The following work may with the strictest justice be said to have
done honour to human nature as well as to the great abilities of the
author. The wisest and most learned man, and those most distinguished
by birth and the elevation of their stations, have, in every country in
Europe, considered it as a most excellent performance. And may we be
permitted to add, that a sovereign prince
[1]
as justly celebrated for
his probity and good sense, as for his political and military skill, has
declared that from M. de Montesquieu he has learnt the art of
government. But had the illustrious author received no such
distinguished honour, the numerous editions of this work in French, and
their sudden spreading through all Europe, are a sufficient testimony of
the high esteem with which it has been received by the public.
But notwithstanding the deserved applause which has been so
liberally bestowed on the author, there have been some who have not only
endeavoured to blast his laurels, but have treated him with all that
scurrility which bigotry and superstition are apt, on every occasion, to
throw out against truth, reason and good sense. These M. de Montesquieu
has himself answered, in a separate treatise intitled, A Defense of the
Spirit of Laws, from whence we have thought proper to extract, for the
sake of such as have not seen that treatise, the principal of those
objections, and the substance of what has been given in reply: Only
first observing, that this defense is divided into three parts, in the
first of which he answers the general reproaches that have been thrown
out against him; in the second he replies to particular reproaches; and
in the third, he gives some reflections on the manner in which his work
has been criticized.
The author first complains of his being charged both with espousing
the doctrines of Spinoza, and with being a Deist, two opinions directly
contradictory to each other. To the former of these he answers, by
placing in one view the several passages in the Spirit of Laws directly
levelled against the doctrines of Spinoza; and then he replies to the
objections that have been made to those passages, upon which this
injurious charge is founded.
The critic asserts that our author stumbles at his first setting
out, and is offended at his saying, that Laws in their most extensive
signification, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of
things. To this he replies, that the critic had heard it said that
Spinoza had maintained that the world was governed by a blind and
necessary principle; and from hence on seeing the word necessary, he
concludes that this must be Spinozism; tho' what is most surprising,
this article is directly levelled at the dangerous principles maintained
by Spinoza: That he had Hobbes's system in his eye, a system, which, as
it makes all the virtues and vices depend on the establishment of human
laws, and as it would prove that men were born in a state of war, and
that the first law of nature is a war of all against all, overturns,
like Spinoza, all religion, and all morality. Hence he laid down this
position, that there were laws of justice and equity before the
establishment of positive laws: hence also he has proved that all beings
had laws; that even before their creation they had possible laws; and
that God himself had laws, that is, the laws which he himself had made.
He has shewn
[2]
that nothing can be more false than the assertion that
men were born in a state of war; and he has made it appear that wars did
not commence till after the establishment of society. His principles are
here extremely clear; from whence it follows, that as he has attacked
Hobbes's errors, he has consequently those of Spinoza; and he has been
so little understood, that they have taken for the opinions of Spinoza,
those very objections which were made against Spinozism.
Again, the author has said that the creation which appears to be an
arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as the fatality of the
Atheists. From these words the critic concludes that the author admits
the fatality of the Atheists.
To this he answers, that he had just before destroyed this fatality,
by representing it as the greatest absurdity to suppose that a blind
fatality was capable of producing intelligent beings. Besides, in the
passage here censured, he can only be made to say what he really does
say: he does not speak of causes, nor does he compare causes; but he
speaks of effects and compares effects. The whole article, what goes
before and what follows, make it evident, that there is nothing here
intended but the laws of motion, which, according to the author, had
been established by God: these laws are invariable; this he as asserted,
and all natural philosophy has asserted the same thing; they are
invariable because God has been pleased to make them so, and because he
has pleased to preserve the world. When the author therefore says that
the creation which appears to be an arbitrary act, supposes laws as
invariable as the fatality of the Atheists, he cannot be understood to
say that the creation was a necessary act like the fatality of the
Atheists.
Having vindicated himself from the charge of Spinozism, he proceeds
to the other accusation, and from a multitude of passages collected
together proves that he has not only acknowledged the truth of revealed
religion; but that he is in love with Christianity, and endeavours to
make it appear amiable in the eyes of others. He then enquires into what
his adversaries have said to prove the contrary, observing that the
proofs ought to bear some proportion to the accusation; that this
accusation is not of a frivolous nature, and that the proofs therefore
ought not to be frivolous.
The first objection is, that he has praised the Stoics, who admitted
a blind fatality, and that this is the foundation of natural religion.
