6. Moral rules.
Of these moral rules or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the
rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different enforcements, or
rewards and punishments. For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men,
without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a
law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to
set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish
deviation from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself
For that, being a natural convenience or inconvenience, would operate of itself, without a law. This, if I mistake
not, is the true nature of all law, properly so called.
