4. Ideas of moral relations.
Fourthly, There is another sort of relation, which is the conformity or disagreement
men's voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think,
may be called moral relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well to be
examined; there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas, and
avoid, as much as may be, obscurity and confusion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects,
manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been shown so many mixed
modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to
acknowledge and return kindness received; polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once: when we
frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all
that concerns our actions: it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to
such and such combinations of ideas. We have a further and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether
such actions, so made up, are morally good or bad.
