17. Relations innumerable, and only the most considerable here mentioned.
And thus much for the relation of
human actions to a law, which, therefore, I call moral relations.
It would make a volume to go over all sorts of relations: it is not, therefore, to be expected that I should here
mention them all. It suffices to our present purpose to show by these, what the ideas are we have of this
comprehensive consideration called relation. Which is so various, and the occasions of it so many, (as many as
there can be of comparing things one to another,) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules, or under just heads.
Those I have mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable; and such as may serve to let us see from
whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what
has been said give me leave to observe:
