, that these objections, when taken in a properlight, will serve to confirm it.
Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man, who despises the vulgar; but `tis because their multitude gives them
additional weight and authority. Plagiaries are delighted with praises, which they are conscious they do not deserve; but this
is a kind of castle-building, where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions, and strives to render them firm and
stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others. Proud men are most shock'd with contempt, sho' they do not most
readily assent to it; but `tis because of the opposition betwixt the passion, which is natural so them, and that receiv'd by
sympathy. A violent lover in like manner is very much disp pleas'd when you blame and condemn his love; tho' `tis evident
your opposition can have no influence, but by the hold it takes of himself, and by his sympathy with you. If he despises you,
or perceives you are in jest, whatever you say has no effect upon him.
[6.]
Book I, Part III. Sect. 10.