16. Infinite divisibility of matter.
In matter, we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts much beyond the
smallest that occur to any of our senses: and therefore, when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum,
though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility, and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by
division; yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles, or minute bodies, so to be divided,
when, by former divisions, they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses;
and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of is of what division in general or abstractedly is, and the relation
of totum and pars: but of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think, we
have no clear nor distinct idea at all. For I ask any one, whether, taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw, he
has any distinct idea (bating still the number, which concerns not extension) betwixt the 1,000,000th and the
1,000,000,000th part of it. Or if he think he can refine his ideas to that degree, without losing sight of them, let
him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed;
since a division carried on so far brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division into two
halves does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those
bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of division of bodies in
infinitum, our idea of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little
progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in obscurity. For that idea which is to represent only bigness must
be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number: so that
we have clear distinct ideas, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain
from hence, that, when we talk of infinite divisibility of body or extension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of
numbers: but the clear distinct ideas of extension after some progress of division, are quite lost; and of such
minute parts we have no distinct ideas at all; but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number
always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a
clear idea of division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in
matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned
numbers we have: endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts, than
endless addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number: they both
being only in a power still of increasing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be
added (wherein consists the infinity) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused idea; from or about which
we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of
which we have no such distinct idea as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obscure one, that, compared to
any other, it is still bigger: and we have no more a clear positive idea of it, when we say or conceive it is bigger,
or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40 or 4: 400,000,000 having no nearer a
proportion to the end of addition or number than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon
come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000 to 400,000,000. And so likewise in eternity; he that
has an idea of but four years, has as much a positive complete idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000
of years: for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the
other; i.e., neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on,
shall as soon reach eternity as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on; or, if he please, doubles the increase
as often as he will: the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions as it is from the
length of a day or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are
all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is also in our idea of extension, when we increase it by addition, as well as
when we diminish it by division, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space. After a few doublings of those
ideas of extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct idea of that space: it
becomes a confusedly great one, with a surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we
shall always find ourselves at a loss; confused ideas, in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which
is confused, always leading us into confusion.