To this he replies, "I will for a moment suppose that this false manner
of reasoning has some weight: has the author praised the philosophy and
metaphysics of the Stoics? He has praised their morals, and has said
that the people reaped great benefit from them: he has said this, and he
has said no more: I am mistaken, he has said more, he has at the
beginning of his book attacked this fatality, he does not then praise
it, when he praises the Stoics."
The second objection is, that he has praised Bayle, in calling him a
great man. To this he answers, "It is true that the author has called
Bayle a great man, but he has censured his opinions: if he has censured
them, he has not espoused them: and since he has censured his opinions,
he does not call him a great man because of his opinions. Every body
knows that Bayle had a great genius which he abused; but this genius
which he abused, he had: the author has attacked his sophisms, and
pities him on account of his errors. I don't love the men who subvert
the laws of their country; but I should find great difficulty in
believing that Caesar and Cromwell had little minds: I am not in love
with conquerors, but it would be very difficult to persuade me to
believe that Alexander and Jenghiz-Khan were men of only a common
genius. Besides, I have remarked, that the declamations of angry men
make but little impression on any except those who are angry: the
greatest part of the readers are men of moderation, and seldom take up a
book but when they are in cool blood; for rational and sensible men love
reason. Had the author loaded Bayle with a thousand injurious
reproaches, it would not have followed from thence, that Bayle had
reasoned well or ill; all that his readers would have been able to
conclude from it would have been, that the author knew how to be
abusive."
The third objection is, that he has not in his first chapter spoken
of original sin. To which he replies: "I ask every sensible man if this
chapter is a treatise of divinity? if the author had spoken of original
sin, they might have imputed it to him as a crime that he had not spoken
of redemption."
The next objection takes notice, that "The author has said that in
England self-murder is the effect of a distemper, and that it cannot be
punished without punishing the effects of madness; the consequence the
critic draws from thence is, that a follower of natural religion can
never forget that England is the cradle of his sect, and that he rubs a
sponge over all the crimes he found there." He replies, "The author does
not know that England is the cradle of natural religion; but he knows
that England was not his cradle. He is not of the same religious
sentiments as an Englishman, any more than an Englishman who speaks of
the physical effects he found in France, is not of the same religion as
the French. He is not a follower of natural religion; but he wishes that
his critic was a follower of natural logic."
These are the principle objections levelled against our author, on
this head, from which our readers will sufficiently see on what
trifling, what puerile arguments this charge of Deism is founded. He
concludes however this article, with a defense of the religion of
nature, and such a defense as every rational Christian must undoubtedly
approve.
"Before I conclude this first part, I am tempted to make one
objection against him who has made so many; but he has so stunned my
ears with the words follower of natural religion, that I scarcely dare
pronounce them. I shall endeavour however to take courage. Do not the
critic's two pieces stand in greater need of an explication, than that
which I defend? Does he do well, while speaking of natural religion and
revelation, to fall perpetually upon one side of the subject, and to
lose all traces of the other? Does he do well never to distinguish those
who acknowledge only the religion of nature, from those who acknowledge
both natural and revealed religion? Does he do well to turn frantic
whenever the author considers man in the state of natural religion, and
whenever he explains any thing on the principles of natural religion?
Does he do well to confound natural religion with Atheism? Have I not
heard that we have all natural religion? Have I not heard that
Christianity is the perfection of natural religion? Have I not heard
that natural religion is employed to prove the truth of revelation
against the Deists? and that the same natural religion is employed to
prove the existence of a God against the Atheists? He has said that the
Stoics were the followers of natural religion; and I say, that they were
Atheists, since they believed that a blind fatality governed the
universe; and it is by the religion of nature that we ought to attack
that of the Stoics. He says that the scheme of natural religion is
connected with that of Spinoza; and I say, that they are contradictory
to each other, and it is by natural religion that we ought to destroy
Spinoza's scheme. I say, that to confound natural religion with Atheism,
is to confound the proof with the thing to be proved, and the objections
against error with error itself, and that this is to take away the most
powerful arms we have against this error."
