The maxim of the great eastern
empires, of exempting such provinces as have very much suffered from
taxes, ought to be extended to monarchical states. There are some,
indeed, where this practice is established; yet the country is more
oppressed than if no such rule took place; because as the prince levies
still neither more nor less, the state becomes bound for the whole. In
order to ease a village that pays badly, they load another that pays
better; the former is not relieved, and the latter is ruined. The people
grow desperate, between the necessity of paying for fear of exactions,
and the danger of paying for fear of new burdens.
A well-regulated government ought to set aside, for the first
article of its expense, a determinate sum to answer contingent cases. It
is with the public as with individuals, who are ruined when they live up
exactly to their income.
With regard to an obligation for the whole amongst the inhabitants
of the same village, some pretend
[16]
that it is but reasonable, because
there is a possibility of a fraudulent combination on their side: but
was it ever heard that, upon mere supposition, we are to establish a
thing in itself unjust and ruinous to the state?
