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CHAPTER III. FIFTH OF OCTOBER.
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3. CHAPTER III.
FIFTH OF OCTOBER.

It was soon found,” says Burgoyne, in his letter to
Lord George Germain, “that no fruits, honour excepted,
were obtained by the preceding victory.”


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Page 283

The action of the Nineteenth of September, was exactly
one of that sort of battles in which both parties have
a right to claim the victory, because there is no victory
to be claimed.

The British had the shadow, and the Americans the
substance of exactly one reason for calling it a victory
at all.

The British remained on the field of battle, and slept
with arms in their hands. The Americans went comfortably
to bed in their secure encampment. The British
had attempted to force them from their position—they
failed; the Americans retained it, and there was hardly
any reason why they should not make use of the very
camp which they had been fighting to secure. The possession
of the field of battle was not, in this instance, a
type of success; because it was not the thing contended for.

Burgoyne was playing a desperate game. He was
losing it, but he did it heroically. He was present in the
hottest of the fight, and so constantly exposed his person,
that for a time, he was believed to have fallen at Stillwater.

If it had been possible for Burgoyne and Burgoyne's
army to effect the minister's plan, they would have effected
it. It is impossible to contemplate the misfortunes
of that gallant and unfortunate general, without admiration
and pity.

If he had succeeded, he would have been canonized;
and yet, in failing, he had exhibited as much bravery,
as much perseverance, and as much soldiership, as if he
had succeeded.

An impracticable plan was laid. He obeyed his orders
in persevering. He was willing to devote himself and
his army.


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Page 284

On the day after the action, the British camp was
pressed forward to nearly within cannon shot of the
enemy. The Americans remained in their strong position.

Retreat to the Canadas was not to be thought of by
the British general. He had forced his army like a
wedge into the heart of the country. He was immoveably
fixed; but so long as he remained, the cloven parts
were prevented from coalescing. In case of his removal,
the junction between Washington and Yates would be
immediate. It was not to be thought of. He was willing
to devote himself.

On the twenty-first, he received a letter from Sir Harry
Clinton. He was informed of the intended attack on
Fort Montgomery. The messenger was sent back to
apprize Sir Harry of his situation. He solicited a diversion
in his favour, which should oblige Yates to detach
from his army.

In the meantime his soldiers were straitened for provisions.
He was obliged to diminish their rations. They
submitted to it willingly.

This was the state of affairs up to October the fifth.