SECT. IX. Of external advantages and disadvantages
But tho' pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body. that is self, for their natural and more immediate causes,
we find by experience, that there are many other objects, which produce these affections, and that the primary one is, in
some measure, obscur'd and lost by the rnultiplicity of foreign and extrinsic. We found a vanity upon houses, gardens,
equipages, as well as upon personal merit and accomplishments; and tho' these external advantages be in themselves widely
distant from thought or a person, yet they considerably influence even a passion, which is directed to that as its ultimate
object, This, happens when external objects acquire any particular relation to ourselves, and are associated or connected
with us. A beautiful fish in the ocean, an animal in a desart, and indeed any thing that neither belongs, nor is related to us,
has no manner of influence on our vanity, whatever extraordinary qualities it may be endow'd with, and whatever degree of
surprize and admiration it may naturally occasion. It must be some way associated with us in order to touch our pride. Its
idea must hang in a manner, upon that of ourselves and the transition from the one to the other must be easy and natural.
But here `tis remarkable, that tho' the relation of resemblance operates upon the mind in the same manner as contiguity and
causation, in conveying us from one idea to another, yet `tis seldom a foundation either of pride or of humility. If we
resemble a person in any of the valuable parts of his character, we must, in some degree, possess the quality, in which we
resemble him; and this quality we always chuse to survey directly in ourselves rather than by reflexion in another person,
when we wou'd found upon it any degree of vanity. So that tho' a likeness may occasionally produce that passion by
suggesting a more advantageous idea of ourselves, `tis there the view fixes at last, and the passion finds its ultimate and final
cause.
There are instances, indeed, wherein men shew a vanity in resembling a great man in his countenance, shape, air, or other
minute circumstances, that contribute not in any degree to his reputation; but it must be confess'd that this extends not very
far, nor is of any considerable moment in these affections. For this I assign the following reason. We can never have a vanity
of resembling in trifles any person, unless he be possess'd of very shining qualities, which give us a respect and veneration
for him. These qualities, then, are, properly speaking, the causes of our vanity, by means of their relation to ourselves. Now
after what manner are they related to ourselves? They are parts of the person we value, and consequently connected with
these trifles; which are also suppos'd to be parts of him. These trifles are connected with the resembling qualities in us; and
these qualities in us, being parts, are connected with the whole; and by that means form a chain of several links of the person
we resemble. But besides that this multitude of relations must weaken the connexion; `tis evident the mind, in passing from
the shining qualities to the trivial ones, must by that contrast the better perceive the minuteness of the latter, and be in some
measure asham'd of the comparison and resemblance.
The relation, therefore, of contiguity, or that of causation, betwixt the cause and object of pride and humility, is alone
requisite to give rise to these passions; and these relations are nothing else but qualities, by which the imagination is
convey'd from one idea to another. Now let us consider what effect these can possibly have upon the mind, and by what
means they become so requisite to the production of the passions. `Tis evident, that the association of ideas operates in so
silent and imperceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it, and discover it more by its effects than by any immediate
feeling or perception. It produces no emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind, but only modifies those
ideas, of which the mind was formerly possess'd, and which it cou'd recal upon occasion. From this reasoning, as well as
from undoubted experience, we may conclude, that an association of ideas, however necessary, is not alone sufficient to give
rise to any passion.
`Tis evident, then, that when the mind feels the passion either of pride or humility upon the appearance of related object,
there is, beside the relation or transition of thought, an emotion or original impression produc'd by some other principle. The
question is, whether the emotion first produc'd be the passion itself, or some other impression related to it. This question we
cannot be long in deciding, For besides all the other arguments, with which this subject abounds, it must evidently appear,
that the relation of ideas, which experience shews to be so requisite a circumstance to the production of the passion, wou'd
be entirely superfluous, were it not to second a relation of affections, and facilitate the transition from one impression to
another. If nature produc'd immediately the passion of pride or humility, it wou'd be compleated in itself, and wou'd require
no farther addition or encrease from any other affection. But supposing the first emotion to be only related to pride or
humility, `tis easily conceiv'd to what purpose the relation of objects may serve, and how the two different associations, of
impressions and ideas, by uniting their forces, may assist each other's operation. This is not only easily conceiv'd, but I will
venture to affirm `tis the only manner, in which we can conceive this subject. An easy transition of ideas, which, of itself,
causes no emotion, can never be necessary, or even useful to the passions, but by forwarding the transition betwixt some
related impressions. Not to mention, that the same object causes a greater or smaller degree of pride, not only in proportion
to the encrease or decrease of its qualities, but also to the distance or nearness of the relation; which is a clear argument for
the transition of affections along the relation of ideas; since every change in the relation produces a proportionable change in
the passion. Thus one part of the preceding system, concerning the relations of ideas is a sufficient proof of the other,
concerning -that of impressions; and is itself so evidently founded on experience, that `twou'd be lost time to endeavour
farther to prove it.
