University of Virginia Library

Search this document 
  
expand section 
  
expand section 
  

expand section1. 
expand section2. 
expand section3. 
expand section4. 
expand section5. 
expand section6. 
expand section7. 
expand section8. 
expand section9. 
expand section10. 
expand section11. 
expand section12. 
expand section13. 
expand section14. 
expand section15. 
expand section16. 
expand section17. 
expand section18. 
expand section19. 
expand section20. 
expand section21. 
expand section22. 
expand section23. 
expand section24. 
expand section25. 
collapse section26. 
 26.1. 
 26.2. 
expand section26.3. 
expand section26.4. 
expand section26.5. 
expand section26.6. 
expand section26.7. 
expand section26.8. 
expand section26.9. 
 26.10. 
 26.11. 
 26.12. 
expand section26.13. 
expand section26.14. 
expand section26.15. 
expand section26.16. 
expand section26.17. 
expand section26.18. 
collapse section26.19. 
  
  
 26.20. 
 26.21. 
expand section26.22. 
expand section26.23. 
expand section26.24. 
expand section26.25. 
expand section27. 
expand section28. 
expand section29. 
expand section30. 
expand section31. 

As virtue is necessary in a popular government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.

The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have, therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the very nature of the constitution.

An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed.

But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it is difficult to restrain themselves. [8] Such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.

Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic; or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one another, and upon this their preservation depends.

Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation, I mean, founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity.