11. The measure that men commonly apply to determine what they call virtue and vice.
That this is the common
measure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who considers, that, though that passes for vice in one country
which is counted a virtue, or at least not vice, in another, yet everywhere virtue and praise, vice and blame, go
together. Virtue is everywhere, that which is thought praiseworthy; and nothing else but that which has the
allowance of public esteem is called virtue. Virtue and praise are so united, that they are called often by the same
name. Sunt sua præmia laudi, says Virgil; and so Cicero, Nihil habet natura præstantius, quam honestatem, quam
laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus, which he tells you are all names for the same thing. This is the language
of the heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted. And though
perhaps, by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out, that
what was thought praiseworthy in one place, escaped not censure in another; and so in different societies, virtues
and vices were changed: yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the same everywhere. For, since nothing
can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and
to blame and discountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should, in a
great measure, everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of God hath
established; there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in
this world, as obedience to the laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion, as the
neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, which they
are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their commendation and blame on that side that
really deserved it not. Nay, even those men whose practice was otherwise, failed not to give their approbation
right, few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves were
guilty of; whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be
the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preferred. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers, have not
feared to appeal to common repute: "Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if
there be any praise," etc. (Phil. 4. 8.)