The author now proceeds to the second part of his defence, in which
he has the following remarks. "What has the critic done to give an ample
scope to his declamations, and to open the widest door to invectives? he
has considered the author, as if he had intended to follow the example
of M. Abbadye, and had been writing a treatise on the Christian
religion: he has attacked him, as if his two books on religion were two
treatises on divinity; he has cavilled against him, as if while he had
been talking of any religion whatsoever which was not Christian, he
should have examined it according to the principles, and doctrines of
Christianity; he has judged him as if in his two books relating to
religion he ought to have preached to Mahometans and Idolators the
doctrines of Christianity. Whenever he has spoken of religion in
general, whenever he has made use of the word religion, the critic says,
'that is the Christian religion'; whenever he has compared the religious
rites of different nations and has said that they are more conformable
to the political government of these countries, than some other rites,
the critic again says, 'you approve them then and abandon the Christian
faith': when he has spoken of a people who have never embraced
Christianity, or who have lived before Christ, again says the critic,
'you don't then acknowledge the morals of Christianity'; when he has
canvassed any custom whatsoever, which he has found in a political
writer, the critic asks him, 'Is this a doctrine of Christianity?' He
might as well add, 'You say you are a civilian, and I will make you a
divine in spite of yourself: you have given us elsewhere some very
excellent things on the Christian religion, but this was only to conceal
your real sentiments, for I know your heart, and penetrate into your
thoughts. It is true I do not understand your book, nor it is material
that I should discover the good or bad design with which it has been
written; but I know the bottom of all your thoughts: I don't know a word
of what you have said, but I understand perfectly well, what you have
not said.'"
But to proceed. The author has maintained the polygamy is
necessarily and in its own nature bad; he has wrote a chapter expressly
against it, and afterwards has examined in a philosophical manner, in
what countries, in what climates, or in what circumstances it is least
pernicious; he has compared climates with climates, and countries with
countries, and has found, that there are countries, where its effects
are less pernicious than in others; because, according to the accounts
that have been given of them, the number of men and women not being
every where equal, it is evident, that if there are places where there
are more women than men, polygamy, bad as it is in itself, is there less
pernicious than in others. But as the title of this chapter
[3]
contains these words, That the law of polygamy is an affair of calculation, they
have seized this title as an excellent subject for declamation. Having
repeated the chapter itself, against which no objection is made, he
proceeds to justify the title and adds: "Polygamy is an affair of
calculation when we would know, if it is more or less pernicious in
certain climates, in certain countries, in certain circumstances than in
others; it is not an affair of calculation when we would decide whether
it be good or bad in itself. It is not an affair of calculation when we
reason on its nature; it may be an affair of calculation when we combine
its effects; in short, it is never an affair of calculation when we
enquire into the end of marriage, and it is even less so, when we
enquire into marriage as a law established and confirmed by Jesus
Christ."
Again, the author having said, that
[4]
polygamy is more conformable
to nature in some countries than in others, the critic has seized the
words more conformable to nature, to make his say, that he approves
polygamy. To which he answers, "If I say, that I should like better to
have a fever than the scurvy, does this signify that I should like to
have a fever? or only that the scurvy is more disagreeable to me than a
fever?"
Having finished his reply to what had been objected to on the
subject of polygamy, he vindicates that excellent part of his work which
treats of the climates; when speaking of the influence these have upon
religion, he says, "I am very sensible that religion is in its own
nature independent of all physical causes whatsoever, that the religion
which is good in one country is good in another, and that it cannot be
pernicious in one country without being so in all; but yet, I say, that
as it is practiced by men, and has a relation to those who do not
practice it, any religion whatsoever will find a greater facility in
being practiced, either in the whole or in part, in certain
circumstances than in others, and that whoever says the contrary must
renounce all pretensions to sense and understanding."
But the critic has been greatly offended by our author's saying,
[5]
that when a state is at liberty to receive or to reject a new religion,
it ought to be rejected; when it is received, it ought to be tolerated.
From hence he objects, that the author has advised idolatrous princes,
not to admit the Christian religion into their dominions. To this he
answers first by referring to a passage in which he says,
[6]
that the best civil and political laws are, next to Christianity, the greatest
blessings that men can give or receive; and adds, "If then Christianity
is the first and greatest blessing, and the political and civil laws the
second, there are no political or civil laws in any state that can or
ought to hinder the entrance of the Christian religion."
His second answer is, "That the religion of heaven is not
established by the same methods as the religions of the earth; read the
history of the church, and you will see the wonders performed by the
Christian religion: was she to enter a country, she knew how to open its
gates; every instrument was able to effect it; at one time God makes use
of a few fisherman, at another he sets an emperor on the throne, and
makes him bow down his head under the yolk of the gospel. Does
Christianity hide herself in subterranean caverns? stay a moment, and
you see an advocate speaking from the imperial throne on her behalf. She
traverses, whenever she pleases, seas, rivers, and mountains; no
obstacles here below can stop her progress: implant aversion in the
mind, she will conquer this aversion: establish customs, form habits,
publish edicts, enact laws, she will triumph over the climate, over the
laws which result from it, and over the legislators who have made them.
God acting according to decrees which are unknown to us, extends or
contracts the limits of his religion."
