4. Moral rules need a proof, ergo not innate.
Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical
principles is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a
reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate; or so much as self-evident, which
every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it
approbation. He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side, or on the other side went to
give a reason why"it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." It carries its own light and evidence
with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms assents to it for its own sake or else nothing will
ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken rule of morality and foundation of all
social virtue, "That one should do as he would be done unto," be proposed to one who never heard of it before,
but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any absurdity ask a reason why? And were
not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shows it not to
be innate; for if it were it could neither want nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least as soon as heard and
understood) be received and assented to as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So
that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they
must be deduced; which could not be if either they were innate or so much as self-evident.
