University of Virginia Library

TO JAMES MONROE.

Dear Sir,—I received the day before yesterday
your favour of the 26th July. I had previously recd
the Report on the proposed change of the 9th art. of
the Confederation, transmitted by Col: Grayson; and
in my answer to him offered such ideas on the subject

as then occurred. I still think the probability of success
or failure ought to weigh much with Congress
in every recommendation to the States; of which
probability Congress, in whom information from
every State centers can alone properly judge. Viewing
in the abstract the question whether the power
of regulating trade, to a certain degree at least,
ought to be vested in Congress, it appears to me
not to admit of a doubt, but that it should be decided
in the affirmative. If it be necessary to regulate
trade at all, it surely is necessary to lodge the
power where trade can be regulated with effect; and
experience has confirmed what reason foresaw, that
it can never be so regulated by the States acting
in their separate capacities. They can no more exercise
this power separately than they could separately
carry on war, or separately form treaties of
alliance or commerce. The nature of the thing
therefore proves the former power, no less than the
latter, to be within the reason of the fœderal Constitution.
Much indeed is it to be wished, as I conceive,
that no regulations of trade, that is to say,
no restrictions on imposts whatever, were necessary.
A perfect freedom is the System which would be
my choice. But before such a System will be eligible
perhaps for the U. S. they must be out of debt;
before it will be attainable, all other nations must
concur in it. Whilst any one of these imposes on
our Vessels seamen &c. in their ports, clogs from
which they exempt their own, we must either retort
the distinction, or renounce not merely a just profit,
but our only defence against the danger which may
most easily beset us. Are we not at this moment
under this very alternative? The policy of G. B.
(to say nothing of other nations) has shut against us
the channels without which our trade with her must
be a losing one; and she has consequently the triumph,
as we have the chagrin, of seeing accomplished
her prophetic threats, that our independence should
forfeit commercial advantages for which it would not
recompence us with any new channels of trade. What
is to be done? Must we remain passive victims to
foreign politics, or shall we exert the lawful means
which our independence has put into our hands of
extorting redress? The very question would be an
affront to every Citizen who loves his Country.
What, then, are these means? Retaliating regulations
of trade only. How are these to be effectuated?
only by harmony in the measures of the States.
How is this harmony to be obtained? only by an
acquiescence of all the States in the opinion of a
reasonable majority. If Congress as they are now
constituted, can not be trusted with the power of digesting
and enforcing this opinion, let them be otherwise
constituted: let their numbers be encreased, let
them be chosen oftener, and let their period of service
be shortened; or if any better medium than Congress
can be proposed by which the wills of the States may
be concentered, let it be substituted; or lastly let no regulation
of trade adopted by Congress be in force until
it shall have been ratified by a certain proportion of
the States. But let us not sacrifice the end to the
means: let us not rush on certain ruin in order to avoid
a possible danger. I conceive it to be of great importance
that the defects of the fœderal system should
be amended, not only because such amendments will
make it better answer the purpose for which it was
instituted, but because I apprehend danger to its
very existence from a continuance of defects which
expose a part if not the whole of the empire to severe
distress. The suffering part, even when the minor
part, can not long respect a Government which is too
feeble to protect their interests: But when the suffering
part comes to be the major part, and they despair
of seeing a protecting energy given to the General
Government, from what motives is their allegiance to
be any longer expected. Should G. B. persist in the
machinations which distress us; and seven or eight of
the States be hindered by the others from obtaining
relief by fœderal means, I own, I tremble at the antifœderal
expedients into which the former may be
tempted.

As to the objection against entrusting Congress
with a power over trade, drawn from the diversity of
interests in the States, it may be answered, i. that if
this objection had been listened to, no confederation
could have ever taken place among the States, 2.
that if it ought now to be listened to, the power held
by Congress of forming com̃ercial treaties, by which
9 States may indirectly dispose of the Commerce of
the residue, ought to be immediately revoked, 3
that the fact is that a case can scarcely be imagined
in which it would be the interest of any 2/3ds of the

States to oppress the remaining 1/3d. 4. that the true
question is whether the commercial interests of the
States do not meet in more points than they differ.
To me it is clear that they do; and if they do there
are so many more reasons for, than against, submitting
the commercial interest of each State to the
direction and care of the Majority. Put the West
India trade alone, in which the interest of every State
is involved, into the scale against all the inequalities
which may result from any probable regulation by
nine States, and who will say that the latter ought to
preponderate? I have heard the different interest
which the Eastern States have as Carriers pointed
out as a ground of caution to the Southern States
who have no bottoms of their own agst. their concurring
hastily in retaliations on G. B. But will the
present system of G. B. ever give the Southern States
bottoms, and if they are not their own Carriers I sd
suppose it no mark either of folly or incivility to give
our custom to our brethren, rather than to those who
have not yet entitled themselves to the name of
friends.

In detailing these sentiments, I have nothing more
in view than to prove the readiness with which I obey
your requests. As far as they are just they must
have been often suggested in the discussions of Congress
on the subject. I can not even give them weight
by saying that I have reason to believe they would
be relished in the public Councils of this State. From
the trials of which I have been a witness I augur that
great difficulties will be encountered in every attempt

to prevail on the Legislature to part with power.
The thing itself is not only unpalatable, but the arguments
which plead for it have not their full force on
minds unaccustomed to consider the interests of the
State as they are interwoven with those of the Confederacy
much less as they may be affected by foreign
politics, whilst those wch plead agst it are not only
specious, but in their nature popular; and for that
reason sure of finding patrons. Add to all this that
the Mercantile interest which has taken the lead in
rousing the public attention of other States, is in this
so exclusively occupied in British Commerce that
what little weight they have will be most likely to
fall into the opposite scale. The only circumstance
which promises a favorable hearing to the meditated
proposition of Congs is that the power which it asks
is to be exerted agst G. B. and the proposition will
consequently be seconded by the animosities which
still prevail in a strong degree agst her.