This will appear still more evidently in particular instances. Men are vain of the beauty of their country, of their county, of
their parish. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleasure. This pleasure is related to pride. The object or cause of this
pleasure is, by the supposition, related to self, or the object of pride. By this double relation of impressions and ideas, a
transition is made from the one impression to the other.
Men are also vain of the temperature of the climate, in which they were born; of the fertility of their native soil; of the
goodness of the wines, fruits or victuals, produc'd by it; of the softness or force of their language; with other particulars of
that kind. These objects have plainly a reference to the pleasures of the senses, and are originally consider'd as agreeable to
the feeling, taste or hearing. How is it possible they cou'd ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition
above-explain'd?
There are some, that discover a vanity of an opposite kind, and affect to depreciate their own country, in comparison of
those, to which they have travell'd. These persons find, when they are at home, and surrounded with their countrymen, that
the strong relation betwixt them and their own nation is shar'd with so many, that `tis in a manner lost to them; whereas their
distant relation to a foreign country, which is form'd by their having seen it and liv'd in it, is augmented by their considering
how few there are who have done the same. For this reason they always admire the beauty, utility and rarity of what is
abroad, above what is at home.
Since we can be vain of a country, climate or any inanimate object, which bears a relation to us, `tis no wonder we are vain
of the qualities of those, who are connected with us by blood or friendship. Accordingly we find, that the very same
qualities, which in ourselves produce pride, produce also in a lesser degree the same affection, when discover'd in persons
related to us. The beauty, address, merit, credit and honours of their kindred are carefully display'd by the proud, as some of
their most considerable sources of their vanity.
As we are proud of riches in ourselves, so to satisfy our vanity we desire that every one, who has any connexion with us,
shou'd likewise be possest of them, and are asham'd of any one, that is mean or poor, among our friends and relations. For
this reason we remove the poor as far from us as possible; and as we cannot prevent poverty in some distant collaterals, and
our forefathers are taken to be our nearest relations; upon this account every one affects to be of a good family, and to be
descended from a long succession of rich and honourable ancestors.
I have frequently observ'd, that those, who boast of the antiquity of their families, are glad when they can join this
circumstance, that their ancestors for many generations have been uninterrupted proprietors of the same portion of land, and
that their family has never chang'd its possessions, or been transplanted into any other county or province. I have also
observ'd, that `tis an additional subject of vanity, when they can boast, that these possessions have been transmitted thro' a
descent compos'd entirely of males, and that the honour, and fortune have never past thro' any female. Let us endeavour to
explain these phaenomena by the foregoing system.
`Tis evident, that when any one boasts of the antiquity of his family, the subjects of his vanity are not merely the extent of
time and number of ancestors, but also their riches and credit, which are suppos'd to reflect a lustre on himself on account of
his relation to them. He first considers these objects; is affected by them in an agreeable manner; and then returning back to
himself, thro' the relation of parent and child, is elevated with the passion of pride, by means of the double relation, of
impressions and ideas. Since therefore the passion depends on these relations, whatever strengthens any of the relations must
also encrease the passion, and whatever weakens the relations must diminish the passion. Now `tis certain the identity of the
possesion strengthens the relation of ideas arising from blood and kindred, and conveys the fancy with greater facility from
one generation to another, from the remote ancestors to their posterity, who are both their heirs and their descendants. By
this facility the impression is transmitted more entire, and excites a greater degree of pride and vanity.
The case is the same with the transmission of the honours and fortune thro' a succession of males without their passing thro'
any female. Tis a quality of human nature, which we shall consider
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afterwards, that the imagination naturally turns to
whatever is important and considerable; and where two `objects are presented to it, a small and a great one, usually leaves
the former, and dwells entirely upon the latter. As in the society of marriage, the male sex has the advantage above the
female, the husband first engages our attention; and whether we consider him directly. or reach him by passing thro' related
objects, the thought both rests upon him with greater satisfaction, and arrives at him with greater facility than his consort.
`Tis easy to see, that this property must strengthen the child's relation to the father, and weaken that to the mother. For as all
relations are nothing hut a propensity to pass from one idea ma another, whatever strengthens the propensity strengthens the
relation; and as we have a stronger propensity to pass from the idea of the children to that of the father, than from the same
idea to that of the mother, we ought to regard the former relation as the closer and more considerable. This is the reason
why children commonly bear their father's name, and are esteem'd to be of nobler or baser birth, according to his family. And
tho' the mother shou'd be possest of a superior spirit and genius to the father, as often happens, the general rule prevails,
notwithstanding the exceprion, according to the doctrine above-explain'd. Nay even when a superiority of any kind is so
great, or when any other reasons have such an effect, as to make the children rather represent :the mother's family than the
father's, the general rule still retains such an efficacy that it weakens the relation, and makes a kind of break in the line of
ancestors. The imagination runs not along them with facility, nor is able to transfer the honour and credit of the ancestors to
their posterity of the same name and family so readily, as when the transition is conformable to the general rules, and passes
from father to son, or from brother to brother.