11. Whole nations reject several moral rules.
Here perhaps it will be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is
not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good where men, though they transgress, yet disown not the
law; where fear of shame, censure, or punishment carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But it is
impossible to conceive that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and renounce what every one of them
certainly and infallibly knew to be a law; for so they must who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. It is
possible men may sometimes own rules of morality which in their private thoughts they do not believe to be true,
only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their obligation. But it is
not to be imagined that a whole society of men should publicly and professedly disown and cast off a rule which
they could not in their own minds but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant that all men they should
have to do with knew it to be such: and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others all the contempt
and abhorrence due to one who professes himself void of humanity: and one who, confounding the known and
natural measures of right and wrong, cannot but be looked on as the professed enemy of their peace and
happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is
therefore little less than a contradiction to suppose, that whole nations of men should, both in their professions and
practice, unanimously and universally give the lie to what, by the most invincible evidence, every one of them
knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy us that no practical rule which is anywhere universally,
and with public approbation or allowance, transgressed, can be supposed innate.--But I have something further to
add in answer to this objection